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THE IMPACT OF *Russian Culture* ON *Soviet Communism*

BY

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The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism

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Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics

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—D. T.

I

Introduction

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INTRODUCTION

THE RISE of Bolshevism in Russia and its rapid expansion has provoked a world conflict which is perilously close to breaking into all-out warfare on a global scale. An understanding of the dynamics of total power, particularly its effect upon the thoughts and feelings of man, might enable us to appraise the menacing implications of this world struggle and to find effective ways to influence its outcome. In an attempt to contribute to such objectives, we shall discuss in the following pages some of the social agents which have affected the formation of power and the growth of personality in Russian society and which might be the sources of its political explosiveness.

It is proposed that some of the most crucial elements in this social drama are the political elites, their psychology, their cultural background and the social setting in which they act. In this interplay of personality, culture, social structure and ideology seems to lie the dynamic source of social change and of its trend. It appears that a system of interpersonal and institutional relationships (social structure) reinforced or undermined by traditional patterns of behavior (culture) and by external physical and social pressures affects the growth of personality and the composition and circulation of political elites. These in turn develop attitudes and formulate ideologies which tend to pro-

121 voke changes in the system of political relations (power structure) and hence in the social structure.

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Two contrasting cultures, that of the power-seeking and self-oriented nomadic horsemen of the Eurasian steppes, and that of the anarchic and group-oriented tillers of the land in the river basins of eastern Europe, provide valuable data for an understanding of the formation of political elites in Russian society, and particularly for identification of conflicting orientations which have been at the root of its social instability and political aggression throughout ages of its growth. There were other sources of conditioning circumstances which have provided significant elements to the content of Russia's culture and its social structure and which have affected the recruitment of political elites and the formation of ideologies. Such were, for instance, the Byzantine system of the administration and of the Church-State relations, the conditions of serfdom and the retarded growth of middle classes, and Western European technology and political and social philosophies. There were also "external" pressures which—in conjunction with Russia's geographic location—have influenced its social and political development. Such, for instance, were the quality of Russia's soil and climate, the moving of the trade routes from the Dnieper valley toward the West in the late middle ages, the sudden growth and disintegration of the Mongol empire, the formation and the expansion of Western European and of Pacific imperial systems. A number of these agents, however, have tended to perpetuate the initial basic structure and to intensify the clash of views of life which was introduced into Russian society through the imposition of the rule of the steppe nomads over the tillers of the land in the ancient past.

[157] One of the basic traits in the interpersonal and institutional relationships of the horse-breeders from the steppes consists of an apparent want of lasting emotional attachments, of social trust and of ties of moral unity. There is a lack of stability in loyalties and therefore a system of power which is self-oriented, that is, based on personal drives for aggrandizement. Only continuing conquests and lasting threats of common external enemies can assure the perpetuation of this predatory system

of rule. The defeat or death of the ruler, as much as lack of 121
constant external pressures, are likely to bring about a sudden 181
disintegration of a political structure based on such foundations.

Want of human attachments in the society of these steppe marauders might have been brought about by a strong feeling of insecurity which seems to be rooted in the physical as well as in the social environment of these people. Nomadic horse-breeding in the steppes and deserts, abusive dominance and humiliating submission in a despotic family organization, autocratic political system, sharply stratified social structure, and predatory warfare of enemy tribes present constant physical and
emotional threats which breed deep fears, anxieties, lack of trust [154]
and violent hostilities. These conditions are harmful to the growth of social intimacy and to the development of group identifications and solidarities; they are likely to favor formation of a self-centered personality and to foster an urge for extreme power-seeking and destructive action as a means of personal survival.

Contrasted to the society of these power-oriented and predatory warriors of the steppes, was the group-oriented and anarchic culture of the Old-Slavonic soil cultivators, spreading since remote times over the forest plains and along the river valleys between the upper Volga and the Carpathians. This society represented a stable system of self-contained and autonomous small agricultural communities with equalitarian social and family organization, diffused social power, lack of central political authority, lack of sharp economic or social stratification and
lack of coerciveness. Interpersonal and institutional relationships [156
in these communities promoted group intimacy and social cohesion; they discouraged self-seeking, destructive aggressiveness and warlike qualities. But as the nomadic warriors, in the course of their centuries-old invasions, were imposing their rule over this egalitarian and stateless social system, significant changes were taking place in the Old-Slavonic world; these have formed the basis for the formation and the growth of Russian society.

One of the most important innovations consisted of the formation of a ruling class of conquerors whose whole view of life was in complete contrast to the social and political philosophy of the

[IX Century]

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subjected agricultural population. In the ruling class of conquerors—who were marrying the native women—the steppe traditions of an unlimited paternal power, centered in a God-like, distant and strict father, tended to prevail. The principles of seniority, of priority of the male sex and of super-ordination and subordination among brothers and sisters favored sibling rivalry in this family system. At the same time, the mother, following her native traditions, tended to assert her marital equality, to maintain separate property rights, to teach her children the native speech and customs, and to protect them against the caprice and wrath of a domineering and warlike father.

[155] It is likely that children in such families of clashing marital and social philosophies might be exposed to alternating experiences of rejection and over-protection; they might develop an exaggerated self-concern and power-orientation, as well as feelings of inadequacy and dependence. Extremes in emotional reactions ranging from blind submission to destructive aggression and violent revolt tend to develop in such circumstances.

Such traits which contain a core of emotional instability and perpetual strife did not seem to be favorable for the growth and consolidation of State. Instead, a number of small principalities were formed, whose ruling strata were torn by internal rivalries and splits, and by never-ending parricidal and fratricidal feuds. Moreover, these petty princes and war chieftains, following steppe tradition, were interested in waging warfare more than in promoting agriculture or industry—which was contrary to the view of life and the social philosophy of the subjected population. There was, therefore, a lack of common culture, lack of common interests and want of social solidarity between the subjects and their warlike lords. Such a situation fomented social unrest; local riots and mass uprisings, which in turn promoted increasing rigidity of controls, centralization of power, never-ending internal splits and never-ending warfare.

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By the ninth century A.D., these turbulent warriors came into conflict with the Byzantine Empire which had a political interest in the same area. This contact with Byzantium was of far-reaching consequence, because it introduced the Eastern Church into the social and political structure of Russian society. This institution has provided moral and ideological foundations for the formation and the expansion of a globally oriented empire, while at the same time, it has also reinforced some of the elements in the structure of the Russian State which have been responsible for its explosiveness and instability. 175 795

In the Byzantine politico-religious system, the Church was not only a religious institution but also a political organization, and an arm of the political power. Byzantium therefore undertook to Christianize the Russian lands as a means of political penetration. Following Byzantine Church traditions and practices, the dominant native speech was adopted for Church services. Christianization therefore fostered also Slavization of these regions. Moreover, the Church of Byzantium carried with it the Byzantine concept of unity of Church and State, as well as that of a god-like monarchial power, with the mission to create a Universal Christian Empire. [797]

The Eastern Church also sanctioned unlimited paternal authority and promoted protection-dependency relationships both on politico-administrative and on family levels. This Church sponsored unconditional obedience, attitudes of reverence and gratitude, and feelings of humility and self-effacement, fear and awe in the relations of man to his God, his Prince and his Father. According to the precepts of this Church-State philosophy, the authorities were held responsible for the well-being as well as for the failures and sins of their dependents. Thus the Byzantine Church was preparing psychological and ideological grounds for a politico-religious integration of Russian lands in a system of military theocracy, which became characterized by its Messianic ideology of world redemption and by its dominance-submission and protection-dependency relationships. But such a political system was in sharp conflict with the anarchic view of life and the equalitarian philosophy of family and community relations held by large sections of the population in that area. [157] [642]

This basic internal clash of ideologies in Russian society was intensified in the course of the following centuries when the pressure of the steppe nomads and of the expanding Western empires favored increased militarization, economic regimentation and centralization of total power in the hands of an auto- 175 642

175 642 cratic Czar. By the time of Ivan the Terrible, the power of the independent landed aristocracy was suppressed, and the autocratic power rested now on a service nobility who were given lands in conditional possession depending upon their service and their loyalty to the Czar. These people therefore found themselves in a slave-like dependency upon the ruler who was likened to God, a situation that promoted political and social regimentation and fostered domineering-subservience relationships, thus intensifying the existing incompatibilities between the upper and lower strata of the Czardom.

[157] Domineering-subservience relationships are likely to breed humiliating experiences of self-abasement and feelings of wounded self-esteem which in turn might foster intense hostilities as well as compensatory ideas of grandeur. Thus in new circumstances, both self-seeking and power-orientation were reinforced in the upper strata, and manifested themselves in the oppressive rule of the nobility, in their extreme factionalism, and in their ruthless struggle for personal power and for the favors of the Czar.

[566] This trend of events, by the second part of the sixteenth century, led to establishment of serfdom and to direct interference of the service nobility and of the government in the communal and family relations of the peasantry. From this time on, the Church, the State and the landlords joined hands in strengthening the power of the Father and of the village elders and sponsoring in the peasant family and in the village community, dominance-submission relationships, absolute power and dependence, blind obedience and self-abnegation.

181 [579] The inevitable clash of this new power-oriented social philosophy with the old stateless and equalitarian values, was reflected in intense family and community tensions and in mass restlessness. Thus a weakening of power and of controls on any level—family, local, or national—opened the way to urges of destructive aggression and revolt against all the holders of power: the fathers, the village elders, the landlords, the Church and the Czar. Outbreaks of such extreme enmity were manifested in frequent communal riots, in mass vagrancy, in bloody revolutionary uprisings, and in widespread dissent from the official

Church. In these protest movements on the folk level, demand 181 for acceptance on equal terms in an all-human brotherhood of men was emphasized.

In the meantime,[1] with the increasing technological, economic, [177] and intellectual advance of the West, the Western pressures 565 against the Czardom were intensified. In order to meet this challenge and withstand the threat, the Czardom, by the time of Peter the Great, embarked on a series of reforms aimed at Westernization of the Empire, such as secularization of the State, bureaucratization, industrialization and mass education. As a result of such developments, a new elite of parvenu salaried bureaucracy, and of parvenu salaried military, distinguished by the rank and not by the possession of land, was gradually taking the place of the old service nobility as the main pillar of the Czardom. At the same time, the old nobility who were freed of their obligatory service to the State, became hereditary owners of their estates.

In this manner, the old service nobility evolved into a class of economically independent landed squires, even though losing their former political status and privileges, such as monopoly on land and on service. This new gentry however, were by tradition, upbringing, and personal traits, interested in ruling, in political and military careers, not in land cultivation or industry. Many of them, when without office, tended to lead a life of [517] leisure, and to emulate Western manners and styles, to cultivate arts and letters and to indulge in philosophical speculation and formulation of political theories. Few showed an inclination to identify themselves with the productive strata of the population and to devote time and energy to improve techniques of economic production and management.

Such an attitude of the nobility was an important agent in the retarded economic growth of Russia and in the lack of development of a numerically strong and influential middle class, which might have served as a cementing force in a culturally and ideologically split society. And it was from among this leisured class of rural gentry who had lost their status as the main pillar of the Czardom, but who had also emancipated themselves from their economic dependency upon the Czar, that the first

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[1] [i.e. from the second half of the XVI century -- Analyst]

565 leaders of an organized opposition to the Czarist autocracy were recruited.

By the nineteenth century, this landed gentry opposition to the Czarist regime took two main forms. One was pro-Western, seeking the reconstruction of the Czardom along humanistic, [517] libertarian and juridical lines, brought about by the ideas of Humanism and Renaissance, by the Reformation and by the French and American Revolutions. The other was anti-Western, reacting against Western rationalism and materialism, against Western "heathenism" and cosmopolitanism, and against the Western system of impersonal formalism and open class strife which was beginning to infiltrate Russia.

177 185 In an attempt to bridge the widening cultural and ideological chasm between the ruling classes and the common folk, the anti-Westerners exalted the anarchic community relations and equalitarian and humanist values of the Old-Slavonic world and of the Russian peasant commune. But they also emphasized the value of the Church-State unity, and sought a Messianic redemption of the whole world through the absorption of the State by the Orthodox Church and reestablishment of a paternalistic system of community relations ruled by collective conscience and based on Christian love and compassion.

178 177 565 517 In the meantime, that is, by the second part of the nineteenth century, with the growing impoverishment of the rural gentry and with increasing educational opportunities for all strata of the population, the ranks of the educated classes (*intelligentsia*) were being swollen by many declassed people as well as by increasing numbers of young people from the families of clergymen, of lower government employees, of petty tradesmen and other lower classes (*raznochintsy*). Even though Czardom at the time was still governmentalized to a high degree, it was not totally regimented. Moreover, by the second part of the nineteenth century, under the pressure of the West, and in order to match the military, the educational, the industrial and the social levels of the Western world, Czardom abolished serfdom and made other concessions in the direction of a libertarian and a juridical state. This trend of events reinforced the penetration of Western political and social philosophies which tended

[xix century]

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to undermine the existing Church, State and family system based on self-abnegation and on unconditional submission.

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As a result[1] a number of raznochintsy intelligentsia, freed of fear and awe before God, the Czar and the Father, but feeling thwarted in their political ambitions and socially rejected, expressed their dissatisfaction and their hostility toward the existing conditions of inequality and oppression by developing ideologies of denial and destruction. Their aim was to reject and to annihilate all the basic institutions and authorities on which Czardom rested: the family, religion, property, the power of the Father, the authority of the Church, as well as the rule of the Czar. These revolutionaries denied God and conscience as well as any existing ethics or rules of conventional conduct. They sought to destroy Czardom "root and branch" and to seize power for themselves by all and any means. Their professed objective was to establish on the earth an all-human stateless society of totally free men living in a system of equalitarian justice and fraternal love.

Thus, while seeking to reestablish the anarchic and group-oriented values of the early Slav folk and of the Russian peasant commune, these revolutionaries exhibited also Messianic power-centered urges and destructive drives common in the ruling classes of Czardom. Hence a number of these people became professional conspirators, advocating establishment of an underground organization with rigidly centralized total power commanding expendability of its members, and demanding their complete dedication to the cause of the revolution. They considered this system of organization to be the only effective way to fight the Czarist rule. In this "mortal struggle," these dedicated young men and women tolerated no opposition or differences of opinion, propagated extreme hatred and pitilessness in dealing with all adversaries, organized assassinations, mutinies, strikes and mass risings, thus preparing the ground for the ascendancy of Bolshevism.

The Bolsheviks were a group of professional conspirators. In common with Messianic and power-oriented aims of all raznochintsy, the Bolsheviks endeavored to seize absolute and total power exclusively for themselves, by any and all means, as a way

[1] [i.e. of undermining due to penetration of western influences -- Analyst]

517 668 to bring about an equalitarian and all-human brotherhood of men on a global scale. Seeking to realize these bi-polar objectives, the Bolsheviks have inherited and reinforced the basic contradictions and conflicts between the aspirations of the rulers and those of the subjects which have throughout centuries undermined the stability of Czardom.

668 661 In their effort to perpetuate themselves in power, the Bolsheviks had to remain organized as a ruling elite of professional conspirators and to reinforce dominance-submission relationships in a system of total power concentrated in their hands. To maintain such a political rule, the Bolsheviks had to introduce a system of total dependence of all upon the holders of power and thus to reinforce the attitudes of self-effacement. They also established a planned system of social differentiation and isolation to prevent social intimacy and group solidarity and hence the potentiality of organized opposition to their rule.

668 771 In such conditions, feelings of rejection and traditional longings for an equalitarian and all-human brotherhood of men have been greatly strengthened among the subjects. It is this situation that points out the fundamental weakness of the Soviet system. To counteract the effects of this basic vulnerability of their regime, the Bolsheviks have endeavored to deify the Soviet rulers, have resorted to the damnation and anathema of the Western world, and have embarked on a propaganda campaign for a Messianic redemption of all suffering and exploited humanity. In this manner, the Bolsheviks have been able to appeal to supra-ethnical and supra-personal loyalties and to all-human longings, not unlike a universal church.

[208] The Bolsheviks have also endeavored to build up the morale of their subjects by means of prestige projects, by mythical undertakings, by mass pageantry, mass unanimous voting and large scale militarization. All these devices are conceived as ways to provoke emotional identification of the masses with the Soviet State and to find in this identification a substitute for their yearnings for a community of free and equal men.

642 665 Total dominance and total submission relationships which have to be maintained to perpetuate this conspiratorial system of power have introduced other basic strains and stresses in the

Soviet social and political structure. The ruling Party which has to remain as an organization of militant conspirators in order to perpetuate itself in power, must also rely for the recruitment of its cadres to a large extent on calculating "careerists" and other self-seekers, who identify themselves not with their group and their society but with the holders of power. The main concern of these people is to rise in the Party and State hierarchy. In their jockeying and struggle for positions and favors, these power-oriented people introduce into the Party and into the government an atmosphere of subservience and ruthlessness, rivalry and intrigue, each seeking to rise on the cadavers of his associates. 642 665 [662]

Just as in the society of steppe warriors, such a ruling group of power-seekers who are not bound by deep moral bonds or ties of ideological loyalty can be kept together as long as the opportunities for self-aggrandizement exist, or as long as there is a common threat to their positions. Hence a cult of hatred of internal and external "enemies," political expansion, conspiracy on a world scale and planned international tension—short of all-out warfare—have become conditions of survival of Bolshevik power. 662 665 648

This situation forces the Bolsheviks to preoccupy themselves with the problems of security, of defense, and of extension of their political power; it prompts them to subordinate the economic production and the intellectual endeavors to these primary needs of their political survival. Such conditions, in turn, make it difficult to satisfy the demands of the masses for acceptance and for a better and more secure life—a situation that tends to deter the subjects from identifying themselves with the rulers and with the State. And it is this aggravating antithesis between the longings of the multitudes and the power-drive of a ruling clique that breeds social upheaval and intensifies urges for destructive aggression. 662 665 641

It is therefore imminent that we think in terms of planned external pressures which might be brought to bear upon the resolution of this gigantic internal struggle before it reaches the proportions of a global war. 000

II

The Structure of the Czardom

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POWER-SEEKING HORSEMEN OF THE STEPPES

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AMONG the horse-breeding nomads in the steppes of Central Asia relations of unrestricted autocracy and complete personal dependency prevail at all levels of social organization: in the family, in the local community and in the state system. Such a situation appears to affect the growth of personality in that society. In the family, for instance, the children occupy a very subordinate position in relation to a stern and distant father. They might be exposed to father's arbitrary and even humiliating treatment; yet they seldom seem to be compensated for it by a demonstration of affection on his part or on the part of the mother, who is treated by her husband in a like manner.[1]

Growing in such conditions, a child tends to develop a sense of deprivation and fear in relation to his detached and harsh father; he is also likely to become preoccupied with his own self and to feel indifferent toward his mother and toward his sisters.[2] At the same time the principle of seniority in matters of

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discipline and property according to the age of the child and the rank of the mother tends to promote antagonism, rivalry and distrust among the brothers.[3]

The effect of such family environment on personality development seems to be well reflected in the oral literature as well as in the native religious beliefs of Turco-Mongol steppe dwellers. The Tartar epic narratives, for instance, often indicate a thwarted desire for attachment. They show difficulties experienced by a child in establishing a stable emotional relation toward either of his parents or toward his brothers and sisters. In this oral poetry the loneliness of heroes is an outstanding feature. Many a hero may start his life as a "lonely and destitute orphan" who has no parents, nor brother or sister.[4] If he has brothers and sisters, they are likely to be treacherous, seeking to destroy him; also his brothers-in-law are perfidious. And the father appears to be unapproachable since the rejected child often begins his heroic career in "search for his father," but he is unable to find or rescue him.[5]

This sense of lack of support and this feeling of deprivation of love and affection which is experienced within the circle of a child's closest relatives is reinforced later by hostile physical and social conditions which the growing child encounters outside of his father's tent. His neighbors are often unfriendly and seek to harm him or to kill him. Enemy cattle raiders, vicissitudes of a rigorous climate, and cattle plagues may destroy all of his or his father's possessions. Everywhere he faces superior forces which he cannot control. From his early childhood he has been trained in the techniques of predatory warfare and nomadic horsebreeding, not in intensive agriculture. His traditions and upbringing, therefore, make him unable to improve his economic lot by learning and applying more advanced techniques of production. As a result he feels it to be his "greatest misfortune and humiliation" if he is forced to take up plowing. The plow to this proud predatory warrior is a symbol of "servitude and shame."[6]

Thus craving for security and love which is denied to him by his physical and social environment, the steppe nomad may find a substitute for these needs in his horse. When in such a frame

000 of mind he might show more consideration for his horse than for his wife, his children or even himself. He likes, for instance, to display a magnificence in the accoutrements of his horse's saddle, while he, "perhaps in a wretched dress of rags, makes a strange contrast with the carefully decorated steed."[7]

This emotional relationship between the Turco-Mongol herder and his horse is well reflected in his oral literature, in which he has assigned to the horse an exceptionally important and often mythical role. In the Tartar epic poetry, for instance, a hero gets his name only when he becomes old enough to own a horse. He is then named by the name of the horse which carries him. In these legends the horse is pictured as having more sense than the hero, and as being the only absolutely loyal and dependable being in a treacherous and insecure world.[8] The horse is therefore worth more than a man, and is valued as such not only in the narratives but in actual life as well. In the Great Yassa of Genghis-Khan, for instance, it is stated that the man in whose possession a stolen horse is found, if unable to pay a fine of nine horses, "his children must be taken instead of the horses, and if he have no children, he himself shall be slaughtered like a sheep."[9]

The native religion, no less than the oral literature, seems to reflect the want of physical protection and emotional support which prevails in the steppes of Central Asia. The deep-seated feeling of anxiety and fear, extreme self-concern, drives of hostile aggression and urge of destruction which develop in such an environment might have been projected into the creed which envisions man as the center of a volcanic struggle between two gigantic supernatural powers: those of light in the heavens, ruled by Kaira Kahn, and those of darkness in the underworld, ruled by Erlik Kahn. Erlik Kahn is likely to corrupt men, to misguide them and to pervert them to evil. His power seems to be on the ascendancy. Cattle diseases, poverty, illness, death, and all kinds of misfortune and distress come from this king of the darkness.

In such circumstances, man must be constantly preoccupied with appeasing the forces of evil, lest they ruin him. Tartar epic heroes, for instance, often make journeys to the underworld

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which is inhabited by bloodthirsty and hideous beings, many of them women. They specialize in torturing and maiming humans and indulge in feasting on human flesh. Only through cunning or help of his horse can the hero get back to the earth safely, but many slayings are necessary before that is accomplished. The Tartar man is therefore terrified by the ruler of the underworld. At the same time he knows that he depends entirely upon him. Therefore he must be submissive to him, honor him, appease him by sacrificial viands, and call him "Father":

> Men's skulls are thy beakers
> O Erlik,
> Erlik, my father,
> Why persecutest thou the people thus?
> Say, why dost thou destroy them?
> O, Erlik, Erlik, my father,
> From generation to generation
> In the long course of time
> We honour thee day and night,
> From generation to generation
> Thou art an honoured lord.[10]

The extent of feeling of complete personal dependency upon arbitrary powers, and resulting sense of hopelessness and fatalism are indicated also in the belief that there is an utter lack of understanding and of willingness to help on the part of the forces of life and light that dwell in heaven. These are engaged in constant bickering among themselves in their struggle for precedence. They are also tyrannical, conceited, deceitful, haughty and contemptuous, and are inclined to ignore the mortals who visit them. These gods of light themselves are not uncorruptible, nor just. If bribed with sacrificial viands, they wink at transgressions. They are envious of man's wealth and constantly expect gifts from him. Thus exposed to the whims of such vicious and arbitrary supernatural powers of light as well as of darkness which he cannot control, what can a man do but be on good terms with both of them through the medium of the shamans.[11] But these, realizing the overwhelming strength of the forces of destruction, are preoccupied with the sources of death and deal rather with the underworld than with the heaven. They spe-

OOD cialize in calling upon the powers of darkness both to help and to destroy men.[12]

His whole upbringing, surroundings, life experiences and innate drives tend to convince the Turco-Mongol nomad that the forces of destruction and death are definitely on the upgrade and will finally prevail over those of life. The Tartar desert dweller, for instance, in his lonesomeness and want of emotional and social security, is inclined to picture himself deserted both by god of heaven and by man. Thus, since even religion cannot offer him consolation, support and hope, he tends to envision the specter of an apocalyptic and total destruction of the whole of mankind, and of the earth itself in fire and blood:

> Then the black earth bursts into flame,
> Hosts of the people perish,
> The rivers arise from springs of blood,
> The mountains turn to dust.
> The rocks fall crushing down,
> The rainbow rocks trembling,
> The waves of the sea are heaped up
> So that the bottom of the sea is visible.
>
> Now on the bottom of the sea
> Nine great black stones are shattered,
> And from each of these stones
> Arises an iron hero.
> The mighty iron heroes
> Ride on nine iron horses.
> On the forefeet of the horses
> Shine brightly nine iron swords,
> And on their hind feet
> Gleam nine iron lances.
>
> When they come in contact with a leaf on a tree,
> All the trees fall prostrate.
> When they come in contact with living beings,
> They sink down destroyed.
> Kaira Khan, the god, the father,
> He, the creator of the world,
> Then closes his ears,
> Does not give ear to the crying of the people

Shaljima then calls in vain,
Mai-Tara persists in silence.

Then two heroes of Erlik,
The hero Karan and the hero Kere
Come up out of the earth.
On Mai-Tara and Mandy-Shire
These heroes rage and fight.
From the blood of Mai-Tara
The earth now takes fire.[13]

Conditions of extreme insecurity and want of attachment on the family and community level do not favor group identification and solidarity and hinder the development of personal trust and of sense of social responsibility. Instead, self-orientation and self-aggrandizement at the expense of others become the main concern of one. As a result the narratives of these people, projecting the interpersonal relations which exist in their society, picture the hero as being primarily and exclusively concerned with his own person. He is a law to himself. He is gluttonous, slothful, callous of wife and home, negligent of parents and dependents; he spills innocent blood and is revengeful and cruel. But all these traits of the hero's character are condoned and even approved in these epic legends, provided that he is successful in battle, and that he can carry off much booty. It little matters by what means his success is gained, whether by incredible strength or skill, or by cunning.[14]

If, like his hero, the steppe warrior does not feel bound by moral laws and obligations, he becomes most ruthless in treating his enemies.[15] In his self-centeredness he considers that might is right and that compromise is weakness. He is therefore unable to act in free accord and is unwilling to make adjustments. But such a man is likely also to lack support from others. He can rely on nobody but himself. Thus he becomes very suspicious and is forced to look at any other person as his potential enemy who may eventually destroy him. Even food offered by others may be poisonous. Genghis Khan, for instance, forbade his people "to eat food offered by others, until the one who offers the food shall eat of it."[16]

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Hence, surrounded by an inimical environment, exposed to a want of love and attachment and lacking in social support, the steppe warrior tends to grow morose and vindictive. He becomes addicted to voracity, lechery, and drunkenness. At the same time, however, he shows a remarkable degree of resistance to physical frustration. He is able to withstand great hardships and can show a great degree of apathy and indifference to the heaviest blows of fate. He can go for days without water and for weeks without any food. He becomes almost insensible to wounds and might even stoically accept his death.[17]

The whole outlook and every action of such a nomad is geared toward personal gain, rather than social recognition or sense of honor.[18] And since it is the powerful and the rich who control the values which he covets, he is willing to cringe before them, to abase himself and to betray even his own kin in order to win their favor. But when in power or free of superior control or threat, he is proud and brave and is even likely to show generosity and be goodhearted and honorable.[19]

II

It might be that this lack of human attachments, social loyalties and moral bonds fosters the want of stability which prevails on all levels of this society of predatory nomads. In the inner clan and tribal relations of these people, for instance, "The young and strong plunder the old and weak, as soon as they feel themselves in a strong enough position to do so, and quite irrespective of any previous relationship which may have existed between them."[20] The power and influence of local leaders depends upon their fighting strength, ability in raiding and success in battle.[21] In disputes over clan or tribal leadership local leaders remain cautiously neutral until it becomes clear which of the claimants is likely to emerge victorious.[22] Chieftanship of the clan is often gained by a violent usurpation. Election of a chief is almost unknown to these nomads. Chieftainship has to be constantly validated by display of superior power or by bribing, and is therefore seldom stabilized or generally accepted.

Clans, tribes, and larger entities, such as hordes, form integrated units as long as they have common interests to defend.

They can be best united in opposition to others. But the camps which consist of six to ten blood related tents have a more stable organization. The leader of the camp is the eldest member of that family which possesses the most animals. The clan is a union of several camps related by common interests. But the interests of the camps within the same clan are frequently in conflict. The same is true for larger unions. The smaller units within these unions struggle for winter settlements and summer pastures. The conflicts are especially sharp when ice appears and when penetration into the neighbors' territory to save herds becomes imperative. Moreover, in this society the wealthy and the illustrious always know how to take advantage of the poor, the lesser, and the weak.[23] 000

In such conditions larger and more permanent political unions, the states and empires, have grown either as a result of alliances which were formed to fight a superior common foe, or as a result of lasting superiority in wealth and arms of one tribe over the others. In the first case the political unity could last as long as the common threat had kept the tribes together. In the latter case the state could maintain itself mainly by means of a well organized system of informers and by using extreme ruthlessness in dealing with any signs of opposition.

Such political relations explain why torturing, maiming and capital punishment had to be inflicted on a great scale and for trifling offenses in Mongol empires.[24] Also periodical wholesale extermination of recalcitrant populations or resettlement of large areas became an imperative principle in dealing with organized or widespread resistance and uprisings. Fostering and perpetuating internal dissension was another way to maintain power. For instance, Ablai Khan, one of the rulers of the Kazaks, is said to have advised his sons never to solve completely the intertribal affairs "for only disagreement and discord can be the unshakable support of the Khanite rule."

All these circumstances have favored the unlimited power of the ruler at the expense of human values or interests of the subjects when these conflict with the ruler's designs.[25] He then comes to consider himself as the true owner of his subjects and acquires the power to dispose of their bodies and of their properties at will,[26] analogous to the power of the father in the family. No subject dares to settle in any place to which he has not been assigned. Whatever is ordered by the sovereign is promptly carried out.[27] Law is conceived not as an instrument of justice but as a personal weapon applied in the interest of those who hold power. Said Kuyak-Khan: "The duty of a Mongol is to carry out my will, to come when I shall call him, to go where I shall order, to put to death whomsoever I shall name."[28] Extreme superordination and complete subordination, and a system of favors, privileges and sharp stratification and regimentation is the result.

But states, like tribes which lack internal cohesion based on moral and emotional bonds and depend instead for their existence upon external threat, repressive measures, intertribal discord, and personal favors of the ruler, can hardly be stable and lasting. Thus, in the political systems built by Mongol warriors it often happened that as soon as a ruler or a local chief showed signs of weakness or was defeated in war, his power crumbled. He was immediately deserted by his former followers and allies. These would, without any delay, shift their loyalty to the ascending central or local authority.

It was, therefore, in the course of successful expansions abundant with unlimited opportunities for plunder, or when exposed to lasting threat on the part of common enemies, that the Mongol system of power had a better chance to survive for a longer period. Otherwise, in times of prolonged peace, each imperial structure built by these nomadic horsemen tended, as a rule, to become internally decomposed as a result of mutual rivalries, animosities, feuds and struggle for power and self-assertion among the ruling cliques or between these cliques and the ascending claimants for leadership.[29]

In seeking self-aggrandizement and gain the steppe warrior of Central Asia is inclined to seize any opportunity for booty, plunder and rapine. Hence, driven by thirst for loot, quest for power, and lust, these people have from times remote invaded the steppes and plains of western Asia and eastern Europe. Meeting no natural geographic barriers nor significant resistance on the part of the native soil cultivators, they laid waste to these lands and boasted to be the "scourge of God."[30]

With an energetic Khan at the head of such raiders, who knew how to organize them along military lines, a horde of looters was often able to transform itself into a highly disciplined army.[31] Being in the midst of a hostile population, the conquerors held fast together. Thus, despotically governed principalities and states were formed and ruled by small bands of horsemen who knew how to use their military advantage over the subjugated and disarmed peoples. It was in this manner that these nomadic warriors had in the early centuries of this era imposed their rule on the Old-Slavonic agricultural population between the Volga and Dnieper rivers.[32] 000

3

POWER-INDIFFERENCE OF THE OLD-SLAVONIC PLOWMEN

I

ACCORDING to both linguistic and historical evidence, it appears that the early home of the Old-Slavonic peasant folk was centered in the middle Dnieper and its western tributaries, a region known as Polesie. Before drainage, this area consisted of deep swamps (Pripet marshes) throughout which were scattered many islets of land. The scantiness of cultivable soil forced the inhabitants to subsist by means of very intensive tillage. Hand hoes and hook-plows, to which men yoked themselves, were the principal modes of cultivation. For clothing and oil, flax and hemp were planted. 174

The people were, on the whole, vegetarians. Some hogs were raised but few sheep or cattle. There was, however, abundant fishing and some hunting. Bee-keeping was prevalent and an intoxicating drink was fermented from honey. Communication between the islets in this marshy land proved difficult during all seasons; therefore, the population, in order to survive, had

174 to maintain a system of economic self-sufficiency which was restricted to small villages or groups of such villages.[1]

175 In early documents these Old-Slavonic plowmen are described
181 as peaceful, moderate, mild, and humane, patient and sober, disinterested in power, hard working, living in social and political democracy. They are pictured as being opposed to subjection, but unable to offer much resistance to a foreign aggressor since they were not skilled in warfare. Procopius (6th century), for instance, said that "these people are not ruled by one man, but they have lived from of old under a democracy, and consequently everything which involves their welfare, whether for good or for ill, is referred to the people."[2] And Emperor Leo (9th century) stated the following:

> . . . jealous of their liberty they have always refused to submit themselves to the Empire. . . . even those who have accepted Christianity keep as much as they can the forms of their ancient freedom. . . . This is a numerous nation, patient in difficult times, and very industrious. Heat, cold, hunger, and want of all things do not beat down these people. . . . They used to be very hospitable and still maintain with great care this virtue. They are affable people and receive travellers with much kindness, show them the way, and protect them against insult. If a traveller would not be well treated by his host because of host's fault all the people would attack the host. They behave with much gentleness also toward their slaves; they do not condemn them to perpetual slavery, but fix a time of service . . . after which time . . . they free them. The women are well-behaved, and attached to their husbands. . . . These people are very frugal . . . they prefer to live with much freedom. . . . They like to take refuge in the woods or in inaccessible places.[3]

175 The people of Polesie seem to have been politically organized
621 in a system of smaller groupings of self-governing villages or
even in single autonomous villages connected among themselves,
not in the form of a central authority or state, but rather as a
[565] loose confederation of independent units. Apparently, there
were no marked social distinctions or differences in class and
rank in this society. There was no aristocracy, no separate class
of priests or warriors, no cities, no temples. There was, therefore,
no class or clique which sought power and expansion over others,

[XI century]

and hence, no group support could be found if a leader had 175
attempted to form a centralized political authority or an imperial 631
system over the whole area. The old Russian Chronicle of Kiev (12th century) describing a tribe with such a culture (the Polians) states that among them each kindred group (*rod*) lived in its own separate locality and had its own government.[4]

In a like manner, principles of dignity and moderation, as well 175
as personal autonomy and lack of coerciveness, prevailed in fam- 593
ily relations of these people. The Chronicle, for instance, states:

> The Polians had customs of their fathers, customs mild and peaceful
> (*krotok i tikh*); they showed a kind of reserve (*stydenie*) towards their [606]
> daughters-in-law (*snokha*) and their sisters, towards their mothers and their parents, towards their fathers-in-law and their brothers-in-law; to all of the persons named they showed great reserve. They had
> marriage cusoms: the bridegroom did not go to seek his bride; she [585]
> was taken to him in the evening, and the following morning they brought what belonged to her (*chto vdaduche*).[5]

It appears that the family organization of the Polians rested on mutual respect of all family members; that the bride brought
the dowry which remained her personal property; that she might [584]
have had the initiative in wooing. This contention is supported by other evidence. Cosmas Pragensis, for instance, speaking of the old Bohemian Slavs, states: "It is not the men who choose the maids, but the maids themselves who take the husbands they like, and when they like."[6] A French writer who visited Ukraine in the seventeenth century wrote: "In Ukraine, contrary to the customs of all other nations, the husbands do not choose their wives, but are themselves chosen by their future consorts."[7]

There is also other evidence concerning some matriarchal 562
traits of the early Slavs.[8] Throughout ages, women of the plains 611
betwen the Dnieper and the Volga maintained property rights 583
over their dowries and also over income from vegetables, poultry, dairy products and yarn that they produced and sold, though such rights were not recognized to men.[9] Although a woman in Russia did not have any claim to the property of her father or her brother, and only a limited right to that of her husband, she had the privilege, denied to a man, of saving and building up a

562 *korobka* (chest) of her own. When a girl married, she took her
611 korobka, together with the property given her by her father or
[583] brothers, to her new home as a dowry and was allowed to dispose
freely of it. At the same time her husband was not responsible
for her debts.[10] When a married woman died, if childless, her
[428] korobka, as a rule, returned to her mother (matrilineal succes-
sion) and only if her mother was not alive, to her father. In
some provinces the husband would inherit his wife's property if
he lived with her four years or more.[11] If she had children, her
property was inherited by both sons and daughters equally.[12]

Matriarchal traits are evident in contemporary folk philoso-
phy and many folk customs in the Bielorussian villages as well
as in some parts of the Ukraine. In the oral poetry of these
[772] people, for instance, the sun is represented as a female who is
wooing the moon, her bridegroom. In some songs of these peas-
ant folk the maidens contend with the male youths in duels and
defeat them.[13] Even today in some of these regions it is often the
girls who take the initiative in finding their suitors. During har-
vest festivals, it is the maidens who play the leading part. Traces
[583] of the capture of the bridegroom still persist in the folk customs
of the Ukraine. In Ukrainian and Bielorussian folk poetry
[593] women, especially the mother, play a very significant role,
while the place of the father is less outstanding. In popular
opinion in this area, the consent of the mother in the mar-
riage of a daughter is considered more important than that
of the father.

582 Marriage among the Old-Slavonic peasant folk was endoga-
mous within the village community and perhaps even within
the joint household community (*verv, zadruga*)—not unlike in
the Croatian zadruga of our days.[14] There was also, apparently,
593 a particularly developed brother-sister attachment as is mani-
fested by brother-sister incest which seems to have taken place
occasionally in some Russian regions until recently.[15] There
were, therefore, abundant opportunities for emotional attach-
ments in the Old-Slavonic family, since there were no external
political, economic, or social pressures that might have disturbed
internal equalitarian family relationships. Such relationships
have persisted until present times in certain parts of Ukraine:

Ukrainians RD4

Ukrainian family is the basis of the Ukrainian democracy. The wife has a position equal to that of her husband. We do not have the oppression of the father over the will of the children. The daughter selects her companion according to her own heart regardless of the taste of her mother, or interests of her father. Hence the Ukrainian family, based on free choice and love, exists a long time and it is seldom troubled by the difficulties of internal dissension.[16] U. 593

It might be expected, therefore, that the child in such a well-balanced family would feel emotionally secure and would tend to identify itself with the group. Growth of feeling of personal dignity, group orientation and solidarity, as well as respect for the rights of others, are fostered in such an environment. In such a family community whose whole structure is built upon the principle of diffusion of social power and in which there is a considerable degree of economic self-sufficiency, of individual independence, of opportunity for self-assertion and for emotional satisfaction, deep tensions tend to be rather rare; instead, self-control and a sense of individual and social responsibility tend to prevail. A great deal of evidence concerning the character of the farming folk of Polesie indicates that these people displayed a highly socialized and stable behavior, showed a high degree of tolerance of frustration—both physical and emotional, and were devoid of those deep emotional tensions and strong animosities that trouble the horse-breeders and marauders in the Eurasian steppes. U. [156] U. [152] U. 181

Thus in contrast to the self-centered and gloomy view of life of the nomadic herdsmen and warriors from the steppes of central Asia, the soil cultivators of the Dnieper river basin showed strong gregarious inclinations, an optimistic world outlook and a great sense of joy in life.[17] Even today the people in that area have countless festivals, dances, rituals and songs in which the worship of nature and love of life is emphasized.[18] The folk sayings of these people, for instance, stress the need for moderation, emotional balance, and harmonious social relationships—deploring hostility, greediness and aggressiveness. "Do not kill even a mosquito; he is good," they say.[19] They also say: "And the people judge, and will not overjudge; and the sun dries, but does not over-dry, and the rain soaks, but does not oversoak."[20] Also the

Ukrainians RD4

U. 181 need for personal responsibility is stressed in these sayings: "No one is to blame. He is to blame himself"; "For a good man all goes well."[21] And when they quarrel they are not expected to become vindictive, but to forget and say "Words are like wind."[22]

U. 273 [152] These people are very fond of intoxicating drink which in their society seems to be a way to increase sociability and channel aggressiveness rather than a means of escape. They drink in groups, not alone, and then they sing and dance and appeal to Lada, who was the Goddess of Love in their heathen past. They tend to turn even sad and mournful events into occasions for merry-making and are inclined to minimize fear of death.[23]

G.R. 771 776

II

Interpersonal relations and philosophy of life of the early Slav plowmen seem to have been projected into their supernatural world. According to the early beliefs of these people, the universe was governed by a great many deities, fairies and spirits. Most of these supernatural beings were pictured as benevolent, some mildly malevolent. They lived in families and had children. They could be found everywhere; in the house as well as in the lakes and rivers; they could be seen swinging from every plant and tree; or heard singing and handclapping in every barn and on every threshing floor. Until very recently, the Bielorussian peasant could see the sun dancing if he got up early in the morning on a certain day of the year.

The whole cosmic view of the early Slav agriculturist seems to have consisted of pantheism and animism. All nature was possessed of spirits that behaved like human beings. Human beings themselves were identified with nature, with animals and plants. [551] This identification of man and nature found its expression, for instance, in personal names which were those of seasons and natural spectacles, of trees, flowers and fruits, birds and other animals. These semi-matriarchal plowmen also apparently practiced a special cult of Mother Earth and of Rozhanitsy—the female beings who presided over the birth and destiny of man. Sacrificial meals were offered to these fairy-like spirits, consisting of meatless dishes.[24] The sermons of the first Christian missionaries

were directed not only against this cult, but also against that of 771
the Fire and of the Sun.[25] There was no cult of war-gods in the 776
mythology of the Old Slavs nor was there any epic poetry in their [538]
folklore.

Unlike the patriarchal, rigidly stratified and dualistic religious system of steppe nomads which was full of tensions and struggles, the supernatural world of the Slavs of Polesie was anarchic, equalitarian and peaceful. Apparently projecting their own social organization into the supernatural world, the Old-Slavonic plowmen conceived it as being composed of both sexes but without a hierarchy of power among themselves. The deities that inhabited that world were neither arbitrary nor corrupted, nor
did they fight among themselves for the control over man. Festi- [796]
vals in their honor were celebrated with the accent on drink, song, dance and lovemaking.

Accordingly the Slavs of Polesie did not have to appease their [782]
deities nor try to be on good terms with both the bad and the
good ones. They believed that after death bad and wicked people [754]
would roam the earth in the form of werewolves and vampires;
but, they also possessed simple means of protection against these evil ghosts, such as pieces of torn clothes, which were accessible to everyone.[26] There were always persons of both sexes who maintained contact and control over the spirits of evil and were willing to help anyone in distress. Hence the Old Slavs trusted their wizards, the *veshchy*.[27]

According to the religious and social philosophy of the Slavs of the Dnieper, there are some general all-embracing rules of behavior to which all people, all the universe as well as all the deities, are subjected. In such a religious and philosophical system, the deities could not be capricious. They could be relied upon to behave according to commonly accepted rules of conduct and should not therefore be distrusted and feared. It is this optimistic view of destiny and of the universe, in which order and anarchic equity, not sword or might nor caprice prevail, that
perhaps had found expression in the Old-Slavonic concept of [671]
law which was identified with truth and justice (*pravda*). The same view of life had perhaps found expression also in the Old-Slavonic concept of judgment which was identified with destiny

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776 (*sud*). Accordingly, in the mind of these people, the universe and
peace (*mir*) were also identical.[28]

[731] Great calamities occasionally befell the Old-Slavonic communities—
754 frequent raids and plundering by the invaders and slave
hunters; then cattle plagues and epidemics. These were thought
to have been brought on by certain demons and malevolent
ghosts, but the Polesie people knew of ways to cope even with
[791] such disasters. Contagious diseases were prevented or stopped by
[562] means of magic, especially by the magical powers of women. As
for their enemies, the soil cultivators of the Dnieper basin were
721 not prepared for any offensive or defensive warfare and were an
725 easy prey for many aggressors. Being not armed, their defense
consisted of hiding themselves. They sought safety in impenetrable
marshes and forests and even resorted to such ruses as lying
submerged on the bottoms of marshes and breathing by means
of cane sticks until the danger was over.[29]

167 Since the Old-Slavonic agriculturists contracted their marriage
[582] unions early in life, as a means of labor supply and since they
were not exposed to exhaustion of constant warfare, the region
which they originally inhabited soon reached its limits of population.
[241] Thus, in spite of their autarchic and intensive agricultural
techniques and their attachment to the soil, the early Slav
folk were forced to leave their original habitat in search of new
lands. They did not migrate in a fury and did not traverse great
distances like the mounted nomads of the steppes; rather, they
moved slowly and quietly for short distances and by stages always
keeping in touch with the mother community from which they
had sprung.

167 In this manner the Old-Slavonic tillers penetrated new regions
241 and territories, not by force and conquest like the predatory
steppe raiders, but by cultivating new soil along the river basins,
in the midst of forest clearings, drained marshes or irrigated
[621] steppes. Living in village communities which remained ethnically
uninterrupted, they transplanted and perpetuated in their
new homes their native agricultural techniques, their beliefs and
customs, their family and community organization, as well as
their philosophy of life. Thus as late as the twentieth century,
the social organization and personality traits of the Zadruga peo-

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ple, in the plains between the Drava and Sava rivers, showed 241
cultural and personality traits similar to those of the Old-Slavonic plowmen.[30]

In their migration, these early Slav soil cultivators were often 177
able to Slavicize the natives among whom they had settled and 167
even to absorb the numerically small bands of steppe raiders who 182
had conquered them. These assimilated invaders were then often employed to fight against new nomadic incursions.[31] It was in the course of such acculturations, due to migrations and conquests, that in the regions between the Volga and the Dnieper a peculiar fusion of contrasting cultural patterns of the steppe horsemen and of the tillers of the soil had developed. Structural relations, personality traits and the religious, social and political ideologies that resulted out of this blend of the two conflicting worlds formed the basis of Russian society and have been at the root of its political instability throughout centuries.[32]

4

TURCO-MONGOL INVASIONS AND FORMATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY

I

THE MOUNTED warriors of the steppes were accus- 727
tomed to covering great distances on their raids and migrations. 631
After they had devastated and annihilated much that was in their way, they would impose their rule with ease over whatever was left. Then they would proceed to organize nomadic federations, principalities and empires.[1] The political systems which thus arose in the area between the Ural mountains and the Carpathians apparently followed the pattern that had been originally established by the Scythians and Huns in the same territory.[2]

Being extremely self-centered and insecure, a strong driving 000

000 force behind the war expeditions of these predatory warriors might have been their need for self-assertion and dominance, as well as an urge for destruction. They were therefore likely to indulge in sadistic cruelty and in mass plunder, in lechery and debauchery.

727 583 It is important to notice, however, that in these conquests[a] the mounted nomads would often invade and settle distant areas without their womenfolk. Therefore, when these womenless, predatory, patriarchal and polygynous horsemen invaded the plains and river valleys between the Ural mountains and the Carpathians, where the Old-Slavonic soil cultivators, Fino-Ugric hunters and other folks were settled, the newcomers not only imposed themselves as political rulers, but it became necessary for them to abduct native women *en masse*, to buy them, or to demand them as a tribute, and make them their wives, concubines, and slaves. Not only the historical records but the Great-Russian marriage customs, folk poetry and other oral literature testify to this trend of events. Marriage by capture, bride price and the use of women as slave laborers figure prominently in all these documents.

182 At first a great cultural diversity in the society at large resulted out of such a situation. Many early observers of the peoples of this area noticed this phenomenon. Often the customs of the peoples that went under the same name were very dissimilar. The same names covered a conglomeration of tillers of the soil, pastoral nomads, nomadic hunters, and warlike tribes. Some of these people were matriarchal, others patriarchal. Some of them lived in wagons and tents, others built houses. Some cremated their dead, others practiced inhumation. Some were cannibalistic, others vegetarians.[3]

[127] It is for this reason that early observers when speaking of "Slavs" sometimes give contradictory data.[4] Such accounts are likely to confuse a student of early Slav society unless he keeps in mind the ethnical mixture and blending of cultures that was taking place in that area in the course of many centuries. Tacitus, for instance, noticed that "The Veneti [Slavs] have borrowed largely from Sarmatian character; in their plundering expeditions they roam over the whole extent of forests and mountains. . . ."[5]

[a] [i.e. of the Turko-Mongols — Analyst]

In a similar manner the old Kiev Chronicle points out the [182]
cultural differences between a number of Slavic-speaking tribes, 101
such as the Polians—the "field-people," and the Drevlians 105
(Drevlyane)—the "inhabitants of the forests," in the middle Dnieper basin. While the former are described as peaceful and mild, organized along egalitarian lines, the latter are represented as ferocious and wild, organized along monarchial, predatory, warlike, and polygynic principles. The Drevlians, says the Chronicle, ". . . lived like beasts; friends killed one another (*ubivahu drug druga*) . . . no marriage took place amongst them, but they captured young girls on the banks of the rivers."[6] And as for some other tribes, such as the Radimichi, the Vyatichi, and the Sever, the Chronicle says that ". . . shameful things occurred amongst them between fathers and daughters-in-law . . . there was no marriage . . . but the villagers would get together for dancing and satanic games, and there they captured their wives . . . they had generally two or three wives . . . they burned their dead."[7]

It is to be expected that under such circumstances cultural 593
dualism and internal conflict and tension occurred within many
individual families in this area. A Slavonic woman as wife or [177]
concubine of a Turco-Mongol horse-breeder and warrior might know nothing about his nomadic and predatory way of life, about horses and mares, about weapons, wagons and tents. She might therefore introduce into her new family agricultural techniques and a more settled way of life.

Being raised in an equalitarian society with some matriarchal traits, and with emphasis on self-respect and personal autonomy, a Slavonic woman would not be inclined to be completely submissive to her Turco-Mongol husband. Following child rearing customs of her own society the Slavonic woman would tend to remain close to her children, would teach them Slavonic speech, and might even be in a position to give them protection from the arbitrariness and impulsiveness of their warlike father. Such a situation reinforced and even magnified the traditional distance between the Turco-Mongol father and the members of his family.

At the same time the invader would insist on a subordinate

593 role of the women and children in his family and on complete subjection of all people under his control. To accept anything else would have been contrary to his view of life, to everything he stood for. It would have conflicted with his temper and his character to have acted differently. It might have meant not only loss of face but loss of power as well.

The invader was therefore likely to maintain his social distance, to resort to physical force and violence, to the *knut,*[8] to impose his dominance on and to expect unconditional obedience from all the members of his household as well as from all others who were settled and worked on the land which he had conquered and which he controlled. He was backed in such attitudes and practices by the traditional philosophy of the steppe warriors which tells them that might is right and that only unchallenged power imposed by means of fear and awe brings personal satisfaction and security.

Such conflicting marital and social philosophies, however, provoked intense social conflicts, witnessed, for instance, by the history of Slav-Avar relations. The oppressed Slavonic concubines and wives, together with their children, tended to revolt against their tyrannical and inscrutable Avar husbands and fathers:

> The Chunen [Avars] came every year to the Slavs to spend the winter among them, and abuse the wives and daughters of the Slavs. . . . But the sons of the Chunen men and the wives and maidens of the Wenden [Slavs] did not tolerate this oppression; they refused to obey the Chunen and started an uprising.[9]

562
538 Such resolute and fighting women have been perhaps personined in Russian epic narratives by Polenitsi (steppe women), the female warriors. The physical strength of these Russian Amazons is represented as being greater than that of the Bogatyri, the legendary heroes. Polenitsi are pictured as daring, bold women, who fight, torture, maim and kill the Bogatyri. But they also invite these heroes to sleep with them and resort to various tricks or to sheer force to coerce the Bogatyri to take them in marriage.

II

The Slavonic soil cultivators, depending upon economic self- 423
sufficiency and cooperative effort in marshy and forest regions, as 621
well as in the steppes, practiced a system of joint-family owner- 428
ship of land (zadruga system). But when nomadic warriors im-
posed their rule over the tillers of the soil, the invaders con-
sidered the land over which they ruled to be their property and
forced the peasants who were settled on it to pay them tribute in [651]
grain and other agricultural produce. According to the ex-
panded version of the *Pravda Ruskaya,* for instance, after the
death of a *smerd* (peasant) his sons would inherit the land, but
if there were no sons the property went to the prince.

It is possible that already at that time some of the Asiatic con-
querors occasionally divided and redistributed the land among
the peasants according to the changing size of their families, the
ability to till it and pay taxes and tithes. This might have been
the most expedient way by which the conquerors sought to in-
crease the income from the lands which they controlled. At the [672]
same time the peasants that formed a land commune were held
jointly responsible by their over-lords for a predetermined
amount of tributes, as well as for criminal acts committed on
their territory.

The system of joint community responsibility was a well- 621
known practice in the society of steppe nomads. It was especially 672
applied as a means to procure fines and force the payment of
debts. In that social system if a wrong-doer was unable to pay a
fine, his nearest relatives, and failing them, the whole camp, had
to provide it.[10] Therefore when these predatory herdsmen im-
posed their rule over the farming folk, they might have intro-
duced the principle of joint responsibility as the most expedient
way to collect the tributes and to exploit economically the sub-
jected peoples.

It was by such social processes that the non-warlike and state- 701
less society of the Old-Slavonic agricultural folk was incorpo- 181
rated into a military society of power-oriented horsemen of the
Eurasian steppes.

701 Eurasian steppes. As it had been a long-established practice 631 among these predatory marauders, the war leader who showed himself competent in organizing a successful war expedition or in controlling a certain area would soon collect a considerable retinue of warriors. When Slavicized, the chieftain of such a band of raiders was known as *voyvoda* (warleader) or *knyaz* (prince). His retinue became known as the *druzhina* (band). The most outstanding members among these *druzhiniki* (band-men) and *muzhi* (men) formed an inner advisory body (*veche*) to the [565] warleader or prince and became known as the "leading men" (*muzhi perednie*), or *boyari*. The voyvoda would reward his druzhina or boyars for their services by granting them land and dividing war booty with them.

It is important to note, however, that the boyars at this time received the granted lands as perpetual hereditary homesteads, and that they were free to leave one prince and enter the service of another at any time.[11] Before the formation of the Muscovite Empire, the plains between the Volga and Dnieper rivers were controlled by numerous such petty potentates, each surrounded by a retinue of boyars and other servicemen. Under those conditions there was no possibility of preventing these professional warriors from leaving one warleader and entering into the service of another. The only way for a local prince to retain his druzhina was by being successful in warfare, collecting large war booty, and offering land and villages together with the peasants in hereditary possession to his comrades in arms.[12]

565 In the meantime another stratum of the population was being 361 formed in the centers of trade, that of the city people or burgh- [438] ers. The nomadic conquerors were not only looters and pirates, but traders as well. They traded in what they looted. When their authority was well established, they endeavored to promote centers and routes of commerce as a means of increasing their wealth. It was in these centers of trade and market places that cities developed. Soon city people became stratified into the well-to-do (*zhitie lyudi*) and the lower urban classes (*molodshie lyudi*). In these urban centers where the warriors became traders the trend was toward concentration of power in the hands of the economically powerful, just as among the professional military

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class the tendency was toward the concentration of power in the hands of the more mighty princes.[13]

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This concentration of power in the hands of the city plutocracy found its expression in the principle of an unanimity vote in the city assembly (*Veche*). Data on the early political and social organization of the Russian urban communities show that the unanimity in decisions was the rule. The old documents about these gatherings tell us that "what has been established by the oldest city, is maintained by its boroughs," that "all thought and spoke as one man," that "all were unanimous in the desire," and that the decision was reached "by all the oldest and all the youngest men of the assembly."[14]

[661]
But we also learn that this unopposed group consensus was achieved by means of threat and terror against all those who might show an inclination to disagree or who disagreed after the assembly had been held and after a resolution had been passed. The dissenters were often beaten with rods, despoiled of their property, or murdered. Sometimes they might escape such fate if ready to pay a fine that varied according to the rank of the dissenter. In this manner a minority, backed by physical force was able to enforce its will on the rest under the guise of "unanimity."[15]

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Pressure for the unanimous consent on the part of the people was applied also in the village assemblies, and later in the land commune (*mir*). In some other customs of the Great-Russian peasantry, even in our own times, the unanimous consent was considered necessary. [585] In marriage ceremonies, for instance, custom demanded that the bride when leaving her parental home obtain blessing from all her neighbors. There was, however, a threat against neighbors who refused their blessing. [789] Curses were invoked against them: "Those who do not bless her, may they never marry their sons and daughters" (*Kto ne blagoslovit tomu vek sinov ne zhenit a docheri za muzh ne vdavat*).[16]

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The principle of unanimity was apparently the procedure in the local assemblies of the Old-Slavonic soil cultivators of the Dnieper river basin. Such an unanimity was also practiced until our times in the Zadruga society of Croatia.[17] But in those pacific and anarchic societies the principle of unanimity was real, not

623 a fiction. Lacking means of physical enforcement because of the
626 lack of a centralized political system, common action could take
place only among those who voluntarily agreed. But when small
[661] bands of mounted warriors imposed their rule over the multitudes of non-warlike peasantry, the power-oriented conquerors made use of the Old-Slavonic system of unanimity for purposes of regimentation and governmentalization from above. That is, they imposed a dictated consensus by means of force else the opposition of the peasant majority would soon have deprived the ruling minority of its power.

634 In this manner a number of band chieftains of nomadic origin
ruled groupings of small peasant communities, in the form of
manorial principalities. Each one of these local potentates, even
[152] though Slavicized in speech or born in mixed families, still exhibited extreme self-seeking characteristics and cherished personal power and aggrandizement above everything else, a tenet that had characterized his nomadic predecessors. Each, therefore, following steppe traditions, had a scheme of his own; each was interested primarily in accumulating riches for himself and his immediate family. In consequence, these local princes and their war bands constantly intrigued and fought among themselves. They also transferred their personal and factional strifes to the neighboring towns of burghers. In these squabbles and struggle for power and expansion, the feuding princes and fighting factions did not hesitate to call on the common enemies in their neighborhoods, such as the steppe marauders or the Viking pirates to come in and help them defeat their opponents.

[579] It was in the course of such an internecine strife (*vsta rod na
628 rod*) in Novgorod region in the middle of the ninth century that
a band of Scandinavian merchant-pirates was called on to come
and help one clique of native princes against the other.[18] These
"Varangians" not only came in but stayed, founding later the
Russian state in the Dnieper river basin, at that time the most
[487] important merchant thoroughfare in that part of the world.
[177] These Norse conquerors and state builders were soon assimilated
by the natives. In the course of time a series of new principalities
was formed and old factional bickerings and fratricidal warfare
was renewed.[19]

These feuds did not affect only the relations between local 628
lords; intense strifes and vendettas were flourishing within the 634
family of each one of the princes. Struggle for power and expan- 593
sion often caused fratricidal warfare among the brothers after the death of their father. The old chronicles and other historical documents are full of examples of such family feuds. Murder, torture and blinding among the brothers and even between fathers and sons apparently were frequent.[20] The life of each one of these local potentates was spent in perpetual warfare, in feuding, and in plundering adventures.[21]

Power-thirstiness, factionalism, and rule of crude force pre- 634
vailed among these petty rulers in no lesser way than among 669
their nomadic predecessors and overlords. The internal system of rule on the domains of each prince was not more advanced. As the Russian written laws of that period testify, the killing of prince's representatives on the part of the peasants must have been frequent. City populace often rose in riots and revolutionary outbursts against the oppressive conditions imposed by these
lords.[22] It was such conditions of physical, social and emotional [156]
insecurity that favored perpetuation of the institutions, practices, and other behavior traits which were introduced by the nomadic invaders and conquerors.

III

The changes that in the course of several centuries were taking 178
place in social and psychological structure of the Old-Slavonic 538
world as a result of the imposition of the rule of the nomadic 156
warriors seem to have been well reflected in the Great-Russian folklore, especially in its epic legends. The military, the peasants, the burghers, their conflicts and their character traits are personified in these narratives by a number of popular heroes.[23]

The general picture which these folk documents present shows that the social stability which existed in the Old-Slavonic society was completely shattered as a result of nomadic invasions and conquests. The invading warriors not only caused great havoc but they provoked rapid and fundamental changes in the structure of the old society. Moreover the social disorganization and the political and economic instability that resulted out of these

178 538 156 events were apparently manifested in a widespread sense of emotional and physical insecurity which fostered destructive aggression and mass violence. In such circumstances extreme self-seeking and dominance-submission relationships tended to substitute the Old-Slavonic egalitarian and anarchic system.

565 538 The plight of the Slavonic peasant strata has been symbolized in these products of folk imagination in the person of Mikula Selyaninovich ("the Villager's son") and in that of Ilya of Murom, who is often referred to as "the peasant's son," and as "the old Cossak." Mikula is pictured as a superb plowman and field laborer. He has a keen knowledge of husbandry and possesses the best mares and the best farming equipment.[24] He is endowed with such tremendous strength and is entrusted with such heavy responsibility that he carries "the weight of the whole [369] world" in a little shoulder bag. This villager, however, comes into conflict with the city people over the custom duties and over the haughty manner of the urbanites. The tolls imposed by the city are too high. Moreover, the burghers treat Mikula in a despicable and undignified way. So he is enraged and loses his self-control:

> I was in the city no longer ago than the day before yesterday,
> On my light bay mare,
> I carried thence two whole bags of salt,
> Two bags of salt of forty pud each.
> The folk there are no better than robbers.
> They demand two kopecks toll;
> But I had a leaded whip for toll
> I paid their two kopecks toll.
> Whoever was upright I left seated
> And whoever was seated I left prostrate,
> And whoever lay prostrate would never rise again.[25]

As a result of such conflicts, Mikula finally came to the conclusion that tilling was not profitable any more. He found that there were other and better ways which would guarantee to one safety, economic gain, and self-respect. So he gave up husbandry and joined Volga Buslavlevich, the bandit-warrior. In his new role in which he uses great physical power not as a productive force, but as a means of coercion, he makes a strong imprint on

the mind of the burghers. As a result, the city folk changed their 565
attitude and instead of haughty bearing they now "bow low" to 538
Mikula.

Ilya of Murom, the other hero of peasant origin, is portrayed as "being crippled" for many years. Then suddenly he acquires gigantic strength from two sources: from psalm singers and from Svyatogor, a hero of supernatural origin and superhuman powers. By means of this acquired strength and by employing cunning, Ilya gets rid of Svyatogor and, like Mikula, joins the bandit-warriors. However, the professional warriors do not accept Ilya on equal terms because of his low origin. But by constant demonstration of superior physical strength employed as a means of intimidation Ilya is finally accepted by the ruling military aristocracy. After a terrifying demonstration of physical strength which shook the whole town to its foundation Prince Vladimir became so panicky that he hurried a messenger to humbly invite Ilya to a prince's feast:

> Knock upon the door five times
> Then cross yourself in the prescribed manner
> Make your bow as it is enjoined,
> Offer humble salutations, and beat with your forehead
> Upon the floor of bricks,
> Upon damp mother earth herself,
> Before the old Cossack, Ilya of Murom.[26]

It seems clear that in these two heroes of peasant origin we 178
find reflected the vicissitudes to which the Old-Slavonic society 565
has been exposed after it has been subjugated to warriors and traders. The moral and productive values of the peasants, symbolized by Mikula's strength, his skill in productiveness, his social responsibility and feelings of dignity and equality, were rapidly declining in the changing conditions. The peasants became an easy prey of the new ruling classes. The result was moral corruption on the part of the soil cultivators, disinterest in land, and an urge to revolt. The peasantry became "crippled." First [789]
they expected help from supernatural forces. Then finally they
began to rely on guile and on terror to protect themselves. They 661
realized that in the new political atmosphere it was superior 579
physical force which was admired and respected. Many peasants 178

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178 therefore were leaving the land to move to the cities or to join the bandits as traders and warriors.

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538 These bandit-warriors are pictured in the Russian folk epic as ruling by such terrifying violence and dreadful terror and craft that all the living beings on the earth flee and hide, or lie prostrate, and even the earth itself shrinks and the sun sinks away at their appearance:

> The red sun was sinking
> Behind the dark woods, behind the broad sea,
> Multitudes of stars studded the clear sky
> When Lord Volga Buslavlevich was born
> In holy Russia.
> When Volga Buslavlevich was five years of age,[27]
> Lord Volga Buslavlevich went forth over the damp earth
> Damp mother earth was rent,
> The wild beasts fled away up to the clouds;
> And the fish scattered in the blue sea:
> And Lord Volga Buslavlevich went
> To learn all craft and wisdom,
> All the various languages;[28]
>
> Volga grew in strength and stature.
> He chose for himself a bold druzhina,
> Of thirty youths save one,
> He, Volga making the thirtieth.
> His dear 'uncle' bestowed upon him,
> Gracious Vladimir of Royal Kiev,
> Three cities with their peasants.[29]

[157] The hero knights of these legendary *Byliny* (the events of the olden days) when they find themselves in circumstances which appear to be under their control, are likely to be boastful, quarrelsome, disrespectful, sensitive to rank and inclined to belittle the strength of their adversaries. In such circumstances they spend their time either in plundering, fighting, maiming and killing, or in feasting, debauchery, and drunkenness.[30]

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152 The extreme power-compulsion and delusions of grandeur of these supermen, as well as their complete lack of self-control, are well symbolized in folk narratives about Svyatogor. This hero has an irresistible urge to bring the heaven and the earth to-

gether and to subdue the whole of the universe to his personal 538 control. But he is at the same time utterly incapable of con- 152 trolling his own gigantic strength. Hence he provokes the whole earth against himself ("Mother Earth could not bear his weight"):

He saddled his heroic steed
And rode forth on his way.
His young heart was throbbing,
His strength vibrated in his sinews,
His energy was like to overflow,
And he was heavily burdened with his strength,
Heavily burdened as with a grievous load;
He could not control his heroic strength.
And he threw away his steel club
Which vanished out of sight about the clouds,
And caught it again in his white hand;
"If I should take to walking on the earth
I would fasten a ring to heaven,
I would bind an iron chain to the ring,
I would drag the sky down to mother earth
I would turn the earth on its end,
And I would confound earth with heaven."[31]

There is no deed that these warriors and bandits would hesitate to commit in order to increase their personal power. The Great-Russian folk narratives agree with the early Russian chronicles and with later Russian historical documents that these men were ready to murder even their own closest kin in order to achieve their personal aims. In a folk epic this extreme blood- 538 thirstiness and quest for power is symbolized by young Shchel- 152 kun, a hero of Tartar origin who murders his own son, and 272 then, like the Scythians of old, drinks his blood. By this act of extreme cruelty he seeks his own self-aggrandizement:

Stab your son
Your beloved son,
Fill a bowl of his blood,
Drink up this blood,
This warm blood,
And then I will grant you

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152 Tver the ancient,
272 Tver the wealthy,
And the two brothers,
The two bold Borisovichi.
At once young Schelkun
Stabbed his son,
Filled a bowl of his blood,
His warm blood,
And drank up the bowl of that warm blood:
And straightway Tsar Azvych
Bestowed upon him
Tver the ancient,
Tver the wealthy,
And the two brothers,
The two bold Borisovichi.[32]

However, as soon as such "Good bold youths who have robbed and slain" find themselves in circumstances which appear to be unsurmountable, they are inclined to become cowardly, are overwhelmed with gloom and fear, and tend to rely on crouching servility and on guile and cunning as a means of self-preservation. When in such a mood they picture their enemies as superhuman, beastly beings possessing supernatural strength, thus justifying the lack of fair play in dealing with them.

178 754 It is possible that this radical change of social structure was projected into the new folk concept of the supernatural world. The Old-Slavonic fairyland inhabited predominantly by benevolent spirits was apparently transformed under the new conditions into a demonland full of beings with terrifying and macabre qualities. Blood-sucking vampires, heart-devouring witches, fiends that feast on human flesh, and other murderous and rapacious beings similar to those found in the underworld of the steppe nomads replaced the Old-Slavonic helpful deities and moderately malignant spirits.

In the same manner the Old-Slavonic benevolent wizards apparently evolved into rapacious and slaughterous witches who specialize in child eating. The Old-Slavonic beautiful and benevolent water spirits developed into monsters who bewitch people, especially the youths, and then draw them down into the deep waters to put them to death. The Old-Slavonic friendly and

attractive forest fairies who used to help travelers changed into 178
beastly demons who trick wayfarers into making them lose their 754
way and then cause them to perish.

The imposition of the rule of nomadic warriors over the soil 178
cultivators brought about not only insecurity of life and property, 156
but disintegration of the old ways of life and of the old morals. Social disintegration favored detachment from the group, caused decline in group identification and solidarity, tended to increase self-concern, fostered destructive aggressiveness and
anti-social behavior. Hence, drunkenness, debauchery, orgiastic 273
practices, together with robbing and killing, became prominent. 786
According to Fedotov, the old Christian sermons are so full of 771
invectives against such behavior that some studies of Russia's religious life consider that these themes formed the main content of anti-pagan literature of those days.[33]

Perhaps as a result of such social disorganization the Old-Slavonic 776
Goddess of Love (Lada) was relegated into the background and obscurity. Instead, male gods of bacchanalian passion and Dionysiac orgy (Iarilo, Pereplut) became outstanding
in folk imagination.[34] A phallic rite was observed at wedding [831]
banquets and sexual promiscuity during the feast gathering of young people became prominent, according to the old sermons.[35]

It was under these conditions of social disorganization and 178
insecurity, and ascendency of power-oriented patriarchal system 562
over the old stateless, semi-matriarchal and equalitarian order 831
that the attitudes toward women changed radically. Mounting 156
hostilities generated by conditions of strife and insecurity can be vented not only through inordinate sex life, alcoholism and delinquency, but also by aggressive behavior against all the unprotected and the weak. And just as sex life tended to take the form of lechery, and love that of uncontrolled passion, the attitudes toward the women changed from respect and reserve to that of scorn and contempt. They came to be looked upon as impure and unclean physically and morally.[36]

It is possible that the new unsatisfactory social conditions 178
might have also affected the concept of the Christian God and 771
attitude toward death. Not only did popular imagination in conditions of disorganization and insecurity tend to see in this

178 771 God a wrathful, irate and revengeful Old Man, but the Church leaders themselves, affected by the conditions of their society, were inclined to emphasize the fear aspect of the Christian God [761] rather than his love and compassion. They also tended to preoccupy themselves with death, describing it as a terror-striking event. In some early Church sermons even the messengers of God, the angels, were represented in a terrifying manner:

> [776] Then, two angels appear, sent by God for the soul. As soon as the soul has seen them, it will be horrified; all its image and beauty and face will change; feet and hands will be torpid, and the hearing as with the tongue will be chained by silence; and man will be all sorrowful and invalid and woeful; and afterwards, appears death. And then, with a terrible pain the soul will issue from the body . . .[37]

793 776 152 These feelings of anxieties and fears, combined perhaps with a strong sense of guilt of the Church leaders, are manifested in the life histories of most Russian saints. These people, as portrayed in their hagiographies, were being constantly threatened by temptations and intimidations of dreadful demons. Hallucinations about demons became very frequent among the monks, and struggle against demons became one of the main aspects of ascetic life. Whole herds of these fiends were sometimes seen by the ascetics. The demons would disguise themselves as humans, as angels, and even as Christ, or they would appear in their true beastly form.[38]

773 Consistent with this gloomy and terrifying view of life and death was also an apocalyptic picture of the end of the world as pictured by Church leaders. According to the old Russian sermons the end of the world was very near and it was to ensue in fire and floods of blood brought about by a wrathful and revengeful God, (a picture that strongly reminds one of the vision of the end of the world found in the beliefs of the steppe nomads of Central Asia):

> Then undying fire will flow from the East to the West, devouring mountains, stones, trees, and the sea. The firmament will be dried up and turned like brick bats, and all existing things, except men, will melt in a like way by the rate of the fire. All the earth will be burned; and through this undying fire all mankind has to pass.

There will be no place to run and hide oneself; it will be woe and 773
pain without comfort, particularly for the repenting sinners. They
will see the anger of God, full of rage and wrath, bearing the woe
of revenge.[39]

Also the folk religious poetry began to emphasize the gloomy 538
aspects of *post-mortem* life, especially that of the *Strashny Sud*— 775
The Terrible Judgment. It was perhaps in such conditions that 777
Destiny, together with the Truth, became dissociated from the
idea of a supreme Justice that reigned everywhere and came to
be looked upon as being subject to the caprice of arbitrary and
uncontrollable forces that now dominated the Universe.

Such circumstances[1] might have meant quick disintegration of 178
this society, not unlike the rapid dissolution of the Turco-Mon- 795
gol empires, had it not been for agents that favored the stabilization and the perpetuation of this social system in spite of its
internal weaknesses. One of the most important instruments in
this process of social consolidation was the Byzantine Church.

5

THE BYZANTINE CHURCH AND MUSCOVITE MILITARY THEOCRACY

I

FOLLOWING the traditions established by the Ro- 795
man Caesars, the Emperor of Byzantium (Basileus) was looked 771
upon as the supreme war-lord, the sole legislator, and the chief 779
justice, as well as the universal ruler. Therefore, the Church, 643
which was subjected to the absolute and autocratic will of the
Emperor, developed a religious ideology in accordance with the
dominant political philosophy and practices of the Empire.

The Emperor assumed the duty of defending the Church, combating heresy, and spreading Orthodox faith throughout all the globe. In return, God had promised him universal dominion

[1] [cf. cat. 116, pp. 52-55--Analyst]

795 over the whole earth.[1] Through the support of the Church the
771 absolute power of the Emperor became sacred, all-comprising
779 and omnipresent. In the proclamation which announced his
643 reign after he has been solemnly anointed by the Patriarch it
was stated that he "proceeded from God, and not from man," and that to him, the "supreme master of the universe, absolute obedience was due from all."[2]

795 It was this Messianic ideology of politico-religious proselytism
797 and world salvation which had united the Church and the state
177 that helped Byzantium to solidify its rule and to spread its influence and control over the neighboring countries. In conquered, dependent and friendly territories numerous bishoprics of Eastern rite were established whose function was to obtain the moral support of the people for the Byzantine ruler. The conquered people were allowed a certain degree of autonomy in their internal affairs and one of their privileges was the right of the use of their native language in church rituals.

This politico-religious expansionism, however, had its weaknesses. The only tie that linked the subjected and the dependent peoples with the central power was the Church. Thus, as soon as the central power and the authority of the Byzantine Emperor weakened as a result of internal feuds, palace revolutions, civil wars, and invasions, some petty local potentates saw a chance to emancipate themselves from Constantinople and proclaim themselves as sovereign rulers. Such a local lord following Byzantine traditions would appoint from his own kinsmen bishops and Patriarchs whose function was to anoint the new king, to bestow upon him God-like qualities, and to sanctify his despotic rule among the subjects.

795 It is this pattern of Church and state relations that also devel-
oped between Byzantium and Russia by the end of the tenth
797 century, when as a result of a political alliance with Byzantium
648 Prince Vladimir of Kiev was converted to Christianity.[3] A Greek
793 Metropolitan and a number of Greek Orthodox bishops were subsequently sent to Russia. Having an eye on the control of all other Russian principalities, the Byzantine Church bestowed upon the Metropolitan of Kiev the authority over all Russian

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territories. He was adorned with the title of the "Metropolitan 797
of Kiev and of all Russias,"[4] a symbolic beginning of Russian 648
religious and political unity. 793

When the Tartars in the beginning of the thirteenth century 727
imposed their overlordship over all Russian lands, lacking an 565
efficient administration and interested not so much in governing 651
as in tributes, they restored to the native princes their old titles and gave them the right to collect tributes for them. In this manner in the beginning of the fourteenth century Ivan Kalita of Moscow succeeded in obtaining a *yarlyk* (charter of privileges) in which the Tartar Kahn recognized Ivan as the *Veliky Knyaz* (Grand Prince). A few years later Ivan also became the chief collector of tributes for the Kahn in Russian lands.

In his function as chief farmer of internal revenues Ivan [661]
practiced extortion from his Russian subjects and acquired a great personal wealth. His riches enabled him to purchase entire domains and apanages, and to buy the protection and backing of
the Kahn. Seeing the ascendency of Ivan, and following Byzan- [795]
tine traditions of Church and state unity, the Metropolitan of Kiev and of all Russias moved his residence to Moscow and built a cathedral there, ready to support Moscow princes in their political ambitions.

The expansion of Moscow's power over other Russian lands 175
was favored also by external circumstances and pressures. By the second part of the fourteenth century the central authority of the Tartar Empire, the Golden Horde, had weakened and as was customary in Turco-Mongol society, civil wars ensued among the contenders for the throne. This situation presented an opportunity for power wise princes of Moscow to change their policy of cringing and prostration before the Tartars into that of rebellion and bargain. From now on at times they fought the Tartars, at other times they were again kneeling before them; but they now knew how to take advantage of Tartar weaknesses and how to gain new possessions with Tartar assistance. In this policy of expansion at the expense of other Russian principalities the Muscovites had the support not only of the Khans but that of the Eastern Orthodox clergy as well. Their

[XVth century]

175 allies were also the local boyars who were traditionally always ready, at the critical moment, to abandon their own local princes and rush to join the ascending power.

[795] In the middle of the fifteenth century, the representatives of the Church of Byzantium, in the hope of obtaining the Pope's help against the Turks, agreed to a union with Rome. However, in Moscow, whose power was ascending in the face of the disintegrating Mongol Empire and where the Turks were not considered a threat, no need was felt for any Latin help. Thus the Metropolitan of Moscow who gave his approval for the union with Rome was deposed and the Russian Church was declared autocephalous and independent of the Greek Patriarch. This break with the Byzantine Church was of far-reaching conse-[659] quences. It placed the Russian Church into a completely dependent position on the Grand Prince of Moscow. From now on, the objectives of the Russian state and those of the Russian Church became inseparable.

175 795 Another international event, the fall of Constantinople (1453), removed the last ideological barrier to the growth of the Muscovite Principality into a world empire. Since the seat of the Greek Patriarch had fallen into the hands of the infidels, Moscow became the strongest and the leading Eastern-Orthodox state thus inheriting the Messianic ideology of world salvation and of a Universal Orthodox Empire.

In accordance with such traditions the Russian clergy began to consider Moscow as the only true successor of the first and of the second Rome, as the only depositor of the True Faith, and as the center of a Messianic politico-religious Orthodoxy. By the beginning of the sixteenth century this ideology of the "Third Rome" was fully developed. The Grand Prince of Moscow had already adopted the title of Czar (Caesar). At that time a monk of one of the old monastaries of Pskov stated this idea in a letter to Czar Vasili III, in the following manner:

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> Two Romes have now fallen, and the third one, our Moscow, yet standeth, and a fourth shall there never be. In thy puissant Empire the council of our church doth shine throughout all the world with the light of holiness which is greater even than the light of the sun. In all the world thou alone art the Christian Tzar.[5]

II

Following Byzantine traditions and being entirely dependent 659
upon and identified with the dominant political power, the Rus- 779
sian Orthodox clergy supported the autocratic reign of Musco- 793
vite rulers by means of an apotheosis of the Czar. According to this theocratic ideology the role of the Church was to be the loyal ally and helper of the Czar who derived his authority directly from God. The Czar's judgment could be overruled by no prelate. In his effort, common with that of the Church to establish a divine order on the whole earth, the Czar had to be unconditionally supported.[6]

Native Russian, Byzantine and Turco-Mongol institutions 177
and concepts were blended in this system of Russian imperial 642
theocracy. According to the Mongol idea of imperial power the emperor was the owner of the body and of the property of each one of his subjects. He was, however, disinterested in their souls and conscience. Thus, as far as religious beliefs were concerned, the Mongol rulers showed a great deal of tolerance; being interested mainly in collecting the tributes and not in governing they did not look at religion and clergy as allies in ruling. The shamans among the Ural-Altaic peoples were not organized as a priestly class and the Mongol emperor, even after he had accepted Islam, did not see any potential threat to his imperial power in any religion. In that system of power there was a complete separation of religion and politics.

In Byzantium, on the other hand, the Church was a powerful and well-organized force with imperial ambitions. But the Church was subdued to the imperial and personal interests of the lay ruler. The Church often succeeded, however, in using the imperial power for its own ends. At the same time the Byzantine Emperor in legal theory did not rule in his own right, but derived his authority from the people. In legal theory, he was an elected monarch and was subjected to the supreme rule of law, even if the law emanated from him. There was thus in Byzantium a well established set of laws which bound equally the Emperor and his subjects and guaranteed also certain rights to the subjects.

177 642 The ideology of Moscow imperial theocracy was rooted in the power-centered traditions of Russian princes, reinforced by a fusion of Mongol and Byzantine political ideas and practices. As among the Mongols, the Czar was considered to be the supreme owner of the body and of the property of his subjects, but as among the Byzantines he was also concerned with their
643 souls. At the same time, according to the Muscovite political philosophy, the Czar as owner of his subjects derived his authority not from the people, as in Byzantium, but directly and exclusively from God.[7] Therefore, the Czar alone possessed rights, his subjects only duties.

In the Muscovite system of theocratical power not only was the Czar's freedom unlimited by any laws, but his personal will was not limited by any recognized human rights either. The Czar was considered to be limited only by his duty to God and by Divine law. The Czar, however, was himself the sole judge of his duty to God. He himself was the sole interpreter of Divine Law in regard to temporal affairs. Even the head of the Church could only supplicate but not advise him in these matters. The Czar was therefore at liberty to use the law capriciously as an instrument of his personal power, or to break the law at his convenience. And so he often did.[8]

643 565 Supported by the imperial ambitions of the Church, Muscovite rulers had two main objectives. One was the solidification of the unlimited personal power of the Czar to which all institutions of law and order were subjected; the other consisted of territorial expansion at the expense of the neighboring countries. The hereditary magnates—the local princes and the boyars—were obstacles in the path of both of these objectives. This landed aristocracy, following the traditions of early Russian princes, insisted on their personal and manorial privileges and resented any interference of the Muscovite Czar. They were therefore in favor of limitation of the Czar's power.

565 [643] At the same time, however, these magnates were members of an advisory council to the Czar (*Boyarskaya Duma*); in this council some of them were closer to the Czar and formed an inner circle which exerted more power and influence on the affairs of the state. The boyars were therefore not unified and did not

form an organized opposition; instead they fought among themselves over priority in rank and position (*mestnichestvo*), over estates and crownlands, and over the favors of the Czar. 565

The lack of unity and struggle for power existed also among the lesser nobility, most of whom obtained their rank not by right of inheritance but by the favor of the Czar or as a reward for their military services. Some of these service nobility were rich in vast possessions, others did not differ much from common peasants in the amount of land they possessed, in standard of living, and in formal education.

Internal squabbles among the landed magnates and the service nobility were weakening the strength of the Czardom in relation to its adversaries. This situation offered a strong argument in favor of the Czar's despotism and at the same time eased the crushing of the opposition in the interest of unlimited power. "If subjects submit not themselves unto their ruler, never shall strife cease in the land," said Ivan the Terrible.[9]

The best way to break the power of the landed aristocracy was 425
by making them economically dependent upon the Czar. This objective was achieved in two ways. One was forceful expropria- [661]
tion, resettlement, imprisonment and assassination of recalcitrant boyars. The other consisted of the increased emphasis on 423
pomestie system of conditional land tenure as against *votchina*, or hereditary land property.

According to the pomestie system, which followed Mongol 565
traditions, the crown lands, together with the peasants settled 423
on them, were donated to the holder of an office or of a military 701
rank under the condition of obligatory and loyal service to the Czar, and only as long as the loyal service on the part of the land recipient lasted. The *pomeshchik* was obliged to provide a contingent of soldiers according to the size of his donation. This obligation devolved from father to son. The older sons would [428]
obtain from the Czar new pomesties and the youngest son would, as a rule, inherit the pomestie of his father.[10] In the Byzantine Empire, too, the land was given in reward for service, but there the land became hereditary property that could be disposed of at will by the holder. In Russia the system of conditional land ownership meant, like in the Mongol political system, complete

565 423 701 dependency of the land recipients upon the Czar, because the Czar could at any time withdraw the grant.

642 565 423 By means of the pomestie system of land tenure which prevailed in the second part of the sixteenth century the Muscovite rulers obtained both of their objectives: unlimited power and permanent war preparedness. Once the owners of the estates became dependent upon the Czar for the possession of their lands, any opposition on their part could be crushed easily, especially if the caste solidarity and the development of an *esprit de corps* among these people could be prevented. By the end of the seventeenth century the hereditary land tenure and the conditional land tenure were equalized. As a result all nobility became service nobility (*dvorianstro*), dependent upon the Czar for their lands. All therefore became *holopy*, the slaves of the supreme *gosudar* (master). Neither type of land holder could alienate his land either by sale, exchange, or any other process. The principle was that "He who owned land should serve the Czar."

178 642 565 Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century, by making the nobility economically dependent and having the support of the Church, the Muscovite Czars were enabled to eliminate all potential opposition to their rule and to perpetuate their despotic power. After the nobility was subdued and regimented, the other classes, including the clergy, followed suit. By the end of the seventeenth century the slaves and free land tenants were equalized and bound to the land and burghers were bound to their
[486] *posads*. It was prohibited for any person to move from one town or borough to another without special permit. There could be a penalty of death for such flight or desertion.

By this time, therefore, all persons were bound to their status. A rigid caste system was established for the purpose of securing for the Czar permanent and controllable bodies of people whose function was either to pay cess or to render military and state service. The whole state was regimented and militarized for the
[641] purpose of the Czar's aggrandizement, defense of the realm and military campaigns; each person had one duty only—to serve the Czar and the country. The whole society was geared to increase the revenues and the military might of the Czardom.

III

157 The atmosphere of despotism, servility, fear and awe which developed under this system of total regimentation and dependency[7] left an imprint on the habits and the attitudes of the people and had some influence on the shaping of their values and of their views of life. In conditions of complete dependency and domineering-subservience relationships, self-concern, destructive aggressiveness, as well as fatalistic resignation, are likely to thrive, not personal and social responsibility, moral obligations or group solidarity.

This trend of events meant also increasing social restlessness 642
and political instability which in turn favored the rise to leader- 157
ship of ruthless power-seekers and psychopaths. Lack of limita-
tion on the personal power of the Czar, dissensions among the
nobility and want of responsibility and of emotional balance in
the person of the Czar led often to extreme excesses in Czar's
rule.[11] All the attempts of the boyars to transform the Boyar- [646]
skaya Duma into a legislative body were unsuccessful. Since
the end of the seventeenth century even the *Zemski Sabor,* the
consultative body of representatives of all classes, ceased to be
convoked.

Only when the throne became vacant and the omnipotent 642
Czar was gone did this nobility sometimes attempt to squeeze 565
out promises and pledges from the pretenders to the throne. But, even then the remnants of the old boyar class and the new service nobility clashed over the question of control. Hence as soon as the new monarch was installed he did not have any difficulty in establishing his unlimited control and in proceeding to rule arbitrarily in face of a divided dvorianstvo.

The Czar could do anything he pleased with the nobles, in- 643
cluding personal chastisement. They were treated as minors by 565
the Czar and trained in blind and unconditional obedience. In the Czar's presence they observed dead silence. Anything that came from his hand, even the most degrading treatment, was to be received with resignation or even regarded as a sign of distinction. At the same time, however, while the nobles were exposed to all kinds of threat, terror and indignities on the part

[7] [i.e. Czardom by end of 17th century.. Analyst]

643 565 of the Czar, they became increasingly rank-conscious, domineering and abusive toward all lower in rank or under their power.[12]

565 661 641 Such a ruling class, with its open misrule and arbitrariness, could not inspire the subjected classes with confidence and respect. The lack of social and political security was manifested in want of initiative, in disinterest in productive activities, in loose morals, in hazard games, in a low value of human life, and in a general lack of trust.[13]

771 156 On the other hand, perhaps as a reaction to these conditions of insecurity and of social disorganization, there was an urge of complete renunciation of the world and its strife, an urge to detach oneself from the group, a tendency to isolate oneself completely from human society and seek personal consolation and personal salvation in religion. This trend of social withdrawal and self-oriented feelings brought about a great development of hermitism and of monastic life. [792] Many of these people, completely detached from human society and preoccupied exclusively with their own self, sought peace and communion with God in lonely, remote depths of forests, in the solitude of the wilds and deserts. Here "far removed from men" they spent their lives in prayer, fasting and self-maceration.

At the same time the masses of the people who lived in great misery and who were exposed to arbitrariness, exploitation, and other forms of oppression on the part of the mighty, sought consolation and hope in supernatural forces. Beliefs in miraculous powers of wonder-working icons and in life-giving properties of the Cross were taking deep roots. On all sides sprang up prophecies and apparitions. 791 Saint men and prophets, often mentally unbalanced, would appear in the streets and openly voice their protest against the Czar and his government.[14]

These were the only signs of an open opposition to the existing system that was becoming increasingly unbearable. Such "idiots" were considered saintly by the people not only because of their strange behavior and their ability to endure extremes of hardship, but also for their unheard of courage to speak openly against the Czar:

They used to go starke naked, save a clout about their middle, with their haire hanging long and wildely about their shoulders, and many of them with an iron coller in chaine about their neckes or middles, even in the very extremity of winter. . . . Among others at this time they have one at Mosco that walketh naked about the streets, and inveyeth commonly against the state and government. . . . Another there was, that dyed not many years agoe . . . that would take upon him to reproove the olde emperour, for all his cruelties and oppressions done towards his people. His body they have translated of late into a sumptuous church neere the emperours house in Mosco, and have canonized him for a saint. Many miracles he doth there. . .[15] 791

Another form of protest or of reaction against the existing conditions consisted of mass vagrancy. Many thousands of these restless people were roaming the roads, the forests, and the deserts, as beggars, as pilgrims or as agricultural nomads. Many of them spent whole lives wandering, unable to find peace and rest. 166

IV

Conditions in which abusive dominance-submission relationships, self-concern, lack of trust, and destructive aggression thrive do not favor unification and stability of an empire. Yet the Czardom showed a steady and remarkable development in spite of such unfavorable circumstances. In the course of several centuries it had grown from a small principality into a great world power. Just as in the states of steppe nomads, the social agents which were responsible for self-seeking, power-orientation and internal restlessness and explosiveness encouraged also external expansion. But unlike the empires of the steppes, there were in the Empire of the Czars several circumstances which fostered ideological and moral unity, such as the politico-religious philosophy of the Orthodox Church and conditioning on the family and community level. It was perhaps this combination of the explosive and unifying tendencies which was responsible for steady expansiveness and growing consolidation of the Czardom. 642 178 [182]

From its very inception the Russian state was a military soci- 000

From it's very inception the Russian state was a military Society.
721 The military campaigns and territorial expansion were
565 needed in this society to provide land to pay for the services of
181 a class of military nobility whose chief occupation was state service
and warfare, not land cultivation. War gave the Czar an
opportunity to distribute land grants, to bestow ranks and offices
and to win the support of the nobility. At the same time warfare
offered an opportunity for the nobles to exert more personal
power, to release their destructive urges, and to compensate for
indignities and humiliations to which they were constantly exposed
on the part of superiors in rank and office. Thus, by engaging
these people in constant warfare the Czars directed their
aggressive impulses against the enemy instead of against the
ruler. The wars were not only a means of occupying a potentially
restless and turbulent military class, but they were necessary to
enhance the Czar's prestige, to solidify his rule, and to impress
his subjects with the idea of his might and invincibility.

723 In such circumstances, prolonged and costly wars were to be
avoided. The military nobility, whose loyalty to the Czar was
conditioned upon his power and favors, could not be completely
depended upon to remain loyal to the Czar under adverse conditions
or in defeat. Therefore, in military campaigns the emphasis
725 had to be put on numerical superiority over the enemy.
Another way of fighting the enemies was to frighten them into
retreat by sudden and unexpected attacks from ambush combined
with wild sounds of the drums, trumpets and shouting, in
Mongol fashion. Soldiers and officers were ready to flee if the
enemy showed considerable resistance. Their preference was
fighting from a distance, or from a place of advantage from
where they could annoy the enemy, but hurt themselves least.[16]
Hence their most common way of taking cities and fortresses
[726] was by a siege, in the course of which they would force the population
to surrender by means of mass starvation, or by provoking
internal dissensions and treachery.[17] Small, weak and unprotected
adversaries would be threatened into submission by "psychological
warfare" methods without even resorting to an open
war.[18]

727 In earlier days, the means employed to keep conquered people
636 in submission were the same as those practiced toward Russian

subjects: coercion and dependency. One such method was to 727 636 massacre a large part of the population, to loot the conquered territories, and to leave those that remained alive in abject misery. The plunder of the conquered peoples sometimes went to such extremes that they were exposed to prolonged famines and food [731] had to be brought from Moscow to save the remaining populace from starving to death.

When a non-Russian territory had been brought to impotence by such means the Muscovite rulers would settle the Russian people among the natives, dividing the territory into a number of administrative units. The next step was to appoint persons who were strangers to those places to govern them. Following the Mongol pattern, these governors were changed often and never allowed to stay long enough to become friendly with the natives and to develop a genuine local power of their own. As a rule, in one and the same place two personages would be appointed, one of higher nobility to hold the office in name, and the other of lower nobility to control the former. Moreover, [625] special overseers and watchdogs were periodically sent directly from Moscow to spy and check on both.[19]

This system of checking on persons who held high offices was [701] practiced also in the army where large army units were headed by persons of the old high nobility, who were not trusted. To these nominal commanders, officers of lesser nobility would be appointed as deputy commanders. It was often these "political commissars" who had the real power.[20]

Just as in the tribes and states of the steppes the conquered [661] people were kept in subjugation also by fomenting continual dissension between various classes and within each class of the population. The Czar at the same time relied on the numerical strength and loyalty of his personal guards and selected garrisons which were strategically distributed throughout the conquered country. The conquered people, brought thus by the conqueror to helplessness, fell to their knees and begged their overlords for mercy.

6

WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND RUSSIA'S BUREAUCRATIC AUTOCRACY

I

THE STRUCTURE of Muscovite power had some
642 advantages in comparison with the Turco-Mongol system of rule.
651 The steppe warriors had not developed an efficient system of
631 administration. They depended upon their vassals for the collection of taxes. This practice gave an opportunity to the vassals to enrich themselves, which strengthened their feelings of independence and of revolt. In the same manner the principle of religious tolerance and the practice of granting Church autonomies helped to perpetuate religious, linguistic and cultural differences among the subjects, a situation that did not favor ideological unification and centralization of power. In Russia, on the other hand, a system of centralized administration which followed the Byzantine pattern took care of revenues and of military manpower. The enserfed agricultural population was a source of steady income. Furthermore, state dominated Church tended to Slavicize linguistically and to unify ideologically all subjects under the Czar.

However, this system of Muscovite military theocracy that was
[648] efficient in dealings with the Mongols, proved inadequate in
642 Russia's relations with its adversaries in the West. Since the end
178 of the middle ages Western countries went through a series of ideological and economic changes which had fundamentally affected the structure of the Western world. Humanism and Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-reformation, the industrial and political revolutions had brought about considerable intellectual and technological advance and radical structural changes. Compared to the West, Russia had many drawbacks in her economic system. Its power-centered and militarized social struc-

ture was detrimental to the development of trade and industry. 642
For centuries its economy remained founded on a system of 178
primitive agriculture. Lack of large centers of trade and indus- [241]
try adversely affected rural economy. There was no stimulation
for agricultural improvements and for freeing of the serfs. In-
stead, the emphasis was on the exploitation of serf labor as the
most expedient means to satisfy the demands of the landlords
and of the state. The landlords were mostly absent on military
campaigns or other state duties and were generally disinterested
in land improvements. At the same time the system of using the [651]
land as a pay for military or other state services, in a country
whose war campaigns and military contingents were increasing,
tended to diminish the size of the donations and increase the
burdens imposed on the serfs.

The lack of urbanization, together with the low standard of [369]
education of the service nobility, kept also the intellectual devel- 517
opment of Russia far behind that in the West. Intellectual activ- 771
ity was limited mainly to the court circles. The ideology and
practices of the Russian Church favored intellectual stagnation.
Russia accepted Christianity from Byzantium after the Greek
Church had already given up classical traditions of Hellenism.
By the time Byzantine Christianity entered Russia, Byzantine
literature had assumed an almost exclusively ecclesiastical char-
acter, and education consisted almost entirely of religious teach-
ing and the reading of the lives of the saints. Art, too, became
exclusively religious and stereotyped. All thought was regi-
mented according to religious dogmas and political objectives of
the power-holders.

In Russia this type of intellectual rigidity and inactivity was [194]
emphasized because of the use of the Old-Slavonic language in
the Church, which resulted in neglect of Greek language. And
it was considered a sin to learn the "thrice accursed Latin
tongue." Thus, the Russian clergymen became isolated from the
West because they lacked the possession of the only instruments
in which human knowledge was communicated in those days.
Moreover, Russian Orthodoxy, like the Byzantine Orthodoxy, 792
was based on monasticism. But unlike the manifold monastic
practices of the Western Church, the monks in the Russian
Church tended to lead an inactive life of asceticism
aimed at personal salvation.

000 Church tended to lead an inactive life of asceticism aimed at personal salvation.[1]

721 642 However, from the seventeenth century on, Russia's expansion, which was earlier oriented mainly toward the East, turned westward. The wars with the West which heretofore were mainly defensive, tended to acquire an increasingly offensive character. But the wars with the advanced Western countries were more difficult and much more costly than those with the economically and technologically backward Asiatics. The defeats which Russia suffered at the hands of the Swedes and Poles made it imperative for the Czars to increase the military effectiveness of their country to meet the challenge. This need dictated changes in the internal structure of the Czardom, in the direction of administrative and industrial advance along European patterns. Even [643] before Peter the Great, measures had been taken in this direction. But it was Peter who dramatized the issue by himself going abroad as an apprentice in Western industries to become "the first carpenter of the Empire."

In accordance with such need the old system of administration
647 based on service nobility was replaced by a system of salaried
565 officials (*chinovnichestvo*). According to this *chin* (civil rank)
555 system which was introduced by Peter the Great and which followed the Western pattern it was no longer necessary to belong to the dvorianstvo class in order to obtain state service. On the contrary, any one who served faithfully and efficiently could rise in chin and rank and thus obtain the status of a hereditary or of a personal *dvoryanin,* without even owning land. In this way a new salaried military and bureaucratic caste, entirely dependent upon the Czar, was growing at the expense of the landed dvorianstvo. As a result, the dvoryanin-guardsman, the chief state functionary of the eighteenth century, was replaced by the *chinovnik*-commoner in the nineteenth century. Chinovnichestvo absorbed and replaced dvorianstvo—just as earlier the dvorianstvo had absorbed and replaced boyarstvo. Now bureaucracy instead of military nobility became the main instrument of governing.[2]

647 642 This change in the structure of the Czardom, however, was accomplished from above, that is, by means of imperial decrees,

not by means of a popular revolution as in the West. Accordingly 647 642
the new bureaucratic rule was based on the *Ukaz*[3] and the knut as much as the old order. For the same reason, though the state was formally secularized, the traditions of an autocracy, divinely [565] ordained and supported by God, were carried on by every official as the representative of the Czar.[4]

Therefore the new system of autocracy based on bureaucracy, the same as the old one based on service nobility, could not recognize any political or personal rights of the subjects. Nor could there have developed any *esprit de corps* among the new governing class. This new class of officials owned little or no land and had to live on meager salaries, but was eager to follow the traditions and the high standards established by the old landed nobility. The chinovnichestvo therefore became even more dependent upon the Czar than the dvorianstvo was earlier. There was even less *esprit de corps* and less solidarity in the new governing class than in the old. Each official was constantly in fear of jeopardizing his own social position if he stood up in defense of any of his colleagues. Besides, in this hierarchical system of power the ruin or falling into disfavor of one official often meant [662] the ascendancy of the other. There was, therefore, a tendency to take advantage of such a situation, to resort to intrigues and calumnies, and to help to destroy rather than to rehabilitate a victim.

All the powers, the lawmaking, the application of law, and the justice were placed into the hands of these bureaucrats. At the same time the system of checks and controls was very deficient. Laws were enacted by special temporary commissions of high officials, and created *ad hoc.* The Council of State, a supreme [645] policy-making body, composed of about seventy to eighty highest dignitaries, was appointed by the Czar to serve him only in advisory capacities. The final decision rested in the hands of the Czar, or with the camarilla clique which happened at the moment to be most influential. The Empire was administratively 631 divided into provinces (*gubernia*) which were usually headed 625 by army generals. The gubernias were divided into districts which were headed by chiefs of police. The governors, supported by the police, ruled autocratically in their domains. They were

631 625 responsible only to the Czar; and the police, not being responsible to the public, but only to their immediate superiors, tended to be arbitrary.

647 What mattered in Russia's bureaucratic system was obedience to one's superiors. That was the primary criterion of judgment of the fitness of a civil servant, not his ability or personal integrity. Seldom was an employee dismissed because of corruption and injustice. A functionary could not be prosecuted for acts committed in the exercise of his functions except with the consent, or, on the initiative of his superiors. And the higher placed the offender, the less real was his responsibility. At the same time a subordinate employee, a soldier, or an inferior officer had no redress if wronged by his superior. A subordinate did have the right by law to lodge a complaint against mistreatment on the part of his chief, but according to the rules of Russian hierarchical discipline, no public servant, civil or military, could present a petition or complaint except through his own superior officer.[5] Few ever dared to do so.

647 871 This bureaucratic irresponsibility and impunity assumes an especial significance if one has in mind the low status of education and training of Russian officials. By the end of the nineteenth century in the provinces, according to an official investigation, out of a hundred employees, only one or two were found to have attended a university, five or six to have graduated from secondary schools, ten or twelve from primary schools. Eighty out of a hundred had had no formal schooling whatever and had passed no examination.[6] Many former soldiers and war veterans with little or no formal schooling crowded civil administration. At times the higher the education the less chances one had to enter state service.[7]

II

647 557 In such a system excess in zeal was often rewarded. On the other hand, initiative and originality, if not successful, were fraught with great personal risks. Therefore, shirking from work and responsibility, and struggling for office and rank became the rule. It was only by achieving higher position and by winning

the favors of one's superiors that one hoped to exercise more power and to achieve a higher degree of security. 647 557

Such a situation often demanded self-abasing and cringing humility toward superiors in the hierarchy as an adjustment to a situation of permanent insecurity and threat. ". . . those employed believe that they can never do enough to show their zeal."[8] "Without being base, it is impossible to get on," the officials themselves would say.[9] At the same time, perhaps as a compensation for degradation and loss of self-respect, there developed the propensity of the officials to show haughtiness and arrogance to those below them in rank and status. "A man, as soon as he rises a grade above the common level, acquires the right . . . to maltreat his inferiors to whom it is his duty to transmit the blows that he receives from those above him."[10] [157]

In such conditions preoccupation with one's self rather than interest in group ideals and objectives thrived. There was therefore a tendency for selfish and petty concerns, greediness, venality, and corruption. Careerism prevailed over loyalty. Fortunes were made by many in public service as a security for the uncertain future.[11] The public opinion itself supported such behavior because it was expected that people who acquire office or any other positions of trust would take personal advantage of the situation. In some departments because of the inadequacy of the salaries and in order to meet the expected high standards of living the officials were considered to have tacit permission to have recourse to illicit perquisites. Administration, justice, police, the army and the navy, and even the clergy, all had their acknowledged perquisites, which often included bribes.[12] [156] [662]

In such conditions in which extreme self-concern thrived, the Czar himself did not feel safe and secure. This sense of insecurity on the very peak of power was reflected, for instance, in the tendency of the Czars not to tolerate any outstanding personalities in their midst.[13] The same feeling was reflected in the idea that any concession on the part of the Czar would be considered as a sign of weakness. The result was that the Czar was often surrounded by sycophants and careerists and had no close friends whom he could trust and on whom he could rely for support at all times. In such circumstances the Czar might feel isolated, 643 157

643 157 imagine himself threatened by "enemies," and live in fear.[14] As a defense against such feelings the Czar might be inclined to follow the advice of those of his officials who favored concentration of power and who advised against giving up any of his prerogatives or against any yielding to the demands of the opposition. "Constitution" to such a Czar and his camarilla was as dangerous as "revolution."

But such policies, which are rooted in a sense of extreme insecurity themselves tend to strengthen such feelings. Mistrust of people, fear of the "enemies," suppression of all opposition and tendency to concentrate increasingly the power in one's hands, to dominate and to demand absolute submissiveness is therefore perpetuated. Hence, power-relations in Russia of the eighteenth and nineteenth century tended to follow the pattern of rule established earlier in Muscovite Czardom:

> 661 643 566 The emperor Nicholas I ruled his country like a gamekeeper. Under his administration of the empire, based as it was upon a system of flogging, imprisonment, and exile to Siberia, the great could indulge their caprices with impunity . . . But . . . in reality . . . the masters were also slaves. Every man, whoever he might be, was dependent on someone more powerful than himself who could with impunity make him wretched, and over him again there was someone still mightier. The lord, it is true, lived in comfort, and the serfs in squalor, but that was all. They were all slaves, one as much as the other . . . I have seen both oppressors and oppressed at close quarters, and I can aver that the inhuman regime of bondage corrupted and depraved one as much as the other.[15]

625 Just as in the political organization of steppe nomads and in the Muscovite Czardom such relations of insecurity, mistrust, self-seeking, abusive domineering and blind subordination demanded an efficient system of watchfulness, vigilance, checking and counterchecking. A special attention therefore had to be paid to the institution of secret political police. Since the days of Czar Nicholas I, the secret political police, known as the Third Section, was placed above all ministries, and was directly subject to the Emperor himself, just as in the days of Ivan the Terrible. Like the Oprichniki of Ivan the Terrible the Third Section was the main agency of vigilance, the chief watchdog of the state. It

was invested with the most extensive powers and was given as its 625
special mission the task of looking after the safety of the state
and overseeing the doings of all departments, of all public func-
tionaries, and of all people. The security police was an omnipo-
tent and all-powerful body before whom all subjects were con- [641]
sidered guilty unless they proved the contrary. This institution—developed in the course of centuries—became of paramount importance to its rulers. It became one of the most essential wheels of the government and one of the chief cares of the ruling class.[16]

III

Hierarchical relations of strict superordination and subordina- 000
tion in the military and bureaucratic ranks might foster feelings of identification with the mighty and the powerful. It is on such grounds that imperialistic nationalism and ideas of national superiority and grandeur thrive. And when state is fused with the Church in a system of theocratic militarism then nationalism might acquire also the aspects of religious fanaticism.

Expansion, greatness of the state, ideas of grandeur and Messianic ideas of world redemption or world domination might provide also compensation for humiliations, self-abasement, feelings of inferiority and unworthiness and other frustrations which are fostered in a system of abusive domineering-subservi-
ence relationships. As a result love of show, display of military 642
might and need for conquests preoccupied the ruling strata of 565
post-Petrine Russia as much as those of the Muscovite state. The 156
Czar's court, the nobility, the military, the bureaucracy, the Church, the cities and the villages tended to display a grandeur that was in sharp contrast with the poverty of the country.[17]

This tendency toward exhibitionism and ideas of greatness 186
was manifested also in the glorification of Russia, and the belief in the sacredness of its exalted mission in the world. Such attitudes and feelings which were rooted in the rigidly hierarchical military and bureaucratic structure were supported also by the Third Rome traditions of the Russian Church according to which Providence itself had bestowed upon Russia's rulers the role of the redeemers of mankind. According to these traditions and teachings Russia was a God-chosen country, the only country

186 where true Christianity was preserved. In the official statements. in the prayers, in the Church sermons and school textbooks, the Russian Empire was represented as a Holy Land (*Sviataya Rus*).

Accordingly, official geographic studies and statistics tended to magnify everything within the frontiers of the Empire. Russian possessions and might, the resources and riches of the Czar, the progress and virtues of the country were pictured in the school textbooks in a fabulous way. A steady and imposing territorial growth of the Czardom in the course of many centuries at the expense of the East and the West undoubtedly supported these feelings of greatness. In this manner successes in policies of external expansion promoted desires for further conquests.

178 642 771 As long as the authority of the Church remained unshaken the power of the Czar rested on solid foundations. The Czars were able to increasingly concentrate and monopolize all social power while the Czardom expanded territorially in all directions, in spite of all its internal weaknesses.

178 669 In the meantime, however, the economic, educational and religious reforms introduced since the eighteenth century tended to undermine the sacredness of the Church as well as the power of the Czar. It was in such circumstances that feelings of revolt bred on all levels of social organization had an opportunity to come into the open, challenging the Czarist regime and all the institutions on which it was based. The people who were treated like wards and minors and were kept in oppressive dependency in the family, in the local community and on the state level rebelled against the system which kept them in perpetual bondage, a trend of events which finally brought about the downfall of the Czardom. The family roots and the development of this personal and social revolt which had shattered the Czardom will be discussed on the following pages.

III

Personality Development

7

PATERNAL VIOLENCE AND COMPASSION

I

TWO CONTRASTING family types, the Turco-Mongol and the Old-Slavonic—one patriarchal and power-oriented and the other matriarchal and equalitarian—seem to have provided the elements out of which the structure of the Great-Russian extended household was shaped. This family community was known among the Great-Russians as the *bolshaya semya* (the great-family). In its fullest development the Great-Russian joint family consisted of grandparents and their descendants, or of a number of married brothers, their wives and descendants, together with some other incorporated persons—such as adopted husbands or children of a widow married to a member of the household. They lived in a number of *izbas* (huts, cabins) built around the *dvor* (courtyard). 596

This family collective was ruled by its eldest male member known as the *bolshak* ("the great man").[1] An elderly woman known as the *bolshuka* ("the great woman") was in charge of the

596 women and children of the household. The power of the bolshak was lifelong, but in case of mismanagement, prolonged illness or want of mental powers, the family adult male members or the village elders could remove him and place another adult male as the head man of the household.[2] All the property: land, farm implements, cattle, buildings, household furniture, and utensils were considered common property of all household members, particularly male adults. But women's clothing and other personal belongings, such as linen and canvas, brought as a dowry or produced by women were considered their private property. When such a household was broken up the common property was divided equally among all the adult male members, regardless of the degree of blood relationship.

The bolshak was assisted in his management by a family council (*soviet*) consisting of married male members, while the bolshuka was assisted by the married females. Though the bolshak's place after his death was taken by his eldest son or his eldest brother, it happened occasionally also that such a household came to be ruled by a woman, if she proved to be an exceptionally resolute personality and good manager.

596 178 476 The remnants of such a family collective persisted in some rural parts of Russia until the beginning of the twentieth century. Such a household in which some of the Old-Slavonic traditions were still in existence was looked upon as a labor association, as much as an association of blood-related families. This is why the heads of such a family commune were designated, not by parental names, as father or mother of the family, but by functional names, as managers of the common property.[3]

596 651 621 Originally the powers of the household soviet were an important check on the authority of the head elder. The soviet assured protection against inequity and tended to maintain equalitarian relationships among the married members of the household. However, early in the development of the Great-Russian society the events tended to favor the power of the bolshak. Following the practices of Mongol rule, frequent censuses were held and frequent levies were imposed on the population according to the number of households or according to acreage. The village community which composed a cess district was made jointly respon-

sible for the whole amount of the tributes and taxes assessed. It 596
was, therefore, in the interest of this land tax commune to favor 651
concentration of power in the hands of the household head and 621
to support his strictness in rule so that each household might contribute at the end of the fiscal year its share of the common tax assessment. With the lack of such a system of control, the taxes of the defaulters might fall on other members of the village community.

To meet the obligations to the tax commune it was necessary 596
for each household to have sufficient manpower and all the farm equipment it needed. Household partition, which implied dispersal of manpower, need for new equipment, and increased taxation, was therefore frowned upon. Loitering or prolonged absence from the community also had to be discouraged. Early marriages, joint households, and rigid supervision by the elders were fostered. In addition, internal household conflicts provoked by forced regimentation and intensified because of lack of privacy, crowded quarters, insufficient food and clothing increased the need for autocratic rule:

> All in the household well know and have learned by experience that in the interest of the well-being of the household it is absolutely necessary that all obey one elder, who has knowledge and experience about the household and upon whom would depend all matters of husbandry.[4]

The landed nobility and the land-owning Church also sup- 596
ported the absolute power of the bolshak and disapproved of 565
household partitions on their estates. The estate owners were 641
bound to furnish the timber and other materials for the construction of new izbas in case of the division of an old household. They also had to provide the new households with farm equipment, all of which was a burden because it implied additional expense for the landlords. At the same time the government, which was constantly engaged in warfare and was increasingly in need of new recruits, found it more expedient to get these from large households so that the tilling of the soil would not suffer and the tax-paying powers would not decrease while military campaigns were taking place. Therefore, all the authori-

596 ties—the state, the Church, the landlords, and the village tax
565 commune—joined hands in backing the collective household sys-
641 tem and the power of its head elder.

II

596 In this manner, under the pressure of circumstances, the *bol-*
178 *shaya* system of jointly ruled community household was gradually giving way to the *otsovskaya* system, that is, the patriarchal family in which the power-oriented steppe traditions tended to take precedence over the Old-Slavonic egalitarianism. Patriarchal traits prevailed especially in the urban strata. The father became absolute master as well as the exclusive owner of the family property in the otsovskaya system. As a result of this change in household structure all family members became economically and personally dependent upon the father; and as long as his power was supported by the state and the Church, they were expected to submit unconditionally to his will; there was no appeal against his arbitrariness, favoritism, and even misbehavior.

As a result of such a development the steppe traditions of life and death power of the father over his wife and children, the relationship of absolute dominance and complete subordination tended to be reinforced and perpetuated. The Church was par-
795 ticularly instrumental in this matter. Under the influence of the
596 Church the father was likened, in the popular mind, to the Almighty. "As God is to the people, so is a father to his children" (*Kak Bog do lyudey, tak otets do detey*),[5] the people would say.

The father had at his disposal a number of ways to impose his will. Owing to the Church teachings, one of the main paternal sanctions consisted of invoking God's wrath This was done
[789] by means of malediction or withdrawal of blessing. Parental curse, as well as lack of parental blessing, was certain to bring great misfortune to the disobedient child (*Lisheniem otsovskogo blagoslovenia shchitaetsa chelovekom propashchim.*)[6] The emphasis on need of parental blessing and fear of disastrous consequences of parental curse is stressed in many Great-Russian folk customs and in their folk sayings, folk songs, and folk tales.[7]

Another instrument at the disposal of the father in imposing

Another instrument at the disposal of the father in imposing discipline on his son consisted of threat of disinheritance and 596 banishment. If an unmarried son left the paternal house during 428 the lifetime of his father to establish his own separate household, the father was not obliged to give him anything and might even let him go "with nothing but his cross" (*s odnim krestom*).[8] But if a married son left with his father's consent, it was the privilege of the father to determine what his share should be.[9] Also in his testamentary disposition, the father was entitled to dispose of family property at will. The father also had the right to disinherit his son and chase him away from home as a punishment for bad behavior, especially disobedience.[10] He also had the power to select the disobedient son for military conscription. According to some sources the father had the right to sell his son "four times."[11] He might show predilection in testamentary disposition.[12] Many tales tell of a father's favoritism toward an obedient son.[13]

But the way the father used most often to impose his will and 593 assert his power was coercion (*prinuzhdenie*) by means of phys- 861 ical beating (*poboi*). The horse whip and the birch rod (*rozga*) were used freely in family relations. The *Domostroy*, a code of Great-Russian family practices and ethics of the urban strata compiled and edited in the sixteenth century by Priest Sylvester, a councillor and confessor of Ivan the Terrible, prescribes in detail the application of corporal punishment as a sanction of the father's authority and rule:

> Beat your son in his youth, and he will comfort you in your old age . . . And do not weaken in beating the child. Beating with a rod will not kill him, but will make him healthier . . . If you will be weak in his childhood, he will make you suffer when he grows up . . . And give him no power in youth but crush his ribs while he is growing, because when he is big he will not obey you, and you will feel annoyed and ill at heart, and your house will be ruined . . . and your enemies will rejoice at your misfortune.[14]

The popular philosophy of life as expressed in the Great- [528] Russian folk proverbs approves of the teachings of the Domostroy. "If God gives you sons, don't be lazy, teach them and beat them"; "If he did not obey his father, he will obey the whip," 593 861 the people would say. Hence, made secure by the prevailing philosophy of life, upheld by court decisions and supported by Church teachings on the supernatural sanction of his will, the father might be tempted to take advantage of his unlimited power and to expose his son to excessively severe and humiliating treatment. "I had born you and I shall kill you," said Taras Bulba to his son and shot him to death.[15]

593 The father might also take advantage of his uncontrolled power in the use of family property and funds. He might gamble them away, spend them on debauchery, or bring the family to ruin as a result of drunkenness or mismanagement. Such incidents in Russian families are often described in autobiographies and other writings of Russian men of letters. It is characteristic of Great-Russian family relations that the other family members were not expected to complain against such extreme abuse of paternal authority.[16] Hence in all strata of Russian society, there was a tendency to accept anything the father did, even the most degrading treatment, as his paternal prerogative. Even if a father had ruined his family because of gambling or lechery he was still held in reverence both by his society and by his children.[17]

606 835 Occasionally, particularly among the peasants, the father might take sexual advantage of his daughters-in-law, a practice which became known as *snokhachestvo* (*snokha* is daughter-in-law). This habit, which was already noticed by the writer of the Kiev Chronicle, was favored by the frequent absences of married sons who spent a part of the year in the city as workers or who were away from home for many years, or indefinitely, when conscripted for military duty. "The more women in the house, the more sin" (*Bolshe bab v semie, bolshe greha*),[18] the people would comment.

593 562 As much as the traditions of the steppe warriors prevailed in the Great-Russian patriarchal family the wife was placed on an equal footing with her children in relation to her husband. She had to show absolute submission and blind obedience to her husband. "The husband is father to his wife" (*Muzh zhene otets*);[19] "Christ is the head of the Church, the husband that of

his wife"; "The husband is the law unto his wife," the proverbs 593
say. As a result of such a view of husband-wife relations, the husband 562 had the right and duty to apply brutal force to his wife as a means of discipline, the same as to his children. "It is woman's fate to be always beaten," the people would say.[20]

The description of folk life in the eastern parts of Russia corroborate this attitude toward wives as expressed in popular sayings. The informants tell of the "miserable fate of the women" (*nepriglyadnaya uchast zheny*),[21] the constant fights of husband and wife (*muzh deretsya s zhenoi*), and the thrashing (*poboi*) to which the wives were exposed on the part of their husbands. In case of adultery the punishment for the woman was "merciless [684] beating" (*neshchadnoe bitie*) or strangling (*udushenie*).[22]

Domostroy, which was under the influence of Church teachings, agrees with this philosophy and practices and even offers elaborate and detailed precepts to the husband about how to treat his wife ". . . if the wife is not afraid of the punishment and does not follow the instructions, the husband should beat her." According to Domostroy only if the wife is blindly and unconditionally submissive "everything will run smoothly in the family." The wife must do everything "to please her husband and God and she must listen to him with fear and awe."[23]

Domostroy was compiled primarily for the urban classes of 369
the Czardom. Its rules reflect a certain deterioration in the 562
status of women as they moved from the peasant to the urban level. In the cities, especially among the merchants, the women were confined to the *terem* (gyneceum) and had less opportunity to work and earn for themselves. In the urban environment, [177]
the Turco-Mongol influences were therefore reinforced.

In the rural areas the women retained their role in economic production. The peasant women were thus enabled to retain some of the the Old-Slavonic traditions; they often knew how to assert themselves and influence family affairs. In a like manner, with the increasing opportunities for schooling in urban centers, a growing number of city women emancipated themselves from family ties and became economically and socially independent. In such circumstances also many women in the urban

562 369 middle and upper strata knew how to assert themselves and increase their role and influence, thus reviving the Old-Slavonic traditions.

III

593 152 Though the father was to be severe and strict, he was expected also to love his wife and his children. Just like God in Heaven, father's duty was to inflict harsh punishment, but he was also to show compassion, kindness, understanding and constant solicitude for the members of his household. He was responsible before God and men for the failings and misdeeds of his family members, and he was therefore to look after their well-being and salvation. Thus love and violence were often mingled in the Great-Russian family. A number of folk sayings express this ambivalent trait of attachment and hostility when referring to the attitudes and behavior of the father. "To love one's wife is to hold her in terror" (*Lyubit zhenu-derzhat grozu*); "Whom I love I thrash" (*Kovo lyublyu togo i biyu*).[24]

One of the basic underlying motives in the father's violence seems to have been his self-seeking and urge for dominance as well as a need for succor. "Beat your wife oftener, it will be useful for the future," the men would say. The Domostroy justifies child beating in a similar manner ". . . he will comfort you in your old age and will give beauty to your soul. . . . and he will make you happy when he grows up. . . . and your enemies will envy you. If you will be weak in his childhood, he will make you suffer when he grows up; will set your soul on edge."[25]

There is in some proverbs also an indication of an expectation of "masochistic" indulgence according to which violence and deprivation would arouse love. "Not to beat one's wife is not to be loved by her" (*zhenu ne bit i milu ne byt*),[26] the people would say. In a folk song, for instance, the husband buys gifts for his wife, but it is of no avail. When the husband buys a knut and gives his wife a beating with it, it is only then that she responds with love. In another folk song the wife boasts the knuting "is an honor to me and is not painful" (*Mne to za chest, ne bolno.*)[27]

Though the father felt dependent upon his wife and children

and was expected to love his family, he was to remain detached 593
and distant. Such paternal behavior was particularly noticeable 152
in the urban strata where both the Turco-Mongol and the Church influences were stronger. "Do not smile at him, do not play with him" is the advice of the Domostroy concerning father-son relations.[28] The father was not supposed to show any outward signs of emotion, neither anger nor affection toward his wife, children, or his servants. Even during the beating the father was expected to remain cold and detached, according to the Domostroy. His love was to be of a charitable and compassionate character. Any kind of personal closeness and familiarity with his wife or children might have undermined an authority that was based on sternness, fear and awe.

A number of autobiographies and other writings of Russian 593
men of letters, as well as the accounts given by foreign observers, 157
stress this duality in the behavior of the father. He is pictured as compassionate, kind and goodhearted, but also as detached, harsh and abusive.[29] A number of these documents tell about the *groza* (terror) in which the father or the grandfather had held all his dependents; about his detachment even when playing with children, and about his inability to be with them on comradely terms or to laugh with them. They often tell about the difficulties the children experienced in attempting to approach their father on intimate and friendly terms, though they felt that he had a "good heart" and was "compassionate":

> My father, true to the family tradition, took up the profession of soldiering . . . To his children he was a comparative stranger but we were terrified of him. We only saw him at meals; he spent the rest of his time in his private rooms which none of us dared to enter save at his command. A masterful, violent nature, he either could not or would not control his temper, and was an object of terror to us and to his servants. However, he had a good heart. But at the period when he lived, harshness had become a moral principle. To show benevolence was to be weak, to be cruel was to be strong . . . and my father, like most men, was cast in the mould of his period. He carefully concealed his feelings under a mask of harshness. He was certainly brutal; he was also compassionate in his own way . . . At this period children, the poor and the weak, and still more the serfs, were scarcely considered to possess a soul. My father reigned, but did not govern.

593 157 Like Jupiter, he only interfered in the affairs of mortals in moments of crisis. But when he did interfere it was no laughing matter, and everybody, from cellar to attic, trembled in his shoes . . .[30]

776 771 This God-like, unapproachable, inscrutable, absolute and arbitrary power of a stern and violent but also benevolent, compassionate and solicitous father was apparently projected into the Russian supernatural world in the form of the *Domovoy,* the house spirit. According to the Great-Russian folk beliefs, the Domovoy was the protector of the house; he had patriarchal prerogatives over it, but also depended upon it. He demanded from the family all kinds of honors. At the same time he was as unpredictable in his behavior as any stereotyped family head in the Great-Russian patriarchal family system.

Thus the Domovoy was at times protective, benevolent and compassionate, but at other times he would become wicked, vindictive and mischievous. He was endowed with supernatural powers and could bring either fortune or calamity upon the family, depending upon his frequently changing moods and dispositions. It was, therefore, considered wise to address him as "Grand Father" and to propitiate and appease him by frequent offerings in viands. If such attention were shown to him he was [782] likely to be helpful. But if he were neglected, he would become enraged and full of wrathful vengeance. In such a case, he could be atoned only by blood; the corners of the izba were sprinkled with blood of a cock that was killed for the occasion and various incantations were uttered.[31]

8

FAMILY CONFLICTS

I

593 **THE FATHER** treated his family members as wards and minors because he was responsible for their well-being, their behavior and their salvation. He had to show a constant solicitude for them (*neustannaya zabota*). The blame for their

failures and their sins would fall upon him. He was emotionally 593 and socially dependent upon the members of his family, yet he had to be stern and distant to maintain his authority.

At the same time, the family members were expected to com- 592 pletely identify themselves with the family as a whole. This submerging of the individual in the family collective was manifested, for instance, in the ideas of common family good, rooted in the Old-Slavonic principles of mutual reponsibility and mutual aid of all community members ("all for one, one for all"). The elder brothers were expected to take care of their minor brothers and of their unmarried sisters; the aged or disabled parents were in the care of their children; the father was expected to maintain his daughter-in-law if she lost her husband or if her husband were away.[1]

Earlier, following Mongol traditions, the family was collec- [672] tively responsible for the misdeeds or crimes of any one of its members.[2] In early Russia, according to the Expanded Version of the *Pravda,* "if anyone attacks and kills another without the [681] slightest provocation, the inhabitants of the district do not make payment for this kind of a murderer, but they shall surrender him, with his wife and children, for sentencing to banishment or imprisonment, and his home shall be given up for plundering."[3] Also later in Muscovite Russia all members of a family were considered involved in the offense of a member.

This complete identification with one's family and this penal philosophy of collective responsibility, of implied collective culpability and family hostages (retained in Russian police practices until nowadays) favored family self-centeredness and self-concern. There was therefore a tendency to draw a curtain of secrecy around the family in order not to expose it to accusations and to protect it from defamation. In the urban strata the master of the household was very much preoccupied with this problem. "Your neighbors will reproach you, and your enemies will rejoice at your misfortune," warns Domostroy. Such family cen- [156] teredness, which was a result of the ascendency of an autocratic state, favored social isolation and lack of intimate contact with neighbors; hence, it fostered also lack of social trust.

Family centrism, family isolation, and lack of trust in one's

592 Familycentrism, family isolation, and lack of trust in one's
771 neighbor were apparently projected into the supernatural world
776 where one's own Domovoy, though at times arbitrary, ill-tempered and spiteful, was generally considered to be benevolent—bringing good luck to the household which was under his care and solicitude. The neighbor's Domovoy, on the other hand, was always a malevolent and wicked being who could never be propitiated and who was likely to steal your hay or drive away your cattle for the benefit of the home which was under his protection.
[789] The Russian peasants, therefore, developed means of defense against the neighbor's Domovoy in the form of spells and exorcisms.

156 Lack of social trust is not favorable to the development of
621 solidarity within a community. Therefore lack of group identi-
578 fication among the peasants and burghers, the same as the lack of the *esprit de corps* among the nobility, contributed to the perpetuation of the autocratic rule. Lack of communal identifications was an obstacle to the turning of group hostilities against the ruling classes. In such circumstances a great deal of personal aggressiveness had to find outlets and targets within the local community and within the family circle itself. Only when the authorities suffered crushing defeat and loss of prestige the hostilities would turn against them and mass uprisings would take place, demanding re-establishment of old communal values.

With the ascendancy of the otsovskaya system, family relations came to be organized in a hierarchical system along the lines of paternity, marriage status, seniority and sex. At one time, only married male members formed the family council (soviet). The males had priority over the females. Within each sex category the elder had priority rights over the younger. When the family was partitioned, custom demanded that the older brothers leave
[428] the ancestral home while the youngest, following Mongol traditions, remained on the paternal *koren* (root).[4] In marrying the
[582] daughters it was the eldest who had to be married first.

In the patriarchal family, in their relations to the father, all
593 family members were expected to accept his rule with fear and awe (*strakh*) and with humility (*smirenie*). They had to show absolute submission and blind obedience (*besprekoslovnoe povinovenie*),[5] as well as love and gratitude (*blagodarnost*).[6]

These attitudes implied complete dependency and self-abnegation on the part of the wife and children in relation to their master. 593 The wife and the children were expected always to speak with respect to the father, that is, in the second person plural instead of the second person singular—the way the children addressed each other or their mother. The wife did not address her husband by his first name, but by his first and second name (patronymic) which was the way less intimate acquaintances addressed each other. The children had to demonstrate their thankfulness for the father's care and solicitude by kissing his hands. Before a bride left her parental home, custom demanded that she say to her father, "God will help you for bread and salt." And he would advise her to be obedient to her new relations: "Be obedient to them the way you were obedient to me" (*slushay kak menia slushala*).[7]

Emphasis on fear and awe, obedience and gratitude was very [157] outstanding in the Great-Russian patriarchal family relations. These feelings and attitudes had a supernatural sanction. As a [861] result of the teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church, it was considered in popular opinion that any disobedience or disrespect of the father's will was mercilessly punished by God who brought life-long misery and misfortune for such unfilial behavior. Even after death, the soul of a disobedient and ungrateful child could hardly escape punishment in the eternal fire of hell. Many Great-Russian folktales place a great emphasis on obedience and gratitude and stress the cruel penalty and fearful fate that awaited a disobedient and ungrateful son.[8]

Such family relations in which demands of a harsh and detached, and even capricious and arbitrary father had to be answered by humility, unconditional submission, blind obedience, love and gratitude; in which family members fought over priorities and rights; where all felt dependent upon one another and isolated from the rest of the world, could not fail to provoke 578 tensions and cause intense family antagonisms and animosities. 596 Such tensions and conflicts became characteristic of the Great-Russian patriarchal family and were manifested in the relations between husband and wife, father and sons, between the siblings and between the in-laws.[9]

II

[582] 606 Perhaps as a result of family centeredness and the need of keeping a distance from one's neighbor, there developed the practice of looking for the bride not in one's own but in another, more remote locality. Brides from afar, who did not have an opportunity to keep frequent contact with their own parents, were considered not only more amenable to control and easier to assimilate, but less dangerous from the point of view of the family's collective responsibility and isolation. "Do not buy a horse nor marry a daughter of your neighbor: both will run away"; "Get a wife from afar, buy a cow from near," the people would say.

[584] Very often there was nothing for a girl to look forward to in her new family. Her mate was not of her choice; he and his family were often complete strangers to her. She might not have even seen any of them before the day of her marriage. Wedding songs always refer to the bridegroom, his home, his father, and his village as "the abode of the strangers," "the unknown, far off land." As soon as the father had "stuck the hands" with the match-maker, the bride-to-be would start to lament and implore her father not to "give her away to the strangers." On the eve of the bride's marriage, her girl friends would come to her home and spend all evening singing *piesni plachevia*—"weeping songs,"[10] while the bride would cry and wail continuously. In these songs the future bride imagines herself as being left completely alone and without any affection in a distant, unknown and unfriendly world.[11]

[538] The anxieties and fears felt by the bride when going away to marry a stranger in a "strange land" might have found, perhaps, a symbolic expression in the *Zmey* tales. Zmey is a mythical being whose function is to deceive and rape young maidens and keep them forever in captivity. In the Great-Russian folk tales the Zmey is pictured as a terrifying "winged" and "many-headed" monster which throws fire from his nostrils and his mouth, but assumes the form of a youth of marvelous beauty before he abducts his victim.[12]

The prospect of the bride's relations with her husband's parents and brothers, and with her sisters-in-law was not any brighter. In folk sayings the father-in-law is often referred to as "worse than a dog," and the mother-in-law as a "wicked satan." Her expectations about the treatment on the part of other in-laws were not more cheerful, as witnessed by the folk songs.[13] 606

When married, she soon realized that "before the husband the wife is always guilty" (*Pered muzhem zhena vsegda vinovata*). And there was no one to whom to complain or from whom to seek comfort. Her own parents and brothers were "far away" or indifferent to her fate, now that she was "cut off from the loaf" and belonged to another family. And if she did not develop an attachment to her husband or to her children, she might have sought an escape from such a difficult emotional situation in extra-marital love affairs, or in fantasies about such affairs. The Great-Russian folk songs are abundant with such themes and often justify these liaisons as a need for love and attachment which was denied to the bride in the home of the husband.[14] Extreme husband-wife antagonism as expressed by murder is occasionally the theme of Great-Russian religious sagas and more frequently the theme of folk tales[15] and of folk songs: 593 [837] [538] [763]

Against my will was I married;
I have taken an evil wife,
An evil one, not to my liking,
Neither in feeling nor in thought.
Lovingly live with her—that will I not.
Across the stream will I go,
Love will I make to the girls.
As for that wife of mine
I will go pray for her death.
Along the bank of the stream
Death, the beautiful, goes.
"Ho there! My beautiful Death!
Turn thee back again, Death!
Make an end of my wife."
Scarce had I spoken—when Death
Began her work with my wife.
Scarce had I time to look around—
Shrouded in linen white was her corpse
Struck was the stroke on the bell.[16]

III

593 No less intense seems to have been the tension between father and son. The son in this family was placed in a difficult position in respect to the absolute power of his father, sanctioned by the Church, by the local authorities, by the landlord, and by the law of the state. According to the Church teachings and according to the popular opinion, the parent's blessing brought good fortune and the parent's curse life-long misery. There was also fear of disinheritance, banishment, and military conscription. But there was also a strong desire for freedom and independence from an arbitrary and brutal paternal authority.

Open rebellion against this authority was not expedient, nor advisable. Leaving home without the father's consent was practically impossible because all the authorities would support the [486] father against the son. Without father's consent the police would not issue a passport which was necessary for travelling within the country. There was also a strong emotional resistance against fighting back one's father because, according to the popular view of life, "The hands which beat the father shall never be able to earn anything." Besides, as long as the father was physically stronger the outcome of such a struggle did not look promising.

There was, however, also a tendency on the part of the son to attach himself to his father, and to identify himself with him. But since the father tended to be detached and stern and might even abuse his son, the son had difficulties in experiencing a close and warm relationship with father and to identify himself with him. And since the father was not always harsh but often good hearted, compassionate and kind, the deprivation of a friendly and intimate contact with the father was painfully felt as a rejection. The result was the development of ambivalent feelings of identification and rebellion, of love and hatred in father-son relations. "When I have a father, I feel like killing him; when I have none, I feel like buying one," was the people's saying.

A son's wounded pride and rebellion against a tyrannical and abusive father took on normally a silent and inner form, at least as long as the father remained physically stronger than his son. This inner form of revolt was sometimes manifested in a secret desire for his father's death.[17] Only then was there hope for freedom. A folk maxim, for instance, says: "When the earth takes the parents, the children get their freedom." Such an extreme form of revolt, however, was not so simple because it went counter to the accepted image of the father, his supernaturally sanctioned absolute power, his care and solicitude for the welfare of all the family, and the traditional obligation of love and gratitude towards him on the part of the family members. Hence antagonistic attitudes against the father were regularly mixed with strong feelings of guilt. 593 [152]

Both the feeling of guilt and the fear of being rejected by the father might have perhaps been manifested in those folk tales which tell gruesome and frightful stories about children who were abandoned by their parents[18] and left at the mercy of wild beasts, frost, open sea, and in those folk tales in which the children are dismembered by their own parents and thrown away in small pieces. That the father himself sensed a potential feeling of rebelliousness on the part of his son and that he himself might have had a feeling of guilt because of his treatment of his son is witnessed by folk sayings which express a dread of old age with its dependency upon one's own children: "To pay old debts and to feed old parents are the hardest things in the world"; "One father will feed nine children sooner than nine children will feed one father"; "God take away my life rather than let me be under my son's care."[19] [538] [888]

There were other tensions and conflicting situations in the Great-Russian patriarchal family, particularly in the urban strata. The principle of seniority, for instance, reserved disciplinary privileges and responsibilities for the brothers in relation to their sisters, and for the senior brothers and sisters in relation to their juniors. At the same time a father's absolute power often took the form of favoritism in respect to a younger son, or to a daughter, which was counter to the established principles of seniority and therefore considered unjust. There was therefore plenty of opportunity for resentments, rivalries, jealousies, hatreds, and fights among the siblings, or between the older and the younger family members: 593 578

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The family was divided into two clans, the elder and the younger. The elder ones were proud, rich, all powerful, fearing none but Jupiter [father]. They had fine rooms where they could run about and play without fear of colliding with the furniture; they lived in style and despised us, and punished us. The youngsters were weak and oppressed, with only a little room as their domain; they were kept running errands and had sweets to eat only on the rare occasion when they were given a few. They were teased and were accused of lying when they were not telling lies; . . . They had none to defend them against the iniquity of the elders . . . The two clans carried on constant warfare. The elders . . . would treat the youngsters as vassals and make fun of them.[20]

In the homes of merchants and petty officials, frictions, tensions, and animosities were so outstanding a feature of family life as late as the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, that they formed a recurrent theme in Russian belles-lettres of those days, such as in the works of Dostoyevsky and of Ostrovsky. N. Dobrolyubov, a noted Russian critic, commenting on the writings of Ostrovsky, asserted that it was the system of tyranny which caused cunning, hatred, lack of justice and of human dignity in the family.[21] In a similar way Peter Kropotkin, observing family relations in various strata of Russian society in the second part of the nineteenth century, claimed that, "quite a network of habits and customs of domestic slavery, of utter disregard of human individuality, of despotism on the part of the fathers, and of hypocritical submission on that of the wives, the sons, and the daughters, had developed."[22] [157]

9

MOTHER-CHILD ATTACHMENT

I

THOUGH the internal situation in the Great-Russian patriarchal family tended to be rather tense, the role played by the mother was likely to introduce into that family an element of moderation and emotional integration.

ment of moderation and emotional integration. In the early 593
Slav society, mother's role in all family affairs was very significant. 562
With the growth of the patriarchal family, one of her important duties came to be that of intercessor and of protector against the wrath of the father. In the patriarchal family the [861]
mother was not the chief disciplinarian; therefore she did not have to resort to threat, violence, privations, and humiliation as a means of discipline. Her punishments were mild and her main means of control were those of love and reasoning. Her authority and self-respect were therefore not endangered by being close to children and by being on familiar terms with them. She was always available and approachable. The children, therefore, felt much more at ease and free in the presence of their mother than in that of their father.[1]

The mother, if feeling neglected, abused or degraded by a [154]
remote and harsh husband, was likely to seek compensation for the lack of love and for wounded self-esteem by being over-protective and over-affectionate in relation to her children, expecting indulgent response from them. The son, if barred in his desire for attachment to his father or if abused and humiliated by him, might feel the more attracted to his mother as a means of emotional outlet and as compensation for feelings of rejection and humiliation.

It is this role of the mother as warm protector and close friend 593
that has been expressed in folk sayings and other products of 538
folk philosophy and imagination. "Fear your father, and respect your mother" says a Russian folk proverb pointing out the sharp contrast in the attitude of a child toward his father and his mother. The folk sayings emphasize also the intimate and tender bond that exists between mother and child and the importance of such close ties for the child. "Without a father the child is half orphan, without a mother a child is a complete orphan"; "Mother's beating does not hurt"; "Mother raises her hand high, but does not strike hard." Because of such close mother-child relationship, it was considered in the popular view of life that mother's influence on the child was in the long run deeper than that of the father. "What mother puts into the child's head, the father will not knock out," the people would say.

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538 The Great-Russian epic legends have the same image of the mother. One of the most peculiar and significant aspects of these narratives is that in times of distress, in moments of gloom or when gripped by strong feelings of guilt it is often the mother who comes to the rescue of the *bogatyr* (legendary hero), gives him solace, helps him with advice, places her treasure at his disposal.[2] The mother is considered to be of such a great value that heroes, in the course of their feasting and drinking bouts, when boasting of their war exploits, of their horses and possessions, boast also of their mothers:

One boasts of his good steed,
One boasts his silken breeches,
One boasts his villages with hamlets,
One boasts his towns with their suburbs,
One boasts of his dear mother,
But the foolish one boasts of his young wife.[3]

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771 Mother's role as a moderator *vis-à-vis* a harsh and detached father was expressed very early in the Russian religious lore. For instance, one of the most popular religious tales of early Russia was the one of the "journey of the Mother of God through the Inferno." In this story the *Bogoroditsa* (Birth-giver to God), impressed by the tortures of sinners, implored God to pardon them. At first God was implacable, but finally, as a result of Bogoroditsa's supplication, he promised some relief in their suffering.[4] In the same manner the contemporary Russian religious folk poetry often pictures the Mother of God as the "fastest helper" and as the "warm interceder":

Mother mine—Mother Maria,
Purest maiden—The Most Holy
Mother of the World—Maria,
Most holy Birthgiver to God,
Beautiful sun,
Purest dove,
Mother of God,
The fastest helper,
The warm interceder
Intercede, save and have mercy.[5]

This idealized image of mother as a helper and interceder that 593
was projected into religious lore has been manifested also in 771
widespread Madonna worship. The cult of the Bogoroditsa was noticeably developed in Russian society from the days of its conversion to Christianity. The old Russian princes of the Kiev period invoked the help of the Mother of God, dedicated their cities to her, and wrote prayers to her.[6] Throughout many centuries Madonna icons were very widely in use and prayers to Madonna were very frequent in the religious practices of the Russian Church. Some of the most outstanding Russian Orthodox cathedrals have been dedicated to the Mother of God.

Identification with mother is seen in the often used phrase 593
"Mother Russia" and in the word *rodina*—"mother-country." Also rivers and cities are regularly identified with mother (Mother Volga, Mother Moscow). The days in the week which [796]
are considered holy or consecrated are sometimes identified with mother, such as Mother Wednesday, Mother Friday.[7] And in Russian epic poetry, the whole earth is invariably identified with mother in the often-repeated phrase *Mat syra zemlya*—moist Mother Earth.

Of course other attachments took place in the Great-Russian family as manifested in the identification of a younger brother with his older brother and in frequent father-daughter emotional ties. There were, also, families in which mother appeared not in her expected role of close friend and protector but in that of a domineering and tyrannical despot. All such relations had their particular effects on the development of a child's personality, as we shall see on the following pages.

10

DEPENDENCE, SENSE OF GUILT, FEAR

I

WHEN a child's demand for attention and love is 000
thwarted by a dominating and forbidding father, feelings of

000 inadequacy and dependency, lack of self-reliance and need for complete submissiveness to authority might be fostered. At the same time the attraction to an unapproachable and unattainable father and the feeling of revolt against his despotism, seeking solace from mother and reaction against her over-protection might cause a constant alternation between extremes of these emotional reactions and therefore reinforce the sense of guilt. The feeling of guilt might then provoke a need to confess, to accuse and punish oneself and to submit again completely to the parent's will in the hope to win his acceptance. Self-incriminatory tendencies which have been acquired in this manner might be generalized and extended to relationships on other social levels.

783 Lanin, an English writer who closely observed Russian behaviour in the second part of the nineteenth century, found that the sense of guilt was "extremely developed."[1] According to this observer there was not only a tendency to confess one's guilt but there was also on the part of the public an insistence on confession of guilt. Moreover, as in the teaching of the Russian Church, confession of guilt was often accepted in social relations as equal to an eradication of sin and therefore demanded forgiveness. "He who confesses has repented, and he who has repented has wiped out his sin," is a Russian folk saying.

[695] Such attitudes and feelings supported the inquisitorial system of justice where the emphasis was on the formality of confession, regardless of the means by which confession has been extorted. Thus since the main emphasis was on confession everything was done to obtain it. If the victim showed any reticence or reluctance, his accusers did not hesitate to employ moral coercion and physical torture to force confession out of him. Once confession was obtained, the conscience of all the participants seemed to have been satisfied:

> . . . Straightway the people rushed
> At the three fleeing murderers; they seized
> The hiding miscreants and led them up
> To the child's corpse, yet warm; when lo! a marvel . . .
> The lifeless little one began to tremble!
> "Confess!" the people thundered; and in terror
> Beneath the ax the villains did confess . . .[2]

Aware of such attitudes and practices and sometimes also moved by a genuine sense of guilt, many of the accused were ready to confess and to incriminate themselves. Hense self-accusatory confessions became common to all strata of Russian society, including the intelligentsia. Thus, for instance, when the Russian anarchist leader Bakunin had been extradited to the Czarist police he wrote a *Confession to the Czar* full of extreme self-recriminations. In his confession this leading Russian conspiritor and revolutionary said that he merited the sternest penalties known to Russian law because his thoughts and actions had been "in the highest degree ridiculous, senseless, presumptuous, and criminal . . . criminal against God, my Emperor, criminal against Russia, my country, criminal against all laws, political and moral, divine and human."[3] Formerly, said Bakunin, he stifled the voice of conscience which warned him of the wickedness of his ways. But now "he can only be thankful that his arrest has been brought to an end," before more harm could be done by "my idle, useless, and criminal career." In his confession Bakunin had put himself completely at the mercy of the "wrathful and dread" Czar, admitting that he deserved the sternest penalty. It is of interest to note that Bakunin had also compared himself to a repentant son before an irate father: (". . . a prodigal, estranged and perverted son before an insulted and angry father.") 783 157

In a like manner, Leo Tolstoy, the apostle of the philosophy of non-resistance, in his confession humbly repents and tends to go to extremes in castigating himself for the sins of his youth:

> . . . I wished with all my heart to be good but I was young, I had passions . . . I cannot recall those years without dread, loathing, and anguish of heart. I killed people in war and challenged to duells# to kill; I lost money at cards, wasting the labour of the peasants; I punished them, fornicated, and cheated. Lying, stealing, acts of lust of every description, drunkenness, violence, murder. There was not a crime which I did not commit . . . At that time I began to write through vanity, avarice, and pride. In my writings I did the same as in life. In order to have glory and money, for which I wrote, I had to conceal what was good and speak what was bad. And so I did.[4]

On the folk level the strength and prevalence of guilt feelings combined with a deeply rooted need and demand for forgiveness

#[sic -- Analyst]

783 [157] might be indicated in the farewell greeting phrase: *prashchaite* (forgive me). The same sentiment is manifested in readiness to shed tears at the slightest provocation. Easy and frequent weeping is found in all strata of Russian society, men and women alike. Autobiographies, belles-lettres as well as folk literature, give ample evidence for this phenomenon. Religious practices of the Russian Church support such needs and demand that repentance be manifested in frequent tears. There are even practical precepts in Russian Church literature about how to provoke tears:

> If you have no tears, do not despair; sigh frequently and heavily from all the heart; for tears are the gift of God, and by and by, with sighs and prayers you will obtain them from God. . . . Having found tears, preserve them with all your strength.[5]

II

It appears that this sense of guilt and passion for confession and self-incrimination, which are rooted in patriarchal family structure, might be strengthened and promoted by a social system in which one is utterly at the mercy of arbitrary superior forces that are not bound nor limited by any moral obligations or any superior principles of law or justice. If one has aroused the anger of such forces he may have a slight hope of forgiveness and salvation only if he completely gives up his individuality, renounces all struggle, and prostrates himself before the omnipotent powers, begging for pity and commiseration.

783 771 157 The annals of Russia's political, social and juridical history give much evidence of such feelings and attitudes. It is perhaps in the field of religion where such sense of utter helplessness before a fearful superior force is projected. There is a tendency in Russian religious beliefs to picture at the one end of the Universe a stern and implacable God and at the other end of it a helpless mankind which is at the complete mercy of this detached and fearful Ruler. But the orphans, the poor, the needy and the repentant, in other words those who are utterly helpless and dependent can expect compassion from Him.[6] Hence there is emphasis both on fear and humility in Russian Orthodoxy.

That image of God and attitudes toward him might be to a 771
certain extent projections of social and political relations could 157
be seen, for instance, in the *Hundred Chapters*, a practical code of several centuries of Russia's early Christian life. This code stresses the need for fear and awe of earthly powers as a way to train oneself in fear and awe of God. "A pupil fears the master's cudgel more than the master himself"; "After them (masters), bow your head with humility, before every rich man"; "Those who have received power and fortune from their Tsar require glory also from their friends and demand veneration from minors." "Bow your head to everybody senior to you . . . fear the prince with all your power . . . from him you will learn how to fear God. . . . Who does not fear the earthly lord, how will he fear Him whom he does not see." "With the fear of God, as with a bridle, restrain your mind, keeping a watch on yourself every hour."[7]

This tendency to project the fear of omnipotent earthly powers into the supernatural world persisted as long as the autocratic and despotic powers of the Father and of the Czar were perpetuated and as long as the Church identified itself with the state. Describing her confessor, a Russian princess said that: "His [the priest's] principles were exactly those of my uncle; he was an extreme monarchist representing God as absolute monarch of the universe, and identifying the ideas of religion with a kind
of rigorous bureaucracy, controlling every detail of life."[8] The 771
image of a demanding God giving nothing in return penetrated 776
all the strata of Great-Russian society, the peasants and the merchants, as well as the nobility and the intelligentsia:

> *Nyanya* [nurse] was entrusted with my religious instruction . . . She thought God was just like the Czar, except that one lived in heaven and the other on earth. He was the most powerful of all beings and inclined to be stern rather than merciful. At any rate she always spoke of his severity and never of his goodness. "He'll teach you to behave yourself! He doesn't forgive people! He is pitiless when He is offended!" . . . The saints were of negligible importance in her eyes.[9]

Chaikovsky, the renowned Russian composer, had a similar idea of God as a fearful being: "I had toward Him (and even

771 now my feelings have not changed) a feeling of wonder but at
776 the same time also of fear. He created Heaven and earth. He too created me—and still even though I bow before Him, there is no love."[10] Michael Bakunin only elaborated on this basic popular concept of the Russian Orthodox God when he pictured the Lord as "God of vengeance and rage" who delights in eternal torturing of human beings and who is so "bloodthirsty and cruel" that he decided that his own son should be tortured and put to death by means of crucifixion.[11] A similar image of a self-seeking, dominating, arbitrary, and cruel God is found also
[538] in some Russian religious folk poems:

> Your gifts are not dear to me
> But dear to me are your souls.
> And I will be God above Gods,
> I will be Tzar above Tzars.
> And I will pick the apostles myself,
> And I will give them my mark,
> And I will give them my baptism.
> I will send them in all countries
> Who will receive them, will save himself
> And who does not, he will be tortured.[12]

Before such a God, like before the omnipotent earthly powers, there is nothing one can do but resign himself to his fate and await for God's decision at his *Strashny Sud* (Terrible Judgment). Thus when Fletcher asked a Russian Orthodox Bishop if he knew he was going to be saved the answer was that ". . . he knew not whether he should bee saved or no: but if God would *poshallovat* (take compassion on) him, or gratifie him so much as to save him, so it was, hee would be glad of it; if not what remedie?"[13] Such an image of an omnipotent, fierce and arbitrary God, the same as that of an all-powerful and harsh Father or Czar, might inspire humility, blind obedience and unconditional submissiveness; it might provoke also strong feelings of guilt, and a need for repentance and expiation of one's sins. Thus, next to fear, Russian religion emphasizes meekness and asceticism as a means of survival in the face of all-mighty and arbitrary powers.[14]

In this manner popular religious ideas and practices which

[Ivan the Terrible]

In this manner popular religious ideas and practices which 771 182
might have developed as a response to the interpersonal relations in the family and in the Czardom in their own turn tended to perpetuate the existing social and political order, its institutions and practices. There were, however, other aspects of interpersonal relations intrinsic to that social organization which provoked responses that tended not to perpetuate it, but to undermine it and to destroy its very foundations. These important agents of structural change in Russian society will be discussed on the following pages.

11

POWER-SEEKING, MISTRUST, AND DESTRUCTIVE AGGRESSION

I

A CHILD who has been rejected and humiliated by a stern and scornful father, but who has been spoiled by an overindulgent mother might respond to such a situation by developing an exaggerated concern for his own ego, and an extreme intolerance for privations and denials. And in case the mother cannot serve as a satisfactory substitute for rejection by the father, complete detachment from the group, and pity for an abandoned, degraded and suffering self might develop. In such circumstances also a deeply rooted suspicion of others, an unbridled desire for power, and an overwhelming hate and urge for destruction of all those who stand in one's path might take place. 000

The life histories of a number of Russian rulers and intelligentsia apparently show such an effect of their family environment.[1] Childhood experiences and character traits of Ivan the Terrible, for instance, provide an outstanding example. There is sufficient evidence for the contention that the strange behavior of this Czar was rooted in rejection and in alternating mistreat- 593 154 159

[Ivan the Terrible]

[Dobrolyubov]

593 ment and indulgence to which Ivan was exposed as a child. Early
154 in his life Ivan was left an orphan. His father died when he was
159 four and he lost his mother four years later. As a child Ivan was reared among crouching servility as well as among arrogance, violence, and contempt. He was greatly pampered on the part of some of his tutors and courtiers, but also often deeply wounded on the part of others. Some of the boyars at the court would annoy him and insult him. They would arrest and threaten with death persons to whom Ivan was attached.

In his own writings, Ivan tells us how much he suffered because he was deprived of his attachments and frustrated in his expectations. It is possible, that it was as a result of such experiences that Ivan developed ideas of rejection, persecution and self-pity, as well as an urge for self-assertion by means of destructive aggression. He sought for himself power which was as overwhelming as that of omnipotent God and asserted himself by means of ruthless violence. "My parents never had a care for me," he claimed. He also said: "In vain I have looked for some man to have pity upon me, but have found no one. Yea, no comforter have I found, but only such as have rewarded me evil for good and hatred for love."[2] He felt emotionally very dependent upon his wife and blamed the courtiers for her early death. He himself explained his assassinations of the boyars on that ground. "Why divided ye me from my wife? Had ye not taken from me my *unitza* (heifer—young wife), never had there been the slayings of the boyars."[3] The old documents say about Ivan
[159] that "He pitieth not men, nor yet yieldeth. Likewise, he loveth not contrary speech, but doth conceive anger against them who do speak it."[4] He is described by his biographers as "self-seeking, opinionated, ferocious and self-willed."

More recent evidence of the effect of rejection-indulgence is given by Dobrolyubov, one of the outstanding Russian intellectual rebels of the second part of the nineteenth century. According to his biographers and according to his own diary, Dobrolyubov was thwarted in his attachment to his father, a clergyman, who was detached, harsh and even brutal in dealings with his son. Dobrolyubov was very close to his mother, but this relation apparently did not compensate for the thwarting and

[Dobrolyubov]

593 154 159 humiliating treatment which Dobrolyubov experienced at the hands of his father. As a reaction to such a family situation, Dobrolyubov developed strong needs for emotional attachment and felt very disillusioned and deeply embittered when his need for dependency was frustrated. When he was sixteen years of age this "forerunner of Bolshevism" wrote in his diary:

> No matter how many attachments I had formed in the past, always the evil fate would whisk the beloved being far away from me; and in my soul remains only the sorrowful memory and bitter realization of my despair . . . I could never live without love, without attachment to someone. This has been so ever since I remember myself. But this constant irony of fate, which makes all my hopes and dreams usually crash into dirt, constantly hardens and chills my heart, and there is nothing surprising in the fact that soon it will be both hard and cold as stone.[5]

517 156 Later, apparently, Dobrolyubov found an outlet for his repressed hostilities, in his writings in which he tended to emphasize the dark sides of Russian society ("Realm of Darkness"). He joined that group of "Nihilists" who excelled in their philosophy of extreme individualism, who attacked the existing society and devised the ways to destroy "coldbloodedly" its very foundations, including the family. It was in this ideology of "Nihilism" that Russian Anarchism as well as Bolshevism have been rooted.

000 The demand for unlimited power as a means of compensation for humiliations and deprivations and as a means of satisfying craving for acceptance and support tends to perpetuate a political system which gives one a chance to indulge such needs through relationships of absolute dominance and unconditional submission and through destructive action. Such a social and political structure, in its own turn, tends to reinforce paternal despotism and absolute obedience in the family. In this manner, just as in the society of steppe marauders, power-seeking, mistrust and destructive aggression are perpetuated, become generalized and are manifested in many social relations.

152 556 844 On the folk level desire for power was manifested, for instance, in the customs connected with childbirth. On that occasion the midwife would place the child on a sheepskin coat or furcoat so

152 that he might be rich and powerful in life.[6] For the same reason
556 money was placed in the water when the child was bathed for the
844 first time.[7]

152 In marriage customs the urge for power was expressed in certain activities performed during the marriage ritual and believed
585 to contain magical properties that enabled either one or the other spouse to dominate. Also in the wedding party the bridegroom was called "knyaz" (prince) and his party "boyars"; an important part of the marriage ceremonies consisted in *velichat gostei*, that is in mutual glorification of the wedding guests.

152 The phrase *Kak vas velichat?*—how to glorify you?, which
551 is employed when asking another person his name might indicate the same feelings. In early Russia personal names were formed by a combination of words which conveyed the image of rule, glory, power, holiness and destruction, such as Sviatoslav (the holy and glorious), Yaropolk (blazing power), Mstislav (the glory of revenge).

[152] Another manifestation of power-seeking, mistrust and destruc-
562 tive aggression on the folk level is revealed, for instance, in attitudes toward women. The folk image of the woman is in remarkable contrast to the image of the mother. The derisive name for woman is *baba,* and baba is said "not to be a human being" (*Baba ne chelovek*), according to a proverb. Therefore mistreatment and abuse of women may be justified.[8] In the folk parlance distinction is made between *Krestyane* (Christians, peasants) and *zhenshchiny* (women). In the folk maxims women are pictured as immoral ("Three babas Sodom"), shameless ("A baba laughs where grandpa blushes"), more cunning than the devil ("Where the devil fails he sends a baba"), the cause of all man's troubles ("She was the cause of Adam's banishment"), and source of all evil ("We cannot expect any good from our rib").[9]

This folk concept of woman as an inferior being is found on
[illegible] all levels of Russian society. Comparatively few women have been admitted to the rank of saints in the Russian Church. Count Leo Tolstoy, a philosopher and novelist, who has been otherwise renowned for his ideas of Christian love, all-human brotherhood and an anarchic social and political equality, showed a great deal of misogynism. In his diary he pictures

women as stupid and nasty, conceited and licentious, and as the 562
mainspring of all calamities of the world.[10] But Tolstoy, too, like
the Russian popular view of life, did make a distinction between
the woman and the mother.[11]

Hostile drives, mistrust and destructive aggression might be 152
revealed also in attitudes towards strangers. These are sometimes 609
likened to animals, especially dogs. Comparing people with 186
beasts indicates an inclination to abase them and to mistreat them. Such an attitude is shown especially toward those who are considered to be "enemies." When talking about the Tartars, the people would say "the dog of a Tartar." In a like way, xenophobia was manifested in the attitudes toward the "thrice accursed Latins," that is, the Western, non-Orthodox peoples.

Perhaps this need to abuse and to destroy in order to demonstrate 152
one's power was manifested also in treatment of those 727
who were abandoned and helpless, such as prisoners in foreign 669
wars, as well as prisoners in rebellions and civil wars at home, or convicted criminals. In the rebellions and civil wars atrocities were committed by both sides, the government troops and the rebels, the Orthodox and the Dissenters, the Whites and the Reds. In a similar manner convicted criminals, domestic servants and serfs were often used as targets of destructive aggression.

Tendency to abuse was manifested also in the relations between 152
merchants and customers, capital and labor. In the lowest 735
strata ruthless self-seeking took also the form of begging. There was a great number of beggars; begging became a widely spread business. Some of the beggars became people of considerable means. Leaders among the beggars would mutilate, deprive of eyesight, and deform healthy men and boys to use them as their instruments in begging. Entire villages, and even some regions were said to have made begging their regular profession.[12]

II

In circumstances where power-seeking, destructive aggression 000
and mistrust prevail any accident may be interpreted as a sign of another person's hostile intentions. The other person tends to be looked upon as a potential enemy. "You mustn't stroke anyone's head—you might get your hand bitten off," said Lenin.[13] And as

000 a self-protection on any sign of hostility a preventive war or feud must be initiated.[14] Hence also craftiness and cunning, readiness to lie and to commit perjury[15] and a general wiliness and wariness might easily develop.[16] When a society is to a large extent governmentalized and regimented, such traits are reinforced because in such conditions the feeling of insecurity and lack of trust favor ruthless domineering and coercive submission on all levels of social organization.

In circumstances where power-seeking, extreme self-concern and lack of mutual trust prevail there is a readiness of many people to spy on one another and to inform. There is also an inclination to caluminate[1] as a means of revenge and personal malice.

152 154 [273] Destructive aggressiveness and feeling of insecurity, as well as need for succor, may explain the passion for hazardous games and intoxicating drink, and the inclination toward lechery. That liquor is used as a compensatory device which provides a feeling of power and security as contrasted to a reality in which one is cowed into submission is well expressed in folk philosophy. According to a proverb, "When the peasant is drunk, he feels equal to a nobleman; when he is sober he is afraid even of a pig."[17] Hence, in a society in which people find themselves subdued, degraded, and oppressed and where their needs for attachment and acceptance are thwarted, a safe way to rebel against such conditions or to find a convenient substitute may be in drunkenness and debauchery. The early Church documents, as well as the recent evidence, point to the perseverance of such practices:

> [786] [781] Numerous are the sermons devoted to invectives against drunkenness and the pagan character of banquets . . . This wild debauch of popular feasts was preserved until the twentieth century, with the same scenes of drunken fighting and killing as are depicted in this document of the thirteenth century. Orgiasm . . . unrestrained emotional outbursts, stimulated by alcohol, dancing, fighting, or sex, always has been an outstanding feature of Russian temperament.[18]

[1] [sic -- Analyst]

12

IDENTIFICATION WITH SUFFERING AND DEMAND FOR ACCEPTANCE

I

WANT of affection and self-pity experienced by a rejected child could be generalized. Identification with a humiliated and suffering mother might foster or reinforce the same tendencies. As a result sympathy is extended to others who suffer and desire might be expressed or action may be taken to alter conditions which cause all human misery. These ideas and attitudes are then strengthened by those patterns of family relationships which stress responsibility of one for well-being and salvation of all and which favor group orientation and social solidarity. 000

Such family experiences might affect the whole life careers of some people. If these happen to be intellectual and political leaders, their emotional responses could have a significant influence on the course of the intellectual and political history of their countries. Thus, in Russia feelings of rejection and identification with those who suffer gave a strong emotional support to ideologies which sought a Messianic salvation of all suffering humanity.

A number of outstanding literary figures of Russia in the middle of the nineteenth century, such as Herzen, Belinsky, and Nekrasov, demonstrated in their writings a strong aversion for the existing social system in Russia, expressed irreverence for the old values, showed love of new and challenging ideas, and exhibited a remarkable fighting spirit of revolutionary character. At the same time, they all tended to idealize the Russian people, professed great love, enthusiasm and admiration for the common folk and felt a great compassion for the poor and the suffering everywhere. They believed that the main purpose of literature 538 517

[Belinsky]
[Nekrasov]
[Herzen]

538 517 was to convey to the masses a social message. In their literary essays they stressed the social and political ills of Russia and believed in the Westernization of their country as a way out of its social and political difficulties.

(593) 159 (157) It is reported that Belinsky grew up with the feeling of revolt against the despotism of his father who tyrannized the family. Nekrasov, "at the age of 17 . . . broke with his father whom he detested even as he idolized his mother" . . . And it was Nekrasov who in his writings showed an especially "great and unfeigned compassion for the poor and the suffering" and who "idealized and worshipped the Russian people,"[1] that is, the people who have been exposed to an age long misery. In a similar manner Herzen had generalized his childhood experiences and had transferred his reactions to all human kind. As a child he showed a strong reaction against his "inaccessible" father and a deep sympathy for all those whom his father abused:

> . . . the hushed voices and noiseless steps of the servants were no sign of devotion, but of repression and fear. All impulsiveness and frankness my father disliked and called familiarity; and all display of feeling passed with him for sentimentality. And when this proud old man, with his clear understanding and sincere contempt of mankind, played this part of a passionless judge, whom did he mean to impress by the performance: A woman whose will he had broken, though she never tried to oppose him; a boy whom his own treatment drove from mere naughtiness to positive disobedience; and a score of footmen whom he did not reckon as human beings! . . . Always on his guard, discontented with everyone, he suffered when he saw the feelings he inspired in every member of the household. Smiles died away and talk stopped whenever he came into the room. Stinging mockery and cool contemptuous irony were the weapons which he could wield with the skill of an artist, and he used them equally against us and against the servants. There are few things that a growing boy resents more; and, in fact, up to the time of my imprisonment I was on bad terms with my father and carried on a petty warfare against him, with the men and maids for my allies . . . did I deserve that he should preach even the truth in a manner so repulsive to the heart of youth? His intelligence, chilled by a long life spent in a corrupt society, made him suspicious of all the world; his feelings were not warm and did not crave for reconciliation; and therefore he remained at enmity

[Herzen]
[Sophia Perovskaya]

with all his fellow creatures . . . I felt intense pity for the old man, but I could do nothing—he was inaccessible.[2] 159

The liberalizing influences which were penetrating Russia 593
from the West reinforced urges of revolt against despotism as [177]
well as feelings of identification with suffering masses. By the 154
second part of the nineteenth century the reaction against the tyrannical family environment and oppressing political system took often an extreme form. It is common knowledge that many Russian terrorists and assassins of the second part of the nineteenth century grew up exposed to constant family tensions and personal humiliations, and sought total destruction of society. Others were inclined to identify themselves with all who were abused. Thus we find the urge for destruction and identification [668]
with suffering as fundamental aspects of the ideology of Russian revolutionary movements. For instance, Kropotkin, the outstanding Russian Anarchist directly related his revolutionary activities to his identification with all those who were persecuted. He appealed to all who were exposed to maltreatment to rise against their oppressors:

> Ay, all of us together, we who suffer and are insulted daily, we are a multitude whom no man can number. We are the ocean that can embrace and swallow up all else. When we have but the will to do it, that very moment will justice be done; that very instant the tyrants of the earth shall bite the dust.[3]

Or take, for instance, Sophia Perovskaya, one of the plotters 668
in the assassination of Czar Alexander II. According to her biog- 154
raphers her father was a willful despot "such as the patriarchal 159
system alone could have produced," and her mother, "constantly humiliated and insulted," remained at home to protect the children. Thus, in her own family Perovskaya learned to hate oppression and developed her love for the oppressed and weak. For her mother, one of the down-trodden, she had a love "bordering upon adoration."[4] Catherine Breshkovskaya, another outstanding Russian revolutionary, who became known as the "little grandmother of the Russian revolution," tells us in her reminiscences and letters how her childhood experiences affected her feelings, thoughts, and actions throughout her life:

[Catherine Breshkovskaya]
[Bakunin]

154 How many times, stupefied and shocked, I have been the witness of
159 such humiliating, degrading, excruciating things! How many times I
668 have thrown myself at my father's feet to implore pardon for a so-called culprit, whose only fault, perhaps, was to have fallen asleep while herding the sheep! How many times I have been indignant to see how hundreds of peasants would be kept waiting in the courtyard, bare-headed and shivering with cold, waiting for the master to appear, after making them wait all day, would send them off without a word, so taken up was he with gambling at cards with other lords, who in their turn were making their coachmen wait on the carriage box till their hands were frozen! These things tormented my childish mind, and pursued me even into my bed, where I would lie awake for hours, unable to sleep for thinking of all the horrors about me. Child as I was, I could not understand why these honest folk should bear the entire burden of work and of taxes. I saw that my father, good though he was, put much more heart into looking after his own interests than the interests of his serfs, and I was shocked at the inequality between the rich and the poor. From the age of eight, how to find justice was the question that troubled me.[5]

538 Identification with suffering is outstanding in the literary
771 works of Dostoyevsky. Influenced by religious feelings, he considered his own sufferings as a blessing. He identified Russia with crucified Christ and regarded the sufferings of the Russian people as a means by which the wrongs of all mankind will be expiated so that a new and better order will prevail on the earth: "All men will be holy and love one another, and there will be no more rich nor poor, no exulted nor humbled, but all will be as the children of God, and the true Kingdom of Christ will come."[6]

II

593 Not in all families of Russian intelligentsia was the situation
159 alike. There were families in which harmonious relations pre-
668 vailed. There were also families in which reaction developed not against the despotism of the father but against the tyranny of the mother. Bakunin, for instance, describes his mother as "a vain, egotistical woman and none of her children loved her."[7] According to Carr, Bakunin "attributed his passion for destruction to the influence of his mother, whose despotic character

[Bakunin]

[Saint Theodosius]

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[668]

inspired him with an insensate hatred of every restriction on liberty."[8]

Identifying himself with all the oppressed, this leading Russian anarchist revolted not only against the family and the state, but against God as well, because God was a symbol of authority and fear. To Bakunin the concept of a God of fear implied abdication of reason and of justice, and was the negation of human liberty. He expounded therefore the overthrow of God as a necessary precondition of human liberation.[9] To Bakunin the revolt of Satan against God was the first attempt of free thought, of science, and of human freedom.[10]

[538]

Not unlike this was the reaction of Turgeniev toward the despotism of his mother. This outstanding Russian novelist apparently developed a great compassion for the Russian serfs and became a champion in the struggle for freedom and for the emancipation of the peasants because he identified his own sufferings with the plight of the muzhiks on the estate of his mother. Turgeniev's mother apparently gave vent both on her son and on her serfs for the sufferings of her unhappy married life, and in bringing up her own son she made few concessions. The same excessive strictness that she applied against serfs she exercised also against her own son. "I was flogged almost every day for merest trifles," says Turgeniev.[11]

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792

An earlier case of reaction against a despotic mother and resulting identification with those who are humiliated is that of Saint Theodosius. This Russian saint was one of the founders of Russian monasticism in the eleventh century. According to Fedotov, the main theme in the hagiography of Theodosius is the "strife with his mother . . . the cruel treatment he endured, and his threefold escape. Many scenes are painted with truly artistic skill, particularly the portrait sketched of the mother, with her passionate transitions from outbursts of anger to caresses, with her appearance as a virago: 'She was strong in body, vigorous as a man: anybody who would not have seen her but only heard her voice would believe it was that of a man.' "[12]

Theodosius reacted to the despotism of his mother by wearing "uncouth and patched garb" like the poor and the beggars to the dismay of his parents, who were well-to-do people and felt hor-

[Saint Theodosius]

593 rified by such behavior. After his father's death, Theodosius used
159 "to go to the fields with the slaves and work humbly."[13] Later
792 when Theodosius finally escaped from his mother's tyranny by
entering a monastery, he became the founder of that school of Russian monastic philosophy which emphasizes self-abnegation and meekness, as well as charitable love and compassion for those who suffer. In that manner Theodosius identified himself and his Church with all those who were tyrannized. But he was also active in protecting those to whom injustice was done. He became "intercessor for many before judges and princes, rescuing people."[14]

152 Deep sympathy for those who suffer and identification with
645 them might explain why the Russian juries and the peasant
courts were so ready to acquit the repentants. Juries and courts would often set free criminals who were found guilty by well established evidence. The verdict in such a case might be "not guilty" because of "commiseration for the poor murderer." A jury sitting through Holy Week would tend to acquit everybody, because "at the time of our Lord's Passion, it does not become Christians to condemn their brethren."[15]

152 Sympathy for those who suffer and identification with them
538 is an outstanding trait of Russian literature of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Russian writings of those days exhibit a preoccupation with great social, political, religious and psychological problems of mankind. They picture a gloomy, painful, and tragic world, full of misery, injustice, blood and death. In the same manner the school textbooks of those days contained many heartbreaking stories full of compassion and commiseration for the suffering, unprotected, weak.

152 When identification with suffering is a manifestation of revolt
783 or is combined with the urge for revolt, strong feelings of guilt
538 might develop. On such grounds compulsion to suffer and to be
668 persecuted might thrive. This "Russian Kenotism" is found
among the early Russian monastics[16] as well as among the Russian nineteenth century revolutionaries and men of letters. Some Russian revolutionary factions, for instance, emphasized sacrifice and martyrdom to the point of self-destruction.[17] In the like manner Count Leo Tolstoy claims in his diary that he, "often

wanted to suffer, wanted persecution."[18] A number of heroes in Dostoyevsky's novels show the same urge. 152 763 668 [538]

Undoubtedly such feelings contributed to that tone of fanaticism and that readiness for self-sacrifice which was characteristic of many Russian revolutionaries and conspirators of pre-Soviet days and which gave a special vigor and intensity to their activities. Such extremes in emotional reactions were supported also by another trait in these people, that of emotional instability. [157]

13

EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY

I

FEAR and awe (*strakh*), submission (*povinovenie*), and sense of guilt (*sovest*) are rooted in the structure of the Great-Russian society and are supported by its traditions. But so is compassion (*zhalost*), humility (*smirenie*), demand for truth and justice (*pravda*) and for egalitarian acceptance, as well as revolt and terror (*ustrashenie*), lack of trust and urge to destroy (*unichtozhenie*). It is the propensity to experience such contrasting sentiments that causes behavior which is alternatively bent in opposite directions. A person's behavior which has been conditioned by an environment which fosters such feelings and attitudes might show a lack of sense of moderation and a tendency toward extremes in responses to his social milieu. 152 154

It is such unbalanced peculiarities of behavior that have drawn the attention of many students and observers of Russian society.[1] A tendency toward diametrically opposite extremes, and frequent alternation between these poles has been often noticed. Kindliness and gentleness have alternated with lack of consideration, excessive severity, brutality and cruelty. Rebelliousness has been followed by resignation. Periods of feverish energy and confidence have been superseded by spells of inertia, languor and despair. Extremes in feasting have alternated with extremes in fasting. Tyrannical rule had its counterpart in demands for

152 absolute and unconditional liberty and denial of any laws, con-
154 ventions or obligations.[2] Ideologies which sought universal salvation and identification with Christ's teaching (Dissent, Slavophilism) had their counterparts in the ideologies which demanded universal destruction and identification with anti-Christ (Nihilism, Terrorism).[3]

517 157 Among the intelligentsia a lack of a sense for methodical work, and lack of initiative were combined with preoccupation concerning grandiose and utopian plans on a world scale. There was a noticeable lack of preparation for these programs and a tendency to consider that having made plans was equal to their fulfillment. Such traits were so striking among some intelligentsia that they were given a special name (*Oblomovshtina*).[4]

It is known that a number of outstanding Russian intellectuals have shown a remarkable lack of emotional balance in their behavior. These would often move from one ideological camp into that of their bitter opponents. In ideological controversies no tolerance was shown for the opposite point of view. There was a tendency to treat all in the opposite camp as enemies. "Who is not with us is against us," was the principle applied in theory and practice. Some outstanding Russian intellectuals themselves
[159] admitted such traits in their character. Dostoyevsky, for instance, analyzing his own feelings stated: "In all things I go to the uttermost extremes; my life long I have never been acquainted with moderation." Not unlike this self-analysis of Dostoyevsky was that of Bakunin. In his "Confession to the Czar" he said: "There was in my character a radical defect: love for the fantastic, for out-of-the-way, unheard of adventures, for undertakings which open up an infinite horizon and whose end no man can foresee."[5]

157 703 According to General Golovine among the army officers there was a "tendency to drunkenness, churlishness and tyranny toward their subordinates," but there were also "many heroes among these negative types," and often a "regular officer showed such readiness to sacrifice himself that his superiors were forced to restrain his excessive ardor."[6] Lack of balance and stability was also reflected in the differences between military units. Often "next to a first class regiment there was another completely worthless."[7]

Top ruling circles themselves often exhibited a great lack of self-control. A number of rulers showed a tendency toward excesses and extremes that bordered on insanity. Even the Czars of the nineteenth century, in spite of many Western moderating influences, showed tendencies toward instability and extremes in their behavior. Not seldom a new monarch would completely reverse the policies of his predecessor. The rulers tended to show great instability also in attitudes toward their advisers. They would turn suddenly against the old councilors and find new favorites. As a result often "the mighty of yesterday were sent to Siberia or the scaffold." But also barrack and bedchamber revolutions were frequent, reflecting the suddenly changing extremes in moods within the ruling cliques. 157 643

Lack of moderation and emotional instability was one of the favored themes of Russian belles-lettres of the nineteenth century. The heroes in these works often display an extremely unbalanced type of behavior. Feodor Chaliapin, who himself took part in producing such types on the Russian stage, states the following: 157 538

> . . . When I think of the characters I have created on the Russian stage, I am conscious not so much of the characters themselves as of an all pervading sense of the Russian temperament that is all extremes. . . . It seems as though Russian temperament is entirely devoid of moderation. . . . The fact remains that their contradictions are far more harsh and violent than those of most mentalities. . . . The Russian heart is infinitely pitiful and tender, but at the same time what gross and often completely aimless cruelty and tyranny are to be found in Russian life. The Russian soul is extraodinarily sensitized, but what brutality and lustful suspicion and vulgarism are to be found in human relationships. It is only too true that neither in good nor in evil can the Russian steer a middle course . . .[8] [181]
>
> In *Khovantchina* it is religious fanaticism, and how profound and powerful is that fanaticism! A normal mind could not possibly comprehend that perfect serenity which enables men to die for their belief. They stand on the sheer rampart, utterly oblivious of the stairway by which they might descend to safety. They batter their heads against the wall, unconscious of pain . . . .In Rimsky-Korsakov's *Pskovitane* I take the part of Ivan the Terrible. He, the Tsar, cares nothing that the river runs red with blood, so illimitable is his knowledge of

157 538 his power over others, so unshakable is his belief in his own sovereignty. . . . There is tremendous strength in *Boris Godunov,* the part I would sooner play than any of the others of my repertory. Here again the Russian temperament is overwhelmingly manifest in the seditious license of the boyars, as it is in the boundless autocracy of Ivan the Terrible. It appears also in the lawlessness and drunkenness of Prince Galitski, one of the chief characters of Borodin's admirable opera *Prince Igor.* Galitski's excesses are as extreme as his cynicism.[9]

157 533 Some observers of Great-Russian music find in it traits similar to those of Great-Russian belles-lettres. According to Leroy-Beaulieu the Great-Russian music shows an "alternation between extreme emotionality and extreme peacefulness."[10] And according to General Golovine this music is a "combination of the vague and salient softness and harshness of sound, deep sorrow and uncontrolled gaiety, dreams and drama, restlessness and calm . . ."[11] Golovine specifically referred to the music of Glinka, Chaikovsky, Borodin, Rimsky-Korsakoff, and Rachmaninoff.

152 538 Extremes of self-aggrandizement followed by self-maceration, murder followed by tears, is noticeable also in the Russian folk psychology. The Great-Russian folk songs, for instance, are often full of cruelty, but are also heart-breaking and plaintive, full of sadness, melancholy and tragedy, sung in minor key. In folk tales and folk songs about Stenka Razin, this robber-bandit is represented both as magnanimous and cruel, as savage and pitiful. He revolted against those in authority, but rallied the poor and rebellious beneath his banner. At the same time he himself showed traits of barbarism and of self-laceration. One of the popular Russian folk songs, tells us, for instance, how once Stenka, "drunk with wine and mirth together," lifted the Persian Princess, his beloved "new-vow bride," over the side of his barque and flung her "forth into the hungry deep" of the Volga, as "a gift from a Cossack of the Don." Stenka acted in such a violent manner because some of his comrades had scornfully reproached him that in his affection to his bride he behaved like a *baba* (woman).

II

152 154 A number of interpretations are offered for such behavior.[12] Most of these explanations are either "geografic" or "cultural-

diffusionist" in their general approach. Thus a number of writers attribute the ambivalent traits in Russian behavior to the influence of climate. The struggle with hostile forces of nature, say these people, has developed in the Russian man qualities of tenacity, energy, and strength; but at the same time the insuperable forces of nature have developed qualities of patience, resignation, and meekness. The former has developed hardness of character by the very bitterness of the struggle; the latter has taught him to sympathize with the afflicted and desolate.[13] 152 154

Other geographic theories point out not only the extremes in climate, but the contrasting nature of the soil as well, as a means to explain Russian behavior and Russia's life and history which are full of contrasts and contradictions. Russia's forest and marshy area is contrasted to the steppe regions as the basic foundations on which Russian society has grown.[14]

There are other students of Russia who tend to explain unbalanced traits in the Russian man on the ground of conflicting Asiatic and European cultural influences, to which Russia has been subjected throughout many centuries of its formation. This view is still shared by many. It had been advanced by a number of Russian intellectuals, among them Leo Tolstoy: [177]

> One *Rus* has its roots in a universal, or at least in European culture. In this *Rus* the ideas of goodness, honor and freedom are understood as in the West. But there is another *Rus:* the *Rus* of the dark forests, the *Rus* of the Taiga, the animal Russia, the fanatic Russia, the Mongol-Tartar Russia. This last Russia made despotism and fanaticism its ideal. . . . Kiev *Rus* was a part of Europe, Moscow long remained negation of Europe.[15]

It would be difficult however to explain ambivalence in the behavior of individuals and peoples exclusively on the basis of such generalized influences of East and West, extremes in climate, and contrasts between forests and steppes. The circumstances which become significant as agents in personality formation have to be felt directly or indirectly on a number of levels of interpersonal and institutional relationships. Among these one of the more effective influences which shape and mold the personality of man seems to be the family environment. 000

Some Russian intellectual leaders and men of letters, such as

154 Some Russian intellectual leaders and men of letters, such as Dobrolyubov, Ostrovsky, Herzen and Kropotkin were very much 517 impressed by the effect which Russian family atmosphere had in shaping the personality of the Russian people, especially the intelligentsia. Herzen pointed out that in a family in which there was "much to hate and despise, and almost nothing to love and to respect," the psychological development was not full, but warped. In a similar manner Kropotkin explains that people who are brought up in families in which the personal relationships between children and their parents are based not on love and mutual respect but on fear and unconditional submission become both domineering and servile, as well as rebellious:

> [861] A child's spirit is weak. It is so easy to coerce it by fear . . . They make the child timid, and they talk to him of the torments of hell. They conjur up before him the sufferings of the condemned, and vengeance of an implacable God . . . and by that habit of submission the thought of the next generation attains this religious twist, which is at once servile and authoritative; for authority and servility walk ever hand in hand. . . . Then the degradation of the ruler and of the judges, of the clergy and of the more or less comfortable classes becomes so revolting that the pendulum begins to swing the other way.[16]

The family environment, however, is itself an integral part of the society to which it belongs and is therefore interacting with it. Hence an understanding of the structure of the whole society, of the view of life, traditional culture and general orientation of its various strata, of the configuration of its interpersonal, institutional and power relationships is necessary in order to explain personality formation and peculiarities of behavior of a people.[17] It is in such a total context that also the direct and the indirect influences of physical environment or of any other "external" pressures might be correctly appraised.

IV

Ideologies and Movements

14

REVOLT OF THE LAND-OWNING INTELLIGENTSIA (WESTERNISM AND SLAVOPHILISM)

I

IN CONSEQUENCE of the reforms of Peter the 565
Great the dvorianstvo obtained hereditary rights on their lands. [423]
At the same time their service to the state ceased to be obliga- 517
tory. But the traditions of this class consisted of warfare and 668
ruling, not of land cultivation. Thus when this newly formed
landed gentry did not have to serve the state, many of them
became a leisure class of people who occupied themselves by
visiting Western lands, cultivating Western languages and fine
arts and studying Western political and social ideologies. Few
among these people were inclined to retire to the country and
dedicate themselves to the management of their estates. The
result of such a trend of events was that a large part of this lei-
sure class people Europeanized themselves and developed high
educational and intellectual standards. And it was from this
group of a well educated landed gentry who were losing their

[565] 517 668 former role as main instruments of the Czar's power to a parvenu bureaucracy and military that leaders of first opposition movements were recruited.

Even before and during the French Revolution a number of Russian landed nobility became aware of the ideas of the Revolution. They were also becoming increasingly interested in constitutional forms of government in which they could take part in their own right, not depending upon the whims of a despotic monarch. Some of these people even became dissatisfied with serfdom because of its economic inefficiency. They were also becoming increasingly impatient with absolutism because of its oppressive and degrading aspects.

[701] Such ideas and feelings penetrated the officers' corps and a number of this military intelligentsia organized themselves into a secret society and formulated a concrete program for constitutional changes.[1] Some of these people came from high nobility. Others, especially those from the South, were impoverished nobles living on meager officer's salaries. In December, 1825 [669] these people attempted to seize power. However, owing to ideological differences and the traditional factional splits within the dvorianstvo, the attempt of this faction of military intelligentsia to gain power was thwarted.[2] Nevertheless, this uprising of the "Decembrists," though abortive, was the beginning of increasing revolutionary activities of the intelligentsia[3] which finally brought about the overthrow of the Czardom in the Revolution of 1917.

[642] 517 177 The revolt of the Decembrists was a sign that the Czardom had already gone through such changes in its social structure that a change in its political system was overdue. The most important change in this structure was the formation of a class which, for the first time in Russia's history, became economically independent of the Czar, and which, though economically idle and not always prosperous, became intellectually very alert and also very sensitive to Western ideas.

In accordance with the traditional behavior pattern of Russian nobility, their reactions to the conditions at home and to Western thought tended to develop in the direction of two opposite extremes. One was that of the "Westerners" who were

inclined to take a defeatist attitude and who in their defeatism 517
tended to acknowledge little in the achievements of Russia. They 177
took a very negative attitude toward Russia's social and political system, demanded a break with Russia's past and wanted a thorough Westernization of the country.[4]

Another group of this landed gentry tended to idealize the 517
values of the Old-Slavonic culture and those of the pre-Petrine, 186
pre-bureaucratized, pre-secularized, and Holy Russia. These people, 177
who were highly learned according to Western standards, were aware of many of the inadequacies and deficiencies of the Russia of their times. At the same time they feared the expansionistic designs of the West and the infiltration of Western thought, institutions and practices. They were extremely sensitive to the criticism of Russia and the Russian people prevalent in those days among Western scholars and other Western observers.

Apparently as a reaction to such a threat and criticisms, and perhaps also because seeking compensation for their wounded pride, these people resorted to a flight into Russia's past and projected an idealized image of former values of Russia and of Slav people into the future. They were inclined to criticize the political and social system which Peter the Great had introduced and in which he followed Western patterns; they demanded a return to pre-Petrine and Orthodox Russia reestablished in all its former glory. Such a visionary image of Russia enabled these well off landowning intelligentsia to see also themselves regaining the grandeur, the self-respect, the social prestige and the political power which they were rapidly losing to a parvenu military and bureaucratic hierarchy.

These people reacted aggressively against a challenging Western world by over-stressing what they thought were superior qualities of Slavs and superior values of Russian and Slav culture. It was in this manner that a romantic view of Slav folk society and of the Russian man was developed. These ideas left a strong imprint on literature, art, philosophy and political thinking both of the nineteenth and of the twentieth century Russia and became known as "Slavophilism."

Brought up in a patriarchal family system which had condi-

517 tioned them to dominance-submission and protection-depend-
186 ence relationships, but yearning also for the Old-Slavonic an-
177 archic and egalitarian justice, the "Slavophils" tended to idealize especially those institutions in which paternalistic, as well as equalitarian, relationships were well established, but which they saw distintegrating in new circumstances. Such was, for instance, the *mir* institution, according to their view.

829 According to the Slavophil interpretation, the old Russian
517 and Slav community was founded on the principles of obedience, mutual responsibility, social justice and equality, Christian love
[621] and humility.[5] They asserted that the Russian land commune was the foundation of an original and highly satisfactory culture which was exempt from the vices of the Western civilization, untainted with proletarianization, pauperism, and the problem of wages. The mir was an institution in which man felt as an organic and integral part of his community. There was no uncertainty, no insecurity, and no frustrations in that social system since in it the values were absolute and unchallenged.[6]

The Slavophils idealized Russia's patriarchal relationships based on absolute and unchallenged values, on faith and on total fusion of man and community, as contrasted to Western individualism, cosmopolitanism, rationalism and skepticism. They contended that reason, if separated from faith, introduces doubts, splits and conflicts between man and his society. They stressed the organic totality and harmony of the Old-Slavonic and pre-Petrine Russian society in contrast to the materialism and class strife of the West.[7]

[771] The old pre-Petrine order which the Slavophils idealized had greatly depended upon Church support and religious sanction for its perpetuation. The Slavophils therefore feared that Western liberalism which was beginning to penetrate Russia would undermine its religious foundation. As a defense against such demoralizing influences, the Slavophils pointed out that the Western world was rapidly disintegrating because of the spreading of free thought and because of the decline of the faith. The West was a prey to Roman heathenism, they said, and it was from this traditional anti-Christian spirit that revolutions, free thought, the papacy, and the Reformation had sprung.

According to Slavophils the doom of the Western civilization 829
was sealed when rationalism was allowed to destroy faith. It was 517
then that the human spirit became divided against itself, which meant its disintegration. God and man, intuition and reason, beauty and truth are one, they claimed. As soon as man does not possess such a mystic unity with the absolute, he is plunged into skepticism and disbelief, his reason is separated from his soul and he becomes a "split man."

Owing to the organic totality of his body and soul, of his 517
faith and reason, the Russian man possessed the "inner truth," 829
which is the real truth, as against the "outer truth" or superficial 771
truth of the Westerner, the Slavophils said. Therefore in contrast 186
to the "split man" of the West, the Russian man was a "total man" (*vsechelovek*).[8] In this manner, the Russian man who has achieved his unity with God has achieved also the unity of his nation with God. The Russian nation is therefore a "God-bearing" nation (*Bogonosets*):

> . . . do you know who are the only 'god-bearing' people on earth, destined to regenerate and save the world in the name of a new God, and to whom are given the keys of life and of the new world . . . Do you know which is that people and what is its name?[9]

Aware that without strong religious feelings such a man and 829
society could not exist, and fearing the decline of the old Ortho- 517
dox-patriarchal values in a bureaucratized and secularized Rus- 668
sia, the Slavophils demanded a return to the old pre-Petrine [771]
theocratic system, one in which the Church would absorb the state. In accordance with such an ideology the Slavophils asserted that when the Church has absorbed the state, then the state will ascend and become a Church over the whole world, a Church kingdom ruling over all the earth which is the "glorious destiny ordained for the Orthodox Church."[10]

The Slavophils asserted that the political organization as developed in the West was a system of conquest and force. Being therefore an instrument of oppression, such a political organization was foreign to the Slavs and to the Russian people, and it should not be maintained.[11] In accordance with the anarchic and egalitarian traditions of the Old-Slavonic society, the Slavophils

829 claimed that the commune should be the main unit of social
517 organization of mankind. In the commune, it was not force or
668 external coerciveness, not the minority or majority rule, but the
[621] collective mind, the inner motivations, the principle of unanimity and organic totality that prevailed.[12] It is only by being completely rooted in his own community and completely identified with his own people that man can be creative and can reach all-human ideas, they said.

In such a society in which the state disappears in the Church and in which the commune becomes the basic unit of social organization, instead of external and formal law and authority imposed from above, emotional bonds of unity, self-discipline, informal egalitarian justice and charity will prevail.[13] It is only in such an integrated community which has been fused with the Church and in which the total and organic unity of all members is established that real freedom of the individual can be realized,[14] according to Slavophilism.

517 Slavophil ideas exerted considerable political influence in
829 Russia and in the rest of the Slav world. Exposed to the growing
668 pressure of imperial designs of Western powers, and embarked on a program of their own imperial expansion in the direction
648 of the Mediterranean and the Pacific, some of Russia's political circles welcomed Slavophil ideas as an ideological justification of Russia's foreign policies. Thus the idea of protection of Orthodox and of Slav peoples,[15] the idea of defense of the Slavs against the encroachments of the Germans and the idea of uniqueness and superiority of Slav culture played an important role in a series of nationalist movements and wars in which Russia became involved since the middle of the nineteenth century.

According to this Pan-Slav movement Russia was the only Christian land, the world outside Russia was "the land of the anti-Christ," the "incorporation of Satan." Accordingly, struggle with the West was not only inevitable, but necessary and salutary, both for Russia and the rest of humankind. And the victory will be undoubtedly on the side of Russia.[16]

For the continuance of its organic life the world required a centre. This centre must be found in a single nation able to

lead the others. Russia was therefore predestined to fulfill this 517
world mission. Hence the Pan-Slavs looked to Moscow, the 829
ancient Russian capital, not the Westernized "City of Peter" 668
(Petersburg) as the heart of Russia[17] and of mankind of the 648
future—the Third Rome.

15

REVOLT OF THE RAZNOCHINTSY INTELLIGENTSIA (NIHILISM AND ANARCHISM)

I

BY THE second part of the nineteenth century, 178
new changes were taking place in the economic relations as well 565
as in the political and class structure of the Czardom. First of all, the process of disintegration of the old order under the impact of the industrialization and bureaucratization was rapidly coming to an end. Serfdom was abolished and with it there came the disastrous ruin of manorial estates which were not prepared to cope with the difficulties of a money and market economy. The result was that the number of impoverished and pauperized gentry was greatly increased.

At the same time the new laws tended to place emphasis on 178
property. Thus, for instance, in the local assemblies of the noble- 565
men the elective franchise was granted only to noblemen possess- 421
ing a certain amount of land or a certain value of industrial 556
establishment. This difference in civil rights according to the [641]
amount of property introduced a sharp cleavage into the gentry class. Earlier all dvorianstvo and all chinovnichestvo were considered equal in rights and had at least theoretically an equal chance to rise in power or to win the favor of the Czar. But now the new laws disfranchised and declassed a large part of the gentry. Similar laws favored the richer class among the merchants which meant that even in municipal affairs birth and education decreased in value in comparison with wealth.[1]

178 565 793 In the new secularized and urbanized society,[a] also, the position of the clergy became increasingly precarious. Like other institutions of the Czardom the Russian Orthodox Church was organized along the lines of sharp social differentiation and dominance-submission relationships. Russian Orthodox clergy as a whole formed a closed caste institution. All lay clergymen and many monastics were recruited from among the members of the [582] families of lay clergy. Endogamous marriage was practiced within this caste. The church maintained its own schools for both the sons and the daughters of clergymen. In this manner [184] the clergy had been separated from the rest of the society and had developed a sub-culture of its own. The clerics were set apart from others not only by their priestly garb, but by their manners, and even by their names.

792 793 554 Internally, however, within the ranks of the Orthodox clergy there was a sharp distinction between the monastic order (black clergy) and the secular priesthood (white clergy). The monastic order was rich in land donations and other possessions and all the Church hierarchy was recruited from among its ranks. The secular clergy was not only subordinate to the monastics, but also poor. Among the secular clergy sharp class distinction existed between the city clergy and the village priests. This differentiation was manifested in the differences in income, education and prestige, as well as in the lack of intermarriage between these strata. The difference was also reflected in the attitudes of the laity. [364] While the city clergy were socially accepted by the middle and lower urban layers, the village priests were rather isolated from the rest of the population.

However, the sharpest difference and social distance existed between the Church hierarchy and the rank-and-file clergymen. The heads of monasteries, for instance, behaved like real magnates. They took in large revenues, kept servants, horses and carriages, and hardly shared in the life of their monastic brothers, even though these Church dignitaries resided in monasteries. In the same way, the bishops were inclined to belittle the lay clergy under their control. They treated them with a great want of respect. They would abuse them, insult them and then even flog them.

[a] [i.e. developing in the second half of the XIXth century—Analyst]

It was this contrast between the alleged lofty calling of the 792
minister of a privileged Church and his sad fate that must have 793
depressed many a priest and made him bitter and resentful. 554
Even before he became priest, while still a student in the divinity [874]
school, where he was educated at the government's expense, he was exposed to abusive treatment at the hands of his superiors. He was ill-fed, insufficiently clothed, and frequently beaten with the rod or lash. At one time these Church seminaries were so unpopular that children of the clergy had to be forced into them with the help of the knut and of the police. Embittered because of bad treatment, many of these young men nursed a grudge against their disciplinarians, as well as against the Church, the state, and the society at large. The instructors in these institutions, ill-paid and badly treated by their own superiors, were often as wretched and as discontented as their pupils.[2] In this manner the conditions in these institutions tended to reinforce feelings of rebellion which were nursed in the family.

As a result of such circumstances, Russian-Orthodox semi- [668]
naries became a fertile ground for revolutionary political propaganda which was spreading with an increasing intensity in all the middle schools and universities of the Czardom ever since the abortive uprising of the Decembrists,‡ In this manner many Russian-Orthodox seminaries became hot-beds of subversive radicalism. Mutinies occurred and even attempts to assassinate rectors.

In the meantime, however, that is since 1869, services other 793
than priesthood were opened to a priest's son. Since then the 668
most rebellious youths from divinity schools and priestly families tended to leave church calling and engage in other activities. It was from among such rebels that many Russian revolutionaries were recruited. Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov among the "Nihilists," Nechaev among the Terrorists, Stalin among the Bolsheviks, are only a few outstanding examples in a long list of Russian professional conspirators and revolutionaries. Said Stalin: [843]

> In protest against the humiliating regime and the jesuitical methods that prevailed in the seminary, I was ready to become, and eventually did become, a revolutionary, a believer in Marxism . . .[3]

‡[i.e. in December, 1825 — Analyst]

668 647 701 554 In a similar manner revolt was brewing in the bureaucracy and the armed forces. In a system which was founded on the principles of absolute dominance, subservience and unconditional submission, it is to be expected that the civil service employees as well as many officers would be often exposed to caprice, arbitrariness and wrong doings on the part of their superiors. These, too, were left without possibility of redress as were the clergymen. Strong sense of rank and social distance were as marked in these strata as among the clergy.

871 565 The lay schools* were not much different in strictness and discipline from the priests' seminaries, and students in these schools were often as ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and as exposed to the rod and other degrading treatment. The student's parents, who were often impoverished gentry, petty chinovniks, or small traders with meager incomes and big families, were not always able to support their children throughout long years of schooling. [555] At the same time in an economically and technologically undeveloped society with strong traditions of service nobility, there was nothing that young people from such families could do but to enroll at a university or a military academy in order to obtain government office, or to engage in free learned professions. In Russian society of those days these were the only possibilities of obtaining positions of some prestige. Many of these students from impoverished strata had therefore to depend upon public or private munificence to finish their studies. Some of them became police informers to secure a meager income and to finish schooling. Many had to drop out of school because of lack of financial resources.

871 668 All Russian schools, therefore, on the middle as well as on the university level, became centers of revolt against an order which exposed them to humiliating treatment, but did not offer them opportunities in accordance with the established traditions of higher classes. Hence the higher the school, the more it was imbued with the revolutionary spirit. And the words "student" and "revolutionary" became synonymous.

517 647 641 When new laws were introduced and these ambitious and rebellious young men and women finally entered state service they found that in addition to being ill-treated and ill-paid, a

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*[i.e. in the second half of the XIXth century--Analyst]

large part of them were disfranchised as well, because in municipal 517
self-government and in district and provincial assemblies 647
even persons holding university degrees, if they did not own a 641
sufficient amount of property, were devoid of the right of suffrage.[4] [565]
And it was this underprivileged group of declassee nobility, of priests' sons, of former clerics, of sons and daughters of lower government employees, of unemployed professionals, of students and of former students who never had a chance to finish their studies, that became known as the *raznochintsy*.

The raznochintsy intelligentsia tended to lead a bohemian life 517
and to engage in literary activities and journalism. But these vocations 565
were greatly limited because of strict censorship laws. 555
When the bar was established some raznochintsy practiced law as barristers, though they were very restricted in their activities because of traditional extra legal practices of the police. When under local self-administration (*Zemstvo*), a health, educational, and economic program for the improvement of rural areas was developed, a number of raznochintsy were employed by the Zemstvo as physicians, veterinarians, agronomists, teachers and bookkeepers. At the same time, their traditions and training, and especially their ambitions and expectations had conditioned the raznochintsy for intellectual pursuits and political leadership, not for routine administrative work or for business promotion and enterprise.

In such a situation the deeply rooted feeling of rejection which 154
had been developed on the family level was greatly magnified.[5] 517
Accordingly, self-centeredness, power-seeking, lack of trust, destructive 152
aggression, as well as identification with suffering which 668
were developed on the family level were heightened in these circumstances and found expression in ideologies which manifested extreme hostility and an urge for universal destruction. Many of these young rebels, for instance, denied all existing social institutions, conventions and restrictions, and demanded their total obliteration.

This ideology of extreme negation and destruction ("Nihilism") manifested, perhaps, the feelings of utter despair of the ambitious and self-seeking raznochintsy who felt impotent before the God-like power of the Czar and his omnipotent police.

154 517 157 668 Thwarted in their drive for power and political leadership, these young men and women gave vent to their feelings of deprivation in phantasies and plans of destruction and death.

[538] Much of the sadness, tragic sarcasm, morbidity and preoccupation with death and suffering which dominated Russian literature in the second part of the nineteenth century reflects such moods of despair. The predominance of social and political themes in the literary creations of these people and the insistence of literary critics of those days on literary "realism," that is, that a work of art should be judged not by artistic and esthetic criteria but by its portrayal of existing life and its faithfulness to reality, especially the brutal and dark reality, manifested the same feelings.

Pisarev, describing this psychological reaction of impotence and the urge for destruction before seemingly uncontrollable forces, stated that when men "find it impossible to transform life, their anger at their own impotence makes itself felt in the sphere of thought, where the destructive work of criticism proceeds unceasingly."[6] That the basic drive behind this urge for negation and destruction was extreme self-seeking is witnessed by some other ideas of the same writer. "Every living being," said Pisarev, "is for himself the center and the meaning of the universe . . . his personal joys, vexations, aspirations, and cares, are more important than universal revolutions. . . ."

Starting with such premises, some of the Nihilists refused to recognize any regulation, any moral law, any principle, whether above, external, or within a person as being "absolute." The [577] result was preaching of extreme materialism and individualism, and denial of all "absolute" ethics, of duty and of responsibility, of ideals and of social values.

II

668 517 [727] In the meantime, however, the effects of European revolutions of 1848 and the defeats of the Russian armies in the Crimean War (1854–1856) led some of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia to the belief that the Czarist system was not as invulnerable as generally accepted. These people proposed direct and organized action against the Czarist regime in order to raze it to

the ground together with all its fundamental institutions. Such plans for direct action aimed at total destruction of the existing order were developed by the Anarchists ("Our task is terrible, total, inexorable, and universal destruction".)[7] 668 517

Not unlike the Slavophils and the Nihilists, the Anarchists revolted against the existing formal law which was abused for personal gains of those in power. Just as the Nihilists, the Anarchists revolted against the family institution whose sacredness in Russian society often veiled arbitrariness, cruelty, injustices, and humiliations imposed by the elders upon the weak and unprotected. Like the Slavophils and the Nihilists, the Anarchists revolted against private property, the official Church, and the state because these institutions in the Czardom joined hands in supporting the system of serfdom and bureaucratic regimentation. "The only revolution which can do any good to the people is that which destroys, from top to bottom, every idea of the state, overthrowing all traditions, social orders, and classes. . . ."[8]

The Anarchists demanded a return to an anarchic and equalitarian brotherhood that strongly reminds one of the Old-Slavonic world. But following the patriarchal and Czarist traditions of unconditional power and dominance, the Anarchists, just as the Nihilists, usurped for themselves the right to cheat, to steal, to lie, to destroy, and to kill, as a means to do away with "deceit, cunning, exploitation, depravity, vice," of the ruling classes. Said Kropotkin: [577]

> I will be immoral to snap a weapon abused by religion; I will do it, were it only to protest against the hypocrisy imposed on us in the name of a word to which the name morality was given.[9]

"The revolutionary defines as moral only that which assists the revolution, and defines as immoral and criminal that which stands in his way," says the *Catechism of Revolution*. In the same manner, Kropotkin, speaking of the Russian terrorists who assassinated Czar Alexander II, said that "these men and women . . . had conquered the right to kill. . . . 'They have the right to steal' . . ."[10]

In order to be able to destroy, to cheat, and to kill the exploiters and the representatives of the government, it was neces- 668 517 152

168 517 152 sary to know how to hate them. The Anarchists therefore undertook to find ways by which extreme hatred could best be promoted. This, they said, should be done first by arousing passionate and uncompromising love for equality and freedom and becoming ready to suffer and to sacrifice oneself for these ideas; then by instilling burning hatred and urge of destruction of those who stand in the path of these objectives. "The terrorist," said Stepniak, "is noble, terrible, irresistibly fascinating for he combines in himself two sublimities of human grandeur: the martyr and the hero."[11] Such a revolutionary will "not hesitate to destroy any position, any place, or any man in this world. He must hate everyone and everything with an equal hatred."[12]

Ambivalence of hatred and love and justification of violence for the sake of salvation of others had their roots in the family and were reinforced by conditions in the society at large. Identification with suffering, guilt feelings, desire for martyrdom and self destruction had the same roots and reinforcements. On the ideological level of Anarchism these feelings and attitudes were formulated into principles of thought and action:

> . . . we do not forego our own capacity to love what seems to us good and to hate what seems to us bad. Love and hate, for only those who know how to hate know how to love . . . We only ask one thing, e.c. to eliminate all that impedes the free development of those two feelings in the present society, all that perverts our judgment: the state, the church, exploitation; judges, priests, government, exploiters . . .[13]

But since the primary sources of this ideology and conduct were feelings of rejection, hate and killing took the upper hand over love. Accordingly the Anarchists demanded severance of the relations with the rest of the society and complete dedication to destruction. "The revolutionary has broken all ties with society." He "should have no . . . attachments, no property and no name. All these must be wholly absorbed in the single thought and the single passion for revolution."[14]

154 517 668 Detachment from the rest of the society promoted self-pity and therefore reinforced destructive aggressiveness both against the others and against the self. Renouncement of all ethical, moral or other consideration in dealing with adversaries, pitiless-

ness and ruthlessness both toward themselves and toward those 154
who were not with them became in this manner an integral part 517
of the revolutionary movement in Russia.[15] On such foundations 668
a "science of merciless destruction" was developed:

> The revolutionary is wholly dedicated. He must show no mercy to the State or towards the civilized classes of society; nor does he ask for mercy for himself. Between him and society there is waged a mortal [156] war declared or concealed, a relentless and irreconcilable fight to the death. He must accustom himself to torture.
>
> Tyrannical towards himself, the revolutionary must be tyrannical towards others. All the emotions that move human beings, all the soft and enervating feelings of kinship, love, friendship, gratitude and honor, must give way to a cold and single-minded passion for revolution. For him there exists only one pleasure, one consolation, one reward, one satisfaction—the success of the revolution. Night and day he must have but one thought, but one aim—merciless destruction. Coldly, relentlessly, he pursues his aim, and he must be prepared to perish himself, as he must be prepared to destroy with his own hands those who stand in his way.[16]

A revolutionary organization engaged in a life and death 668
struggle with the rest of society precluded any internal disagree- [578]
ment. Bakunin, for instance, conceived a secret organization with a disciplined membership, a system of strict control of its members, and a rigidly centralized authority vested in one man only. Bakunin's secret society was to consist of three separate and independent groups which would function under different names and would be unacquainted with one another. Each one of these three groups was to operate in a different stratum of society. But each group was to be subject to a rigid hierarchy of power and each member of the group subjected to unconditional obedience to his superiors.

These secret societies were to be limited to a small number of people and were to include, as far as possible, only able, experienced, energetic, and influential men, professional conspirators, who, in strict obedience to a central control would lead the masses. All three secret societies were to be coordinated by a central committee which would have consisted of Bakunin and of three or four other members selected by him. Bakunin wanted

668 to be sure that by means of such a "Politburo" he would be able to dictate the "Party line": "all the chief threads of the movement would have been concentrated in my hands, and I could have been sure that the intended revolution would not stray from the line I had laid down for it."[17]

The top revolutionary body was to regard all those below them as expendable in the interest of the revolution, "as revolutionary capital placed at their disposal."[18] This idea of a revolutionary elite leading expendable masses was justified by the Anarchist claim that masses are by themselves unable to achieve radical social changes. The Anarchists believed that only a minority consisting of professional conspirators, wholly dedicated to ruthless terror and destruction, can accomplish social revolution.[19]

This "science of revolution" had to be based on a thorough knowledge of a society which had to be infiltrated before it was destroyed.[20] *Catechism* had therefore classified all people into definite categories and had prescribed the attitude and the behavior of revolutionists toward each one of them. In the first two groups were the people who had to be immediately assassinated if the revolution were to be successful and counter-revolution prevented. ". . . their violent and sudden death will put fear into the heart of the government, break its will, and deprive it of its most energetic and intelligent agents."[21]

Next came the "highly placed beasts," that is, wealthy but not dangerous individuals with connections, influence and power; also ambitious careerists and "liberals of varying shades." All these were to be compromised and then blackmailed and compelled to serve the interests of the revolution. Finally came the categories of the intellectual "doctrinaires" who had to be "liquidated" unless won over to the cause of the revolution. "The majority of these will disappear but of the rest we shall make genuine revolutionaries."[22] Particular attention was paid [562] to women. Those completely won over to the revolutionary cause were considered "the most precious of our treasures."

Other methods in this "science of revolution" consisted of frightening the enemies, of cowing the neutrals and of terrifying their own followers. To that end assassination of members of

revolutionary organizations was approved whenever such an 668
act was considered necessary to strike terror into the hearts of the followers or to knit them more closely together.[23] Equally good was considered to be the method of deception, not only of the public, but also of the followers. Moreover, in order to achieve revolution and destroy the existing order, it was considered necessary to increase the existing evils. "The society will use all its resources to increase and intensify the evils and miseries of the people . . ."[24] so that the people would lose patience and be stimulated to a mass rising.

III //

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The extent to which Nihilist and Anarchist ideas had penetrated into various strata of Russian society by the middle of the second part of the nineteenth century may be indicated by the police records revealed during the many trials of Anarchists and Terrorists. Thus in a trial of a group known as the "Nechaevtsy," out of approximately 150 conspirators, about 30 of them or 20% were classified as nobles, about 50 or 33% of the accused were classified as students and former students. About 20 or 13% were sons of priests and divinity students. About 40 or 26% belonged to the class of bureaucrats and the military. About 15 or 10% belonged to the class of merchants and petty traders. There were five peasants, one artisan and one janitor in the group. There were also about ten women, married and single. The overwhelming majority of the conspirators were between 20 and 26 years of age, the median age being 22.[25]

As a result of Anarchist propaganda and agitation a number of secret revolutionary groups were organized and became known collectively as *podpolie* (underground).[26] One of them was *Zemlya i Volya* (land and freedom), organized in the early seventies. This society split a few years later into two factions, a moderate one, and an openly terroristic group known as the *Narodnaya Volya* (the people's will).[27] The *Narodovoltsy* initiated a series of terroristic acts and assassinations of high officials, including a number of attempts on the life of Czar Alexander II.[28]

The Czarist police fought back with the same weapons. The

668 625 secret police had completely free hands in hunting down the
members of the Terrorist movement, using the same cunning
means as the terrorists did. Each party relied on terror, based
on the principle that all means were justified. One of the princi-
[643] pal victims in this struggle was Czar Alexander II whose ideas
and policies were aimed at liberalizing the Russian society and
raising it to the economic and educational level that had been
achieved in the European West.

661 668 As a reaction against this event, Alexander's son and successor,
Alexander III, instituted officially a regime of terror and declared a ruthless war of extermination of all terrorists and other subversive elements. The Russian public opinion, too, shocked by the assassination of Alexander II, was becoming alert to the dangers of terrorist practices.[29] Such circumstances had a disheartening effect on terrorist plans. A number of revolutionaries found it expedient to move the center of their activities to European capitals. Other young malcontents endeavored to "go among the people" (*iti v narod*) and start mass agitation and propaganda. These *Narodniki* wanted also to raise the educational and economic standards of the lower strata of the Russian society, particularly the peasants who were to play a significant role in the coming events.

16

THE STRUCTURE OF VILLAGE COMMUNITY

I

BEFORE serfdom, the land commune (*mir*) whose
621 function was to distribute land periodically, to collect taxes and
651 maintain order, was also an institution which protected its members from outside interference. It was an institution made up of peasants who were not differentiated economically and who knew their own needs and capacities. In such village communities the Old-Slavonic traditions of mutual aid and egalitarian

brotherhood could still be maintained. Since the seventeenth 621
century, however, expenditures for military campaigns and for 651
growing ranks of salaried bureaucrats necessitated increasing state incomes which could be obtained without much delay. Since the state was industrially and commercially undeveloped, the only way to increase revenues was in finding new means to squeeze out of the peasantry a still larger part of its produce. Therefore the old system of direct tax collecting from the mir was found to function inefficiently on the estates of the nobility, and laws were passed which made the landowners responsible for the collection of state taxes from the peasantry. In this way ties between the manorial peasants and the central government were severed.[1]

As a result of such a change in the political structure, the 566
manorial serfs became now entirely dependent upon the owners of the manorial estates. There was no more possibility for the peasants to appeal directly to the government. Between the government and the manorial peasants stood now the landlords to whom the peasants became exclusively responsible as a final authority in all matters, administrative as well as judiciary.[2] *Pomeshchik* was now looked upon as the "natural protector of people, their local judge, the guardian of their welfare, their tutor, the trustee of poor and orphans, observer of good order and law."[3] He was considered as the Czar's overseer and watchdog.[4] The patriarchal dominance-submission and protection-dependence relationships which existed between the Czar and his subjects were now extended to the landlord and his serfs. Both the Czar and the landlord were addressed as *batyushka* (father).

The position of the serf, however, was now so much more precarious because in new relationships the power of the land-
lord was absolute. A life-long banishment to Siberia awaited him [681]
who lodged a complaint against his master. And since there [671]
were neither written laws nor any established customary law to regulate the relations between the serfs and the manorial lords,
the serfs were completely dependent upon the degree of moral [577]
or ethical standards of their masters for their lives and well-being. These were often very low. Hence unprotected either by

566 written or by customary rules of conduct and often exposed to the arbitrariness and mistreatment of their lords, the serfs on many manorial estates came to be completely dependent upon the will and capriciousness of their masters.

566 621 It is obvious that many landed gentry who were given such absolute rights over their serfs would tend to completely subjugate the mir also. In such circumstances the mir was likely to lose its character of a self-ruled and self-contained community and instead tended to become an instrument of landlord's power which made the landowner the absolute monarch of his estate. Under the overlordship of the estate owner the mir kept its watchful eye over every peasant, and made it easier for the landowner to manage his property, and for the government to rule the country. It was under such external pressures that the steppe traditions of an absolute, stern and distant patriarchal power were being strengthened among the peasantry.

II

565 651 621 [566] The conditions of the peasants did not improve in these respects after the abolishment of serfdom in the second part of the nineteenth century.[5] The peasants were emancipated from the rule of the pomeshchiks and subjected again directly to the government. But now the government, pushed by pressing demands for increasing revenues, made the mir an instrument of state control and found in it one of the most exacting of tax collectors. In order to be assured of payment the state had to concede to the mir all of the most severe measures of authority. [681] Now the mir was entitled to banish unsolvent peasants to Siberia. And when corporal punishment was abolished in urban criminal law practice, it was still left in use in the mir.[6]

625 621 After the abolishment of serfdom the mir came under the supervision of the district chief of police (*Ispravnik*). The law of 1874 gave the police the right to arrest and to fine the village elders, and even to demand from the governor of the province [622] their discharge. The position of the elder became so undesirable that the mir sometimes had to exert force to obtain candidates for this office or to prevent those in office from resigning.[7]

000 There was another official in this system of rural administra-

There was another official in this system of rural administration,[7] the *pisar,* who, though only a salaried clerk, with no executive authority, frequently exerted great influence. He was usually a stranger to the commune because of his urban manners and dress. He might be a former divinity student, an army veteran, or a city clerk dismissed for inefficiency. He was ill paid as a commune clerk and inclined to make up for his low salary by accepting bribes.[8] But the real power in the village was often vested in the hands of the *uryadnik,* the village constable, who had manifold duties and many prerogatives. He tended to consider himself as Czar of the village and was inclined to be arbitrary and insolent. He often terrorized the peasants and "the government protected him in his practices, even to the point of prohibiting the newspapers from printing accounts of outrages he perpetrated."[9] 624

In the meantime other structural changes were taking place in the Russian village. Since earlier the landlords and now the government relied on a few peasants who controlled the mir, these often took advantage of their privileged position and tended to beguile the commune out of its best lands. Some of these people also owned taverns (*kabak*) and were money lenders and usurers. They tended to ape their masters, kept at a certain distance from other peasants and looked down upon them. Because of their greediness, misuse of power, and contemptuous attitude toward the peasants, they became known among the peasants as *miroedy* (mir-eaters) and as *kulaki* (fists).[10] 621 565

According to the established custom the decisions in the village assembly were arrived at unanimously and by acclamation. If there was a minority opinion the minority was expected to expressly or tacitly accept the view of the majority. In the Old-Slavonic village community and in the mir before serfdom a genuine unanimity rule was possible because that community was on the whole undifferentiated economically or socially, and was governed to a large extent by public consensus. But as soon as this rural community became stratified, the unanimity principle was exploited to the advantage of the dominant cliques. When serfdom was established, the unanimity principle was often employed to support the decisions and the whims of the landlords. And after emancipation, the police or an oligarchy of 623

[7] [i.e. after the abolition of serfdom -- Analyst]

623 a few kulaks were often able to force the commune members into unanimous decision by means of threats or bribing. And there was no appeal against such decisions.

565 In such circumstances many land communes tended to lose
621 their former equalitarian and protective aspects and the peasants
154 came to fear the mir and to feel an awe before it as much as they had a fear and awe before God and the Czar or before a stern and distant father. They feared the overwhelming power of the mir, the finality of its decision, and the lack of redress against its will They tended to identify the mir's final power with that of Almighty God. "There is no court for the mir, one God is its judge," they would say. Feeling helpless in the front of such an
[156] uncontrollable power, there seemed to be nothing else for the peasants to do but to submit to its will. "One cannot argue with the mir"; "Mir will stand for itself, you cannot go against it" they would say. And since there was no other way out for one but to be a part of such an overwhelming and capricious institution the most expedient way of behavior for him was to accept it and to do as the others do. "Although bad, you cannot do without it"; "If you have to live with wolves you might as well howl as they do."[11]

621 The mir and police were empowered to interfere not only in
625 the system of planting, sowing, and harvesting, but in family
156 and personal affairs as well. The problems of paternal authority and filial duties, the relations between husband and wife, and between in-laws, the questions of inheritance, military conscription, and general behavior, all were within the grasp of these village authorities.[12] Just as in his own family, the rank-and-file individual was completely lost in his village commune. A rank-and-file man had the right to participate in the debates and was expected to vote unanimously for the regulations which restricted his personal and his economic freedom. He who dared to object was unprotected against the despotism and arbitrariness either of the ruling minority or of an incited mob. Thus the feelings of complete dependence upon superior powers prevailed in the community.

241 In addition, poor quality of land, lack of sufficient moisture, long and hard winters, many years of military service, low

standards of formal education, low level of agricultural technology, 241
undeveloped means of transportation and too many idle
days handicapped the advance of agriculture. In such circumstances
the peasants[1] did not even produce sufficient food to [262]
nourish themselves, much less a surplus to exchange for manufactured
products. As a consequence the peasants were exposed [731]
to periodical famines during which many died of starvation.

Periodical epidemics of cholera, typhus, small pox, and other 165
diseases took a toll as high as famines. A low degree of personal 511
hygiene in crowded living conditions also increased the death 565
rate. In addition there was a great dearth of doctors, nurses and
hospitals, and no measures of preventive medicine. Equally ruinous
were the periodical cattle epidemics due to primitive techniques
of cattle raising. One should add to these misfortunes the
figure of more than one hundred thousand peasant homes [674]
destroyed each summer by fires, many of them the result of arson.
And if one considers the widely spread robbery, theft and murder
that went undetected and unpunished, one gets an idea of
the distressing personal and social conditions in which the Russian
peasant lived. It was in such circumstances, left entirely to
his own resources, that he developed an ideological, emotional
and symbolical world of his own.

17

THE ATTITUDES OF THE PEASANTRY

I

STUNNED by the magnitude of the inimical and 565
arbitrary social and physical forces which surrounded him and 154
completely controlled his life, the Great-Russian peasant felt
impotent and helpless. In the family circle if he had to be submissive
and he was exposed to arbitrariness of the elder, he also
might have enjoyed a certain degree of protection and succor.

[1] [i.e. in second half of XIXth century--Analyst]

565 Outside the family,[1] however, this system of social relationships
154 tended to lose its protection-dependence character and to em-
[156] phasize domineering-subservience attitudes in complete contrast
to the traditions of and his yearning for an equalitarian and protective folk community that had existed in the past.

In such circumstances his sense of rejection and his demand for acceptance which he might have experienced in the family were reinforced and magnified, affecting his whole view of life, his attitudes toward the world around him and his image of the universe. He was convinced that there was no justice in the world and that there was nobody to whom he could appeal for redress. "Injustice and untruth rule the world"; "Injustice and untruth started with the world and will end with the world," he would say.[1]

771 In such circumstances the peasant was inclined to see the
565 wrathful, the revengeful, and the implacable aspect of God, especially since such image of a Christian God had support in the teachings of the Russian Orthodoxy. Accordingly the peasant visioned the saints who surrounded the Old Man as quarrelling among themselves and bragging about their strength and achievements and as being vindictive, cheating, and playing tricks on one another.[2] Since the peasant pictured Christ as being only the son of a wrathful Father, he could not depend upon him according to the Russian view of patriarchal family relationships. The Russian peasant therefore had a "sympathetic but detached view of Christ."[3]

The peasant's feeling of rejection in regard to God was manifested in his lack of assurance as to the help he could expect from Him. God, to whom he prayed, seldom interfered on his behalf against earthly authorities. And though "All power was from God," the peasant knew that "God gives power to whom he wants to." The peasant was therefore at times openly resentful of God's neglect. "God neither lets you live nor die," he would say. In his despair he was inclined to believe that there were other forces, beside God, which ruled the universe, such as the Devil who was looked upon as "the junior brother of God and his carpenter in the creation of the universe."[4] And, not unlike Asiatic steppe herders who lived in similar circumstances, the

[1] [i.e. the pesant family of Tsarist days -- Analyst]

Great-Russian peasant saw the need to keep on good terms with 771
this ruler of the underworld. 565

Since the Czar was identified with God, the peasant's feeling 643
toward the Czar was like his attitude toward God. He knew that 565
the Czar was as omnipotent as God. "Everything is in the power of God and the Czar," he would say. Therefore, he feared the Czar like he feared God, he felt an awe before the Czar as before God, and he hoped for the best, but it can hardly be said that he had much love for him. "Czar is not fire, but if you come close to him you will burn yourself," he would say. His idea was also that "Where there is Czar there is fear and dread," and that "Czar's rage spreads death." Since God was so far away, detached, neglectful, and implacable, it was the Czar's fearful power that mattered. "God's is the will, but the court is Czar's," he would say.[5]

The peasant's feelings toward the supreme power of the world 691
and of the universe reflected only his bitter experiences with 692
the representatives of these powers on the earth with whom he 565
had to deal in local affairs. Often these did not bring justice, but venality, arbitrariness and persecution. "The court is founded on untruth and injustice"; "Where there is court there is chicanery," he would say. And since the judges were corrupted, the only way to get anything from them was to bribe them. "The judge is useful as much as the pocket is helpful," he would say. Such action, however, was not always advisable because of greediness of the judges. "You will never fill a judge's pocket"; "Do not litigate, you will strangle yourself."[6]

Because of his traditional distrust of authorities the peasant 671
showed also a profound lack of trust in all written laws. He 565
likened the law to the cobweb whose purpose was to catch the small and helpless, not the big and powerful ("The bumblebee will break through, the fly will get stuck."). He also compared the law to a tool that could be used arbitrarily by those who held it in their hands ("The law is like shaft, you turn it wherever you want it."). He noticed that "those who write the laws also break them," and concluded that "It is in vain to write laws if they are not carried out." In accordance with the Old-Slavonic anarchic and equalitarian traditions he was inclined to believe

671 565 that "If all laws perished the people would live in truth and justice."[7]

556 565 The peasant realized that there was sharp differentiation in economic status in his society as well as in his own local community. But what he especially resented was that the men of wealth took advantage of their position to oppress the weak; and that the poor had to be utterly submissive and subservient to the well-to-do. "The one who is better off has long hands," the peasants would say, meaning that the men of wealth had control over others. And he would compare the arbitrariness of the man of power with the craftsman who handles his material according to his will. "The master is like the carpenter: he cuts the way it pleases him." He would also say that the rich man has all the space he wants "as much as the pike in the water," but as "for the poor there is nowhere any room." He resented the fact that though "Poverty was not sin, yet the people laughed at it." He also objected that the poor were forced to repress their real feelings and cringe before the rich. "The poor are angry at the rich, yet they find themselves in their trail with cap in hand," he would complain.[8]

565 157 369 The peasant therefore grew distrustful and resentful of everyone who was in one way or other above him. He could not depend much upon God and Czar, and he mistrusted the bureaucrats, the landlords, the priests, the judges, the police, and even the better-off people of his own strata. He was particularly distrustful of cities and city folk, of Moscow and Moscovites especially. From ancient times he looked upon Moscow, the seat of the Czar's government, as heartless and deceitful, and as the source of most of his troubles. "In Moscow," he thought, "you find everything except own father and mother." He also considered that his capital city was so corrupted that, "If you go to Moscow you must take there your last penny."

154 665 The peasant therefore lived in an environment in which he felt deserted by the powers of heaven and oppressed by their representatives on earth. He therefore felt unprotected, isolated, friendless, lonely, and insecure. His idea was that both God and man were against him. "If God attacks you, good people will attack you too," he would complain.

The peasant therefore appraised the social environment in 154
which he lived as dominated by powerful destructive forces 565
which were capricious, neglectful and inimical but upon which he was completely dependent for his life and livelihood. He strongly resented these powers and wished he could destroy them, but felt helpless before them. He therefore projected his [771]
feelings of helplessness as well as his destructive urges into the supernatural world and proceeded to inhabit that world with all-powerful, arbitrary, and vicious beings which sought the annihilation of man, and of the earth.

II

On the family level in similar circumstances, two contrasting 565
tendencies, that of complete submission to the parental power 156
and that of rebellion against it are likely to be formed. In a like manner submission and rebellion characterized the behavior of the Russian peasantry on the local community level. The peasant was inclined to appear servile and docile toward all authorities. He would address every one of his superiors as "Father" (*batyushka*). He would bow low (*klanyatsya v poyas*) or in twain (*klanyatsya v nogi*) before them. Before the Czar he would prostrate himself (*chelobitye*) and if the Czar was passing by he would fall on his knees and cross himself. All he could hope for was that by offering unconditional obedience or by propitiating the powers that be, he would be spared. And if all this appeasing of the authorities were in vain he would refrain from revolt as long as he realized that he was utterly helpless and without support in the front of overwhelming powers. In such circumstances he tended to become completely resigned and fatalistic. He might arrive at the conclusion that "You cannot run away from fate, not even on horse-back," and that "Unto each man happens what was decreed at his birth."[9]

With such a frame of mind the Russian peasant was ready to 565
accept great suffering without much complaint. "Misfortune is 154
like the ocean: neither you can swim across it nor can you draw it out," he would say. "And who is it that was not visited by misfortune and misery?" he would ask. Therefore since "You cannot escape misery," "Do not struggle with misery, but suffer"

565 (*S bedoyu ne perekoryaisya, terpi!*). And then if life is all suffer-
154 ing, why be afraid of death, he would ask himself. "Be afraid to live, do not be afraid to die! To live is more terrible than to
[761] die"; "We do not rejoice in life, but in death."[10]

565 Identification with suffering and preoccupation with death
785 which has been conditioned by family experiences and reinforced on the community level led the Russian peasants to prac-
788 tice long and hard fasts, and to undertake difficult pilgrimages to far off places of worship. "There is only one salvation, fast and prayer"; "We don't live on bread, but on prayer" they would say. Long and hard fasting and prayer of the Great-Russian peasants were not only manifestations of his identification with suffering and his feeling of helplessness and complete dependency upon superior forces, but were perhaps also expressions of his tendency to completely retire from an unsatisfactory and an unhappy world.

792 The extremes of this suffering and withdrawal from the world
156 were reached by anchorites who sought complete solitude in wild deserts "far away from men," and by those hermits who lived self-buried in the catacombs, away not only from man, but also from the light of day. Such people enjoyed among the peasants the fame of saints and were believed to possess miraculous powers. Many peasants would make vows of pilgrimage to places where such people lived self-buried, isolated and withdrawn from all human contact.

III

565 The peasant's complete submission to unpredictable and ar-
156 bitrary forces was enhanced because of the lack of solidarity among the peasants themselves. After the peasant had been subjected to arbitrary regimentation and to permanent policing on the part of the authorities, he began to lose faith not only in the authorities but in his fellow peasants as well. Thus mistrust and suspiciousness rooted in patriarchal relations were heightened. In such circumstances the peasant became increasingly distrustful of his neighbors, tended to withdraw within his own family and to become himself ready to spy on others.[11]

In such conditions when isolated, helpless and self-oriented, the peasant tended to conceive of every man as a dangerous fellow. "Ruddy or red, the man is dangerous" (*Ryzhyi da krasnyi chelovek opasnyi*), he would say. He did not think he could expect any help from man. "Do not expect any good from a human being," he would advise. And between a living man and a dead one, he thought that the latter was preferred. "No evil comes from a dead man, and no good comes from a living one," he would assert. Many Great-Russian folk sayings emphasize the need for silence, or the necessity to spare words, so that one may not betray himself and let the others take advantage of him. "Do not say every word! Do not reveal every little thought when people are near!" these maxims caution. They also warn: "Do not believe every talk, do not tell every truth!"[12] 565 156

But such a lack of faith in human beings might lead to the resolution that one is quite justified to take advantage of everyone else, since all others would do the same to him. Thus social isolation and mistrust tended to reinforce self-seeking and encourage the use of all means to achieve one's personal ends: "Lie began with the world and with the world it will die," the peasants would say. They concluded that since "Man lives by falsehood, we too should not remain behind." Their advice therefore was: "Do not mourn for truth, make terms with falsehood"; "It is by falsehood that men live."[13] [577]

The Great-Russian peasant was accordingly often forced to rely on deliberate deceit as a means of survival in a hostile, distrustful, and unreliable world. He did not consider it necessary to have any respect for agreements, contract obligations or given pledges. He tended to be crafty even in his dealings with God and saints. When committing sinful acts at home he would cover his icons. A number of Russian folk tales are concerned with cunning and show how profitable it might be for one to resort to such means.[14] Heroes in folk epics are addicted to deceit and are condoned for their deeds of guile. Merchants in peasant villages almost invariably used false weights and measures. Perjury was so frequent that there were people whose sole profession it was to swear falsely.[15]

While in such an aggressive mood the peasant was inclined to evoke to his help the dark forces. As a result there was a great 565 754

565 demand for the witches (*vedma*) and wizards (*znakhar*), persons 754 who dealt in black magic. One bought their services both as protection from his enemies and as a means of attack on them. In this manner the dealers in black magic who were a means of protection and attack were also an added threat in life. Some knowledge of defensive and offensive magic became therefore indispensable for everybody.

[152] Destructive urges which developed in such conditions were manifested also in the idea that it was possible for one, if he so wished, to turn into vampire in order to bring evil upon his enemies or to suck their blood. Any wizard or witch by using a spell (*zagovor*) was able to transform a man into a vampire. Such men, transformed into ghost-beasts, would then deal their terrible blows on their enemies, slaking on their victims their thirst for blood.[16]

674 These same conditions[1] fostered crime, particularly theft, robbery and murder. Some of the sayings, for instance, condone theft and even robbery, particularly if they were done cleverly and the perpetrators escaped being caught. That crime was not only a means of personal gain but also a means of protest against existing conditions is witnessed by those folk proverbs which rationalize or justify theft on the ground that those from whom it was stolen were likely to be much more guilty than the thieves themselves. "He who stole sinned once; those from whom it was stolen sinned ten times." The same motivation might be seen in the inclination to put the blame on the informers more than on the thieves. "Not he who steals, but he who leads is a thief," they would say.[17] Backed by such philosophy of life and favored by existing conditions, crime became widespread. And since in that society force was identified with law, violence was often justified as a means to secure the property of others, especially in times of war. "What is taken by force is sacred," the people would say.

565 152 Since the conditions in the patriarchal family and in the stratified local community fostered destructive aggression, and since violence was widely used by all the authorities, the peasant manifested a strong inclination toward violence, whenever this expression of his protest could go unpunished. On the family

[1] [i.e., among the peasants of Tsarist days. Cf. this, pp. 140-150.. Analyst]

level violence was manifested in frequent beatings of wife and 565
children, and on the rural community level in habitual drunk- 152
enness that often ended in brawls and even murder.[18] In conditions which foster human degradation and lack of trust, both self-seeking and vindictiveness flourish. Hence the Great-Russian peasant was inclined to commit atrocious acts of revenge against people whom he considered as his persecutors or who caused him any harm. When threatening with revenge the Great-Russian [627] peasant was likely to say: "You will pay me with your own blood" (*Ty u menya kroviyu svoey umoeshsya*). Killing as a revenge, burning hay-ricks, barns and homes was a common occurrence. The peasants were likely to organize a collective hunt against real or fancied malefactors and mutilate them or put them to death by means of torture:

> For murder and robbery, death of the culprit—sometimes with mutilation by cutting and tearing off of various parts of his body. For horse-theft and grand larceny they practice sometimes hammering of iron nails into the head and forcing of wooden pins under the nails and also merciless beating even onto death; . . . in some instances the case ends by maiming the thief and letting him go.[19] [681]

At the same time the frontiersmen and professional warriors, 727
such as the Cossacks, became renowned and widely admired be- 152
cause of their deeds of vindictiveness and violence. War was a great opportunity for people with such inclinations. As Gogol has put it, the Cossacks found a great delight in "accumulating booty from raided towns, putting the villages and the fields on fire, and spreading their glories by far and wide throughout the steppe" in order "to revenge themselves for all evil and humiliation."[20] There were numerous robber and Cossack songs which told about such exploits, and expressed desire for vindictiveness and destructive aggression.

Destructive aggression was nursed on the patriarchal family 152
level and reinforced by conditions in the local community. Thus 626
as soon as the controls of the authorities would weaken, mass 579
revolts would come into the open. Such a behavior in turn was used by the local authorities as a justification for their strictness in dealing with the peasants:

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181 Speaking of the character of the peasants Mr. Karnovitch observed, that whoever has to exercise authority over them must above all things guard against indecision, whether in word or act. The Russian always requires a definite command; and in disputes, if the settlement be distinct and pre-emptory, he will be satisfied, whether the sentence is favorable or unfavorable, wise or unwise. If there be hesitation, he immediately becomes intractable, while a resolute command has a magical influence which he cannot resist.[21]

[579] In such a society which is kept together by naked force rather than by moral bonds, breakdown of controls easily results in revolt and upheavals, in widespread bloodshed and destruction. On such occasions, just like the raznochintsy intelligentsia, the peasants, too, tended to revolt against all forms of humiliation and oppressive submission and demanded reestablishment of the [577] old community relations, in which truth and justice and equalitarian brotherhood of man prevailed.

000 Such forms of peasant protest, which were directed against all the authorities, the family, community elders, the landlord, the Church and the state, will be discussed on the following pages.

18

RELIGIOUS REVOLT OF THE PEASANTRY

I

[659] THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH which in the course of its history came to be completely subjected to [795] the state and was made an instrument of governing, supported 793 the lay authorities in their policies of enserfment. But the state had meagerly rewarded the Church for such services. The revenues from the land donations given to the parishes by the state or by the landlords were not sufficient to maintain the parish priests and their families. The village priests therefore depended for their living upon the fees which the peasants

793 had to pay for religious services. In addition many village priests had an inferior training, were often semi-literate, and were sometimes publicly humiliated by their superiors. Abased by hard conditions of life, some of them tended to lose self-respect and sought comfort in habitual drunkenness.

565 793 In the meantime as a result of the conditions of serfdom the economic situation of the peasants was deteriorating while the village priests whose main revenues consisted of fees received for their services tended to squeeze out of the peasantry all they could. Hence in many parishes the relations between the priests and the peasants gradually developed into a state of perpetual bickering and struggle.[1] In such circumstances peasants were likely to develop a negative attitude toward the clergy. To "have a priest's eye" meant in peasant idiom to covet everything. Similar meaning was conveyed in the phrase "Am I a priest to eat two dinners?" The peasants compared the greediness of the priests to that of the judges. "A priest waits for a rich dead, and a judge for a rich litigant"; "A judge's pocket is the same as a priest's belly," they would say. It was considered a bad omen to meet a priest on the street. It must be pointed out, also, that in a situation in which any expression of opposition against the lay authorities was very risky and dangerous, the attack against the priests might have served as a convenient substitute target for destructive aggression directed against the landlords and the state.

[625] 565 796 793 In such conditions government ukases and police measures were sometimes necessary to force the peasants into churches; they were made to confess and to take communion by means of threat. As a result, confession and communion tended to be looked upon as a commercialized formality. It was a tedious obligation that had to be paid for in cash, the same as all other tributes and taxes to which the peasants were subjected. In such circumstances, confession and communion tended to lose their function of consolation, comfort, relief from guilt and identification with divinity. As a result a growing number of peasants ceased to look upon the priests as their friends and protectors; they tended to look upon them as government agents who conspired with the landlords and the police against the

565 peasants. Such a situation in many cases bred extreme antago-
796 nism against the priests, especially when hostility against the
793 priests was stirred up by systematic agitation, as in the case of
[795] various sects of Dissenters (*Raskolniki*). This agitation often took the form of folk songs:

[538]

hairy ones . . . the beasts:
These beasts are the priests
They howl, like wolves. . . .

* * *

In the churches they praise the Lord hypocritically,
And ensnare innocent people with their words;
In the churches they offer glory to God,
And send the Uryadniks to hunt innocent people;

* * *

And they drive innocent people to Siberia.
In the churches they open their mouths,
But before the government they keep silent.
Their hair is long like women's,
But their brain is a great deal shorter.

* * *

They howl like beasts;

* * *

They extort from all.
Wicked hairy priests . . .[2]

* * *

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668 The peasants were attracted to numerous sects of the Dis-
[546] senters which were spreading in Russia, especially since the seventeenth century when the great movement of the Old Believers (*Starovery*) began. In these sects and their ideologies the peasants protested against the conditions of serfdom. The teachings of a number of these sects expressed yearning for a new life, and for an anarchic brotherhood of men in which nobody would be rejected and everybody accepted on equal terms. Peasant Sutayev, for instance, who founded the Sutayevtsy sect in 1880, was considered to be one of the most pious churchgoers before he revolted against the official Church. He rebelled when he was over fifty. The occasion was a dispute that he had with his parish priest over a fee for the burial of his grandson. It was after this quarrel that he stopped going to

church claiming that "... one is not better for going there ... because everything there has to be paid for. Besides, I have the Church within myself."[3] 795 668

Sutayev then started a religious crusade aiming at "a new life, the organization of a Christian life." He preached that "the nobles and the rich must give back the land to those to whom it of right belongs." He disapproved of commerce, of money, of private property, of violence, and of any form of coercion. He claimed that if commerce, money and violence were eliminated, then the courts and the tax collectors would disappear too. The tax collectors and all the functionaries who live on the people will not be necessary any more, he said. The army and the war will be suppressed since "all men are brothers." "The Kingdom of God must be brought here on the earth," he asserted.[4] Similar protest against the existing conditions of serfdom and rejection, and demand for an all-human equalitarian brotherhood were expressed in many songs of the Dissenters: 538 795 771

All kinds of ignorance,
Moral wretchedness,
Falsehood and inconsistency,
Baseness, hypocrisy,
Coarse superstition,
Are contrary to Christianity!
Slavery, oppression,
Violence, constraint,
Every sort of pressure against people—
All this—
Is abomination before God,
Transgression of his commandments.
All people on earth
Are the children of one mother,
And above God there is no power.
And all without regard to standing in society,
Should be equal
And free in their conscience.
Everyone can pray,
According to what seems to him,
To be his obligation in relation to God.

* * *

[558]
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Why then in deeds of faith
Measures of compulsion
And all kinds of constraint?

* * *

Why then is this?[5]

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Protest against the existing conditions of abusive dominance and subservient submission and longing for acceptance on terms of anarchic equality seems to have been the driving power behind the ideologies of a number of Great-Russian religious sects, such as the *Dukhobortsy* (the spirit-wrestlers), and the *Molokane* (the milk-drinkers). Not unlike the Nihilists and the Anarchists (whose reaction was also rooted in feelings of rejection), all these sects showed a strong resentment against abusive and distant authorities. At first the religious dissenters attacked the Church authorities but then this anti-authority attitude was generalized and extended to all the authorities, including the family, the landlords, the state and the Czar.

As a result all the authorities were blamed for the existing social ills and their removal was considered necessary in order to achieve a better life. There was no need for official clergy, courts, churches, sacraments, fasts, confession, communion, or any Church rituals except simple hymn singing, these sects said. There was no need for the Czar either, they claimed. Anything that smacked of authority and power was rejected. "We behold what a spirit of impiety works and shall work to the end of the world in all holders of power," they stated.[6] In 1868, a sect decreed that anyone who prays for the existing authorities shall be excommunicated. Now all the authorities, not just the priests, were identified with the beasts! "How will you ever find grace at the hands of the Beast?" A number of these sects identified the Czar with the Anti-Christ.

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In their reaction against the suppression of the individual in the interest of those who hold power and in their strongly felt need for acceptance on terms of complete equality, the Dukhobortsy—not unlike the Nihilists—proclaimed the supremacy and the sanctity of the individual. Their demand for an anarchic acceptance was manifested in the emphasis of the

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worth and dignity of the individual above all other values; the Dukhobortsy claimed that every human being was a god. "God is spirit; he is in us; then we are gods."[7]

Disapproval of oppressive authority on the family level led the Dukhobortsy to repudiate even the names of "father" and "mother." They therefore did not call their parents "father" and "mother," but only "old man" and "old woman." In the same way a father would not say of his children "mine," but "ours."[8] Proscribing the existing degrading subjection of the wife to her husband the Dukhobortsy—not unlike the early Slavs—stressed the complete equality of men and women, husbands and wives. "Among us a woman is not a beast of burden, but a helpmate and standby, a friend and companion in this vale of misery," the Molokane would say.[9] The men called their wives "sisters." [562]

To satisfy their demands for complete acceptance and anarchic relations the Molokane attempted to build a society in which all things were to be possessed in common, and in which the evangelic principles of charity and equality, and the gospel of peace, truth and justice would reign supreme and forever.[10] They felt that it was only in such a communistic society that complete acceptance of all on equal terms could be achieved.

II

Just as in the ideology and practices of Russian monasticism, in some sects of the Dissenters reaction against the oppressive conditions and feeling of utter rejection took the form of extreme social withdrawal. For instance, the *Straniki* (wanderers) proscribed marriage and all family ties, and sought salvation in isolation and flight as the only way to avoid any contact with "Satan's representatives," that is, with the authorities. They would destroy and reject passports and all papers of identification, admit of no social distinction or ties, renounce private property and tramp from village to village, living by theft or by the hospitality of their sympathizers who provided food and secret shelter for them. "Have no city, no village, no home," they would advise.[11]

795 Another manifestation of withdrawal from degrading oppres-
156 sion was expressed by the *Molchalniki* (speechless) or *Bezslovestnye* (mutes), the sect whose members refused to speak. The moment one would join this sect he would suddenly become dumb and nothing could force even a syllable from his lips. The government was unable to obtain any information from such voluntary martyrs,[12] even under extreme torture.[13] The Theodosians and the Denisovtsy manifested feelings of dejection and withdrawal by means of complete asceticism. These sects demanded celibacy and abstinence not only from bachelors, but from married people as well. ("Let the unwedded wed not, the wedded separate"). The members of these sects therefore
[792] founded settlements which were organized along monastic lines, where they attempted to live a solitary life of complete seclusion in the wilderness, and far away from worldly authorities.[14]

On the other hand, some sects apparently reacted to the existing unsatisfactory conditions by various forms of destruc-
[304] tive aggressiveness, including self-destruction. The *Skoptsy* (castrated), for instance, practiced castration and mutilation of sex organs.[15] Other sects preached and practiced mass assassination and mass immolation. The *Detoubiytsy* (infant-killers), preached and practiced infanticide. The *Dushilshchiki* (stranglers) or *Tyukalshchiki* (clubbers) preached and practiced killing of adults.[16] Other sects, such as the *Samoszhigateli* (self-cremators) of *Morelshchiki* (self-immolators), organized mass immolation. Cases of such acts of extreme destructiveness have occurred until the end of the nineteenth century, and in the most different and distant parts of the Empire where the Great-Russians are settled.[17] As among the Anarchists, there was among these people an urge for pan-destruction:

> I wish that all Romanov, every man, wife, and child, would come to the banks of the Volga, throw themselves into the waters, and sink to the bottom so that the temptations of the world should not attract them. And what is even better: that I might set fire to and burn down the entire city;—what joy if it were to burn from end to end destroying all the aged and infants, so that none could receive the stamp of Antichrist.[18]

III

Just as in the ideology of Nihilism and Anarchism, revolt 795
against degrading submission and rejection and demand for 152
acceptance in some sects took the form of extreme power-seeking 781
and self-deification. In the sect *Lyudi Bozhii* (people of God), for 776
instance, the craving to become God incarnate or to have a live incarnation of Deity actually present in their midst was so strong that since the time of the sect's founder who claimed to be God Zebaoth (Sabaoth) a whole series of Christs came into being, succeeding one another by a sort of filiation or adoption. Finally each religious community of this sect boasted of having a flesh-and-blood Christ in its midst. They claimed that it was in each man's own power to unite himself to the Deity and to incarnate it in his own body. A woman had the faculty to become *Boginya* (the Goddess) or *Bogoroditsa* (Mother of God) and many women did achieve such self-apotheosis, adding to the number of divinities of each community.[19]

It was by means of suffering and mortification of flesh that candidates for Messiahship competed among themselves for this supreme achievement. These exploits were accompanied with self-glorification. In this way both power-seeking and identification with suffering were realized. The followers would watch for years to see which of the rival pretenders to Christhood underwent the greatest sufferings. The rivals for Godship, on the other hand, often resorted to trickery to prove their claims.[20] But once the issue was settled and a God-incarnate was recognized, the whole congregation owed Him supreme reverence and unconditional obedience which satisfied the contender's craving for power: "I am God, foretold of the prophets. There is no other God than I. Seek ye none other. Where unto ye are appointed, abide therein."[21] On the part of the congregation the desire for Christ-incarnate in their midst manifested a strong need for protective dependence and acceptance.

Hence longing for a world in which truth and justice, kind- 795
ness and love would reign, in which there would be no abusive 577
serfdom, no subservience, tortures and sufferings, but happi- 771

795 ness, trust and all-human equality and fraternal aid was strongly
577 felt in these sects. Many of these people expressed such yearn-
771 ings in the form of religious hymns and rituals. It is to be expected that in these hymns and practices Christ and Mother of God, symbols of love and acceptance, not "Old God," symbol of rage and fear, would be worshipped and longed for:

The Czardom of Truth will be restored
Amongst us here on earth,
And the flame of heavenly life
Will be rekindled in our midst.
Only then, when malice and slander
Disappear from the face of earth,
And man acknowledges the Lord,
God of everlasting love,
When the world replaces pride and hypocrisy
With Truth and Justice of God,
And in the yearnings of the noble soul
Love and kindness are revived,
When all are equal under God
And the weak no longer are oppressed,
When man his thoughts to Lord will turn
And spread Truth and Justice of God,
When the force of dismal prisons, tortures and shackles
No longer reigns,
The living God will resurrect
Eternal freedom in the heart of man.
To this Czardom, thou seeker of God,
Hasten and sincerely yearn for
With a clear heart, tirelessly,
Pray thou to the Creator of the universe.
For to sow the seeds of good and love,
Are we summoned by the Lord;
So that torture and death do not appall us
In the living of our days,
We will have to be the executors
Of the Holy conceptions of Christ
Then the Czardom of Truth of God
Will tread upon the earth.
We shall have the destiny
Of creating Christ's Family.

795

This is great fortune 577
For all the servants of the world, 771
Sharers in honesty and trust,
Executors of the Covenant of Christ.[22]

Longing for acceptance was not only manifested in the wor- 795
ship of living "Christ," but also in carnal communion with the 152
"Christs" and "Madonnas," in ecstatic trances and mass religious [786]
hallucinations, and apparently even in some cannibalistic practices.[23] Thus when in consequence of sacred rites a Bogorodica would bear a child, if a boy, he was known as *Khristosik* (the little Christ). According to some students of Russia's religious
life the Khristosik was immolated on the eighth day after his [782]
birth. His heart and blood, mixed with flour and honey, were served to make the cakes for the Eucharist. This practice was called "Taking Communion in the blood of the Lamb."[24] At other times, according to the same sources, it was a young virgin, chosen as Mother of God who willingly gave her left breast to be cut out amidst ritual dancing and singing. The breast was then partaken of as the "true Eucharistic food."[25]

Great emotional insecurity and extreme fear of rejection might explain why elements of power-seeking were present in all sects, even in those which professed complete repudiation of power in any form whatsoever. For instance, Popov, the founder of the Molokane sect which originally professed complete freedom of conscience and complete equality, eventually entirely suppressed liberty of discussion and interpretation. Unconditional submission to the authorities he declared to be the first duty, insubordination the greatest sin.[26] Andrey Selivanov, the founder of the Skoptsy sect, had himself designated in the prayers which were addressed to him in his lifetime, as "God of Gods and King of Kings," even though the Skoptsy sect professed complete freedom from any form of coercion.[27]

Also early in the history of the Dukhobortsy we find that their 795
communistic practices finally led to dictatorship and despot- 621
ism.[28] The leaders of this sect knew how to take personal advantage of the longing of the sect members for protective dependence and acceptance. One of the leaders of this sect, Kapustin, in the beginning of the nineteenth century expounded

795 the communistic tenets of the Dukhobortsy in such a way as to
621 turn them to his own profit and advantage. Like other Dukho-
[781] bortsy, Kapustin too believed that God was in every man, and
therefore all men were equal. He said, however, that God first
had revealed himself in Jesus and the soul of Jesus has then
continually animated new bodies throughout many generations.
And by virtue of its higher qualities, and the absolute command
of God, the soul of Jesus as it passed from one man to another
had invariably retained its identity, and the man in whom the
soul of Jesus resided, unmistakenly knew he was Jesus:

> Thus Sylvan Kolisnikof at Nikisk whom many of older among you knew, was Jesus; but now, as truly as the heaven is above and the earth under my feet, I am the true Jesus Christ, your Lord! fall down therefore on your knees and worship me![28]

Kapustin introduced a complete community of goods among
[476] his followers. They worked the fields in common and divided
the harvest among them. Storehouses were erected to provide
against years of dearth or famine. Also various kinds of indus-
tries were introduced and the colony showed visible progress in
the first few years of its existence. Kapustin had also assembled
an advisory Council of thirty Elders about him, from among
whom an inner circle of twelve was selected. These were known
as "The Apostles." Before he died he endeavored to impose his
son as his successor and claimed that when he died the soul of
Jesus would enter the body of his son.

[661] After Kapustin's death dissatisfactions grew stronger and manifested themselves in suspicion, mistrust, and denunciation. The Council of Elders developed into an inquisitional tribunal which ruled arbitrarily, interpreting justice according to their caprices. Those who submitted unconditionally were rewarded, those who were suspected of deviation were accused of treachery and of intention to go over to their "enemy" that is, the official Church, and were punished with torture and even with death. The house from which the Elders ruled became known as *Ray i muka*—paradise and torture.[29]

19
PEASANT UPRISINGS

I

566 167 EVER since the establishment of serfdom, slaves and serfs would free themselves from oppressive bondage by joining the gangs of vagabonds, fugitives from justice, army deserters, malcontents and escapees of all kinds, many of whom lived by theft, robbery, and begging. These victims of oppression, as well as many adventurers, gathered along the frontiers of the empire in "no man's land" where they would organize themselves as bands of freebooters, guerillas, and mercenaries, ready to enter the service of rival powers.

621 701 In the regions of the lower Don and Dnieper these communities of fugitives of all social classes and occupations and of many races formed elective military governments, known as the Cossack republics. Once they were established, these free Cossack communes served as a place of attraction to all who longed for freedom from oppression or who sought adventure. In these free societies no one was asked any question about his passport, his identity, his domicile, his faith, or his belongings. Everyone willing to fight and loot was welcome, but none was forced to come or stay.[1]

[565] However, by the middle of the seventeenth century in these Cossack commonwealths, there appeared a social differentiation between the old settlers and the newcomers. The older settlers formed a property-owning class known as the "house-owners," and the newcomers became known as the *golytba* (the naked). And it was these unsettled and restless Cossacks of the "naked class" that played an especially prominent part in the uprisings of the seventeenth century and later.[2]

175 669 566 The first part of the seventeenth century, known in the history of the Czardom as the "Period of Trouble," was characterized by the lack of an established authority. The old dynasty had

175 669 [566] ended in a violent and mysterious way and a number of pretenders arose to take its place. It was in this interval between the fall of the former authority and the relative consolidation of a new one that the oppressed strata of the Czardom saw an opportunity to rebel against a state of humiliating bondage and economic misery. Seeking relief from their burdens and yearning for social acceptance in a system of equalitarian relationships, the poorer burghers, homeless Cossacks and runaway peasants and slaves flocked into the camp of Bolotnikov, himself an ex-slave and adventurer who marched at the head of this strange army upon Moscow. From his camp near Moscow he distributed proclamations inviting slaves and serfs to slay their masters, commanding all of his followers to rise against the voevodas and others in authority, and exciting them to rob and beat traders. In return he promised the slaves and serfs the wives and the property of the serf-owners. To all his followers he pledged honors, riches and the status of boyars.[3]

[152] Search for security in a system of protection-dependence relationships manifested itself in a need for pretenders. If only a rumor started about the appearance of a pretender, whole provinces would rise to greet him. Sometimes a pretender had to be subsequently found to lead these masses of discontents who rose to follow a fancied liberator and benefactor. Such conditions only contributed to the prolongation of the troubled times and prevented an early establishment and consolidation of a new authority. It was in such a way that most of the seventeenth century became a century of riotings and rebellions which climaxed in the great rising under Stanka Razin in 1670–1671. Originating among the Don Cossacks, this movement soon spread to the Volga regions and developed into a general war of the lower strata against the upper classes. In this, as in the other uprisings of that century, many excesses were committed by both the rebels and the government forces. The same features of social struggle were repeated in the eighteenth century, in the great peasant rebellion that was led by Pugachev, another Cossack chieftain.

565 669 Also the nineteenth century witnessed a number of peasant rebellions. In the beginning of that century the peasants of the

Pensa gubernia rose against the landlords with the slogan "Liberty and Land" (*Zemlya i Volya*).[4] Ever since they had been 565 669 enserfed and bound to the land, the peasants kept in cherished memory the *Yuriev den*, St. George's day, the day when in earlier times each peasant was allowed to leave his landlord (*vykhod*). The peasants' demand for freedom from bondage was as strong as their demand for land. When the ideas of personal, economic [177] and political freedoms started to penetrate Russia from the European West, also, the Russian peasants, owing to a growing contact with the city and the intelligentsia, became affected by them and in consequence revolts were increasing in number. Between 1826 and 1830 there were 41 cases of peasant rebellions and between 1858–1860 there were 284 such uprisings.[5]

It is significant to note that these peasant rebellions became [727] especially prominent and especially widely spread each time the ruling class had suffered loss of prestige, such as in case of defeat on the battlefield. During the Crimean War in 1854 and 1855 widespread peasant uprisings took place on the shores of the Volga, and in central and southwestern gubernias, the Vladimir, Ryasan, Tambov, Pensa, and Voronezh.[6] In these provinces the mir institution prevailed and periodical redistribution of land [423] was practiced. Here also reaction against abusive and humiliating conditions of serfdom was very intense and demand for land became very strong. In these provinces the traditions of earlier revolts were fresh in the memory of the peasantry. In addition, growing density of population and increasing land shortage tended to strengthen the revolutionary attitudes of the peasants. Their hostilities turned against the landlords whom they blamed for all their ills and misfortunes.

II

The defeat in the Crimean War and the internal disturbances 727 178 which followed that war forced the Czarist government to undertake measures to reorganize its armed forces and to stabilize the regime internally. After being defeated by technologically and politically superior enemies, the Czarist government finally realized that in order to improve Russia's fighting effectiveness vis-a-vis the West, higher state revenues were needed and these

[727] could be achieved only if Russia was to change radically its
178 economic structure. As a result of such a trend of events and of
[566] thought the government passed a decree in 1861 according to
which the peasants were set legally free from their masters.

565 As a consequence of his legal emancipation, the peasant found
621 himself in the possession of less arable land than before, and he
651 was still bound to it. He was overburdened even more than
before because he was obliged to pay high redemption dues in
addition to the heavy taxes that were imposed on him. Moreover
[672] the peasants in land communes not only remained jointly responsible to the government for the payment of taxes, but they were also made jointly responsible for redemption payments. The commune's authority over the peasants was increased and the peasant found himself under an even more exacting and more despotic commune regimentation than the one that existed before the "Emancipation Act."

241 At the same time the peasant still did not have sufficient arable land. He also lacked pasture grounds and timber which were of special importance in his technologically backward and extensive agricultural economy; most of such land was left in the hands of his former masters. The acuteness of land shortage was especially felt because of lack of artificial fertilizers, need for draught animals, and primitiveness of farm equipment. Many peasants did not even possess a wooden plow.

565 But though the emancipation act of 1861 still kept the peas-
668 ants bound to the land, and did not provide them with sufficient land, it did open up opportunities for their economic advance and political activation. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the peasantry became generally recognized as a potentially very significant force, both politically and economically. It was this prospect of the peasant masses as the leading political power of the future in combination with the Slavophil idealization of the peasantry that gave rise to the ideology of *narodnichestvo* (populism). This ideology idealized the virtues and the creative potentialities of the peasantry, and just as the Slavophils, the narodniki claimed that the reconstruction of Russian society, even of the whole world, will come from Russian peasantry.

By the end of that century a faction of Russian radical intel-

By the end of that century[1] a faction of Russian radical intelligentsia fused the Russian Narodnik and Anarchist ideologies 668
and practices with those of Western Socialism and formed the 517
Party of Socialist Revolutionaries. The program of this Party 665
was agrarian socialism and terrorism. They published leaflets [177]
and manifestos, and spread their ideas in the villages. The Socialist Revolutionaries preached open violence as a means of overthrowing the Czarist regime. They relied on the peasantry to start uprisings against the landlords and government officials, and to commit individual acts of terror to achieve their ends. Just as earlier, the Anarchists and Terrorists, the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, had a separate organization which specialized in perpetrating acts of terror:

> Where the lash and the whip are, there are also the bomb and the revolver! So has it been, so is it now, and so shall it be. When public indignation and hate become centered upon an agent of the regime whether he be placed high or low; when that agent becomes a symbol of violence and despotism; when his activity becomes harmful to the commonweal; when no means are available to render him harmless and his continued existence represents an affront to the social conscience, then is the door open to terror in the executor of the sentence pressed from the hearts of public-minded citizens.[7]

The terroristic organization of the Party of Socialist Revolu- 665
tionaries enjoyed complete autonomy within the Party. It had its 668
own sources of revenue and was independent in selection of prospective victims. In the course of a few years of its existence it perpetrated more than two hundred acts of terror. Most of these consisted of assassinations or of attempted assassinations of highly placed officials of the government, including a member of the Imperial Family, two Ministers of Interior, thirty-nine governors, seventy-four ranking officers of the army and the navy, and fifty-two high police officials. Seventy percent of these acts of terror were perpetrated by workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors.[8]

The Socialist Revolutionaries relied mainly on middle and 665
poor peasant strata. They attempted to widen the gap between 565
the better-off and the poor, to set up the lowest strata against the 668
upper, to stir class hatred against the kulaks. In their manifestos, leaflets, and speeches, the Socialist Revolutionaries harangued

[1] [i.e. 19th century -- Analyst]

665 the peasantry, and appealed to their deeply rooted hostilities
565 against the ruling classes, and against all people of means. In
668 their proclamations to the peasantry they stated that "the land belongs to those who till it." They incited the peasants to appropriate by force hay, pasture, and timber. They also encouraged violence and murder against all those whom they held responsible for their plight.[9]

[579] As a result of such propaganda and agitation combined with economic and social difficulties, peasant disturbances were re-
669 newed and increased in frequency and intensity. They led to the events of 1905. That year the government suffered a considerable
[727] loss of prestige because of the defeat on the battlefield (the Japanese War of 1904–1905). In such circumstances (the same as after the Crimean War), fear and awe and unconditional obedience—the foundations of Czarist rule—were shaken, internal disturbances ensued and threatened the existence of the Czardom. By this time the revolutionary eruptions of the peasantry were combined with those of the industrial proletariat. Between
[468] January and April, 1905, there were about 660,000 workers on economic and political strikes.[10] In October of the same year there was again a general strike.

In that month also a general peasant rising took place embracing three hundred districts in 47 gubernias. Again it was the central and southern regions that took the lead;[11] and again the gubernias in which the landlords suffered the heaviest losses were predominantly those where the system of repartitional land tenure prevailed over the system of individual peasant households and of hereditary holdings. In the communities with communal land holdings the dissatisfaction was greatest and violence ran especially high.

665 The activities of the Social Revolutionaries in the village
668 were joined by those of the Bolsheviks. By the beginning of the twentieth century a wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party, the Bolsheviks, who earlier scorned the peasants and worked exclusively among the urban proletariat, began to pay more attention to the Russian village. They became impressed by the frequency and the intensity of the peasants' disturbances and realized that the peasantry presented potentially very ex-

plosive revolutionary material. Hence the Bolsheviks began to send their agitators into the village. 665 668

There was no tendency among these extremists and maximalists to make use of peaceful means which had now been made [642] possible by the Czar's Manifesto of October, 1905. In this manifesto legislative powers were given to Duma (house of representatives) and a certain degree of political, cultural and personal freedom was introduced. On the contrary these professional conspirators, following Anarchist precepts and practices, took advantage of increased opportunities for political agitation. That year the Socialist Revolutionaries in one of their proclamations stated: "If you need more land, hay, pasture, timber, take it from the landlord. Do not pay taxes. Drive evil priests out of the villages, boycott the courts, replace bad officials by good, throw out the police!"[12] In the same year the Bolsheviks, struck by the increasing restlessness in the village, called upon the peasants and the village proletariat for a "collective refusal to pay taxes, refusal to furnish recruits, refusal to fulfill the orders and commands of the government and its agents."[13]

III

Such revolutionary ideas which were infiltrating the villages 668 not only confirmed the peasants in their beliefs and dispositions; 565 they also tended to promote their feelings of rebelliousness, to radicalize them in the extreme, and push them toward excesses. In common with most tillers of land, the Russian peasants were convinced that the land by "natural right" belonged only to those who cultivate it, and that somehow, sometimes in the past, the land was taken away from them by force and trickery, not by right and justice.

The question of ownership of land was closely related to 423 humiliating subservience to the landlords, the commune and the 565 state. Ownership of land meant the regaining of self-respect. The peasants were therefore inclined to believe that they never lost the right to the land and that someday, somehow, all the land would have to be given back to them. "We are yours, but the land is ours" (*My vashi a zemlya nasha*), the peasants would say to the pomeshchiks. The speeches of the peasants' deputies

565 The speeches of the peasants' deputies
423 in the second Duma unmistakably show that the peasants con-
[646] sidered that the land belonged to them and to nobody else and that the times of degrading oppression were over. They declared themselves in favor of the free distribution of all the land that was in the possession of the nobility, the Church, and the state:

> We are talking of land these days as of nothing else. We are told it is a sacred, inviolate possession. I think if the people want it, there can be no inviolateness about it. Gentlemen of the nobility! You think we have forgotten the time when you used us as stakes in playing at cards and exchanged us for dogs! We know we were your sacred inviolate property. But the land has been stolen from us. The peasants who have sent me here have said that the land is ours! We have come here not to buy but to take it.[14]

168 Because of such beliefs and ideas which were intensified by
565 systematic revolutionary propaganda of professional conspirators
425 and agitators, any rumors concerning the land always found a
627 ready response among the peasantry. It is for the same reason that often only a vague rumor about a government land decree was sufficient to convince the peasants that the land was given back to them by the Czar, but that it was the lesser government officials, bribed by the landlords, who kept the land out of their hands. Such land-hungry peasants, already inclined to rebel against age-long and humiliating dependency, were ready to take the law into their own hands, to seize the manorial lands, to loot the estates and to kill the landlords whenever they felt that the power of the existing authorities was crumbling.

178 The professional conspirators among the Russian revolution-
515 ary intelligentsia took full advantage of such inclinations. Their revolutionary plans were especially favored by the growing differentiation in the Russian villages. In the first decade of the twentieth century economic and social differentiation in the Great-Russian village was already well advanced. It was favored by a series of government measures (Stolypin reforms)[15] which were aimed at developing a stratum of independent and prosperous peasantry and destroying the system of communal landholding. As a result of such measures the Great-Russian village became by the first decade of this century composed of a number

of strata, whose interests were often conflicting. There were the 565
obshchiniki (the communal landholders), the *otrubniki* (the 178
peasant private property owners), the *khutoriane* (isolated homestead owners), the *bednyaki* (the poor and indebted peasants), the *serednyaki* (the middle peasants), and the *kulaki*. Finally, there were still the pomeshchiki who owned manorial estates with arable lands, timber-forests and pasture grounds. These were, however, gradually selling their land to the better-off peasants.

The peasant private landholders prospered better than those 241
in the communes. The yield per acre on communal lands has 423
always been much lower than on the private lands. The com- 472
munal landholders had to rely for a part of their income on wages. These they got as seasonal industrial workers or as agricultural laborers on the lands of the landed gentry. They also worked on the lands of better-off individual peasant property
owners whom they resented and called "*novye pomeshchiki*" [565]
(the new squires). The poor, landless, and indebted peasants [578]
antagonized the better-off peasants. The lower and the middle peasants resented the kulaks and the pomeshchiki.

At the same time the individualization of the Great-Russian 652
peasantry was proceeding very slowly in spite of government 421
help and encouragement. By 1912 the proportion of consolidated 241
peasant holdings, as compared to those remaining in the communal system, was less than 11 percent. Between 1907 and 1915 only about 20 percent of the peasants left land commune.[16] This slow decommunalization did not, however, indicate lack of desire for private land ownership. The reasons for the persistence of the old communal land system lay in the shortage of land, in peasant poverty, in vested interests within the village commune, and finally in traditional lack of self-reliance among the peasants.

As long as a large part of the Great-Russian peasantry re- 241
mained in the system of communal landholding where lack of 511
initiative and primitive techniques of cultivation prevailed, no 668
great general improvement in land cultivation and in the standard of living of the peasantry could have been expected in spite of all government efforts. Thus, economically insecure and

241 hungry for land, resentful of degrading dependency and inclined
511 to be hostile to the existing authorities, many peasants were
668 ready to follow the leadership of professional conspirators and
demagogues who incited them to revolt and promised them "land and freedom." Such feelings and attitudes were of decisive importance in the revolutionary days of 1917, as well as later in the civil war.

20

ASCENDENCY OF BOLSHEVISM

I

178 WHEN the Czardom in the eighteenth century
464 embarked on its policy of industrialization, the newly built
industries, both those state owned and those owned by the landed nobility, were based on serf labor. Also the non-noble entrepreneurs purchased or rented serfs to work in their mines and factories.[1] In such conditions the technical equipment and the production output of Russia's industries remained at a very low level. There was no incentive to introduce technological improvements as long as the labor was abundant, and its cost low. Only a few industries, such as the cotton industry which was in the hands of non-noble owners, and which from its start was based on free labor, had introduced modern machinery.

[652] Thus since the Russian industries did not advance technologically and were unable to compete with the European industrial products, they had to be protected by high tariff barriers, by
434 grants and subsidies. This situation kept the level of prices of manufactured goods high in comparison with the buying power of the industrial workers, of peasants and of middle urban strata.
178 The resulting lack of buying power of these broad strata of the
458 population made the progress of industrialization in Russia very slow, uneven, unstable, and chronically affected by crises

178
and unemployment, a situation that was well exploited by the 458
professional conspirators, particularly the Bolsheviks.

By the end of the nineteenth century the first wave of strikes 468
swept the country.[4] At first the strikes were spontaneous, local 668
and purely economic in character. The workers wanted higher
wages and better working conditions. But since many industries [438]
were located in Petersburgh which was the center of heavy industry, and in Moscow which was the center of the railroad system and of the textile industry, the revolutionary intelligentsia and professional conspirators and agitators who were also concentrated in these two capitals could not fail to see great political opportunities, both in the concentration of the industrial proletariat, and in its economic plight. But there were differences among the revolutionary factions of the intelligentsia in regard to revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

The ideological differences as to propaganda policies and 665
revolutionary strategy was one of the factors which led to the 668
split of the Socialist Democratic Party into two factions, the *Bolsheviks* (the majority), and the *Mensheviks* (the minority). Being mostly of urban middle class origin the Mensheviks were inclined to advocate gradual advance of the country toward democratization. They also proposed an alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie. Accordingly also in internal Party organization the Mensheviks were in favor of a policy of liberalism and democracy. The Bolshevik faction, on the other hand, was recruited from among the raznochintsy who were affected by Anarchism and were inclined toward extremist solutions and recognized no compromise. They proposed an alliance with the revolutionary peasants and an armed rebellion staged by the workers and peasants as the most effective means of seizing power.

Following the ideas and practices of the Anarchists and the 665
Terrorists (Narodovoltsy), the Bolsheviks claimed that the im- 669
mediate seizure of power was of paramount importance while the work of educating the masses could begin later. That end, the seizure of power, to the Bolsheviks no less than to their political predecessors, the Anarchists, sanctified everything. Deliberate instigation of hatred, planned deceit, individual killing, armed uprising, and systematic terror were all equally approved

means if they led to the final goal, revolution and the overthrow of the Czarist system. Thus even at that time the Party was placed above everything else and the interests and the rights of the individual had to be subordinated to the Party and to its supreme objective, the revolution. At the second congress of Russian Social Democrats, which took place in London in 1903 where the final split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks occurred, Pasadovski, one of Lenin's aassiciates declared:

> There is no doubt that we do not agree on the following fundamental issue: should our future policy be subordinated to some kind of basic democratic principles, or should all democratic principles be subordinated exclusively to the advantages of our party. I decidedly advocate the latter. There is nothing among the democratic principles that we should not subordinate to the advantages of our Party. . . . Yes, also the inviolability of the individual. As a revolutionary party striving for its ultimate aim—social revolution, we should consider the democratic principles exclusively from the standpoint of the advantages of our party.[3]

This idea of supreme Party interests to which everybody and everything was subordinated was closely associated with the principle of centralistic and dictatorial party organization which was earlier conceived by Bakunin and later advocated by Lenin, and finally adopted by the Communist International.[4] Lenin said that the organizational principle of revolutionary social democracy demands the enlargement of the rights and plenary powers of the central body against the parts.[5] Just like Bakunin, Lenin advocated the need of a "close circle of professional revolutionaries"[6] who would compose a stable and continuous Party leadership. He claimed that in a country with despotic leadership, in a life and death struggle with Czarist police, a small but stable and continuous revolutionary committee at the top of the Party would be more efficient to lead a mass movement and therefore better equipped to seize power.[7]

This principle of centralized and autocratic Party leadership which had its roots in the self-seeking drives of the raznochintsy led eventually to the dictatorship of one man. Just as Bakunin saw only himself at the top of his revolutionary hierarchy, so did Lenin. Early in the history of the Party it was noticed that

"Lenin always felt that the Party was he, that he was the will of the movement concentrated in one man, and he acted accordingly . . . "[8] It was this demand for total power and urge to perpetuate oneself in power that necessitated military discipline and frequent purges within the Party, just as earlier among the Terrorists, the same demand and urge fostered intolerance and hatred of all deviationists and outsiders, promoted mistrust and led to the use of terror inside and outside of Party ranks. Thus Lenin, too, approved of terror:

> We have never rejected terror on principle, nor can we ever do so. Terror is a form of military operation that may be usefully applied, or may even be essential in certain movements of the battle. . . .[9]

Extreme power-seeking and resulting dogmatism and inability to compromise, as well as the example set by the Anarchists and Terrorists, led even in the early years of Party life to an emphasis on hatred of the opponents and on ruthlessness in dealing with them. Thus, in early Bolshevik writings, the words "hatred," "ruthlessness," "irreconcilability," "mercilessness," "relentlessness," "extermination," "destruction," "wiping off," became prominent. When called before the Central Committee of the Party to answer for his accusations against some Party members, which the Central Committee considered unjust and false, Lenin prided himself on using unethical methods in fighting his opponents. He proudly admitted that his accusations were deliberately schemed to:

> . . . evoke in the reader hatred, aversion and contempt . . . calculated not to convince but to break up the ranks of the opponent, not to correct the mistake of the opponent but to destroy him, to wipe his organization off the face of the earth . . . to evoke the worst thoughts, the worst suspicions about the opponent . . . Against such political enemies I then conducted—and in the event of a repetition and development of a split shall always conduct a fight of extermination . . .[10]

It was this compulsive urge of the Bolsheviks to seize power by all and any means, their centralistic and military Party organization and their ruthlessness in dealing with their opponents that had enabled them to take advantage of the chaotic situa-

665 tion which had developed in Russia after the February revolution and to achieve their main objective.

II

182 Just as earlier, in Turco-Mongol empires, the great weakness of the Czardom lay in its low degree of emotional and ideological unity. And it is this basic vulnerability of the Czardom which has enabled a small, but determined, well disciplined and ruthless faction of professional conspirators to seize power. Like its patriarchal family, the whole Czardom was torn by internal dissension and strife. The abusive and humiliating power relationships at all levels of social organization of the Czardom encouraged self-orientation and destructive aggressiveness which precluded tolerance, compromise and social cohesion.

In such circumstances it was difficult to develop a set of common values that would serve as a focal point of unity of all subjects and keep the society unified in face of all threats to its existence. Orthodox religion, as well as Russian nationalism, failed in its role of unifying ideologies in a society in which interpersonal and intergroup relationships provoked feelings of rejection, mistrust, emotional instability and extreme factionalism. Thus, instead of developing itself into an integrated community unified by common feelings and identification and common interests, there grew within the Czardom a number of separate and inimical worlds with conflicting expectations and demands and with differing images and visions.

184
565 There was the world of the peasants, the world of the landlords, the world of the lower urban folk, the world of the clergy, the world of the bureaucracy, the world of the military, the world of the intelligentsia, the world of a small upper commercial and industrial class, and finally the separate worlds of ethnical, religious and national minorities. Since Russia had not developed a numerically strong and influential middle class to link and unify all these strata, there was little contact, less understanding and no mutual sympathy between these contrasting worlds. There were deep tensions and conflicts also within each one of these worlds and all were in a perpetual state of hostility and warfare among themselves.[11]

The landed gentry had for ages kept the peasants in slavery, misery and contempt. The peasants, feeling humiliated and wronged, had risen against the landlords, burning manorial mansions, looting estates, and massacring their masters whenever the power of the nobility appeared to be waning. Since the traditions of Russian landed squires were those of service nobility, not of manorial aristocrats, their interests and ambitions did not prepare them to take a personal interest in either their lands or serfs. The mansions on the estates of these rural gentry were located on the outskirts of the peasant villages and except for the house servants there was little if any contact with the world of the peasantry. Since Peter the Great the differences between these two worlds became also very visible in dress, manners, standard of living, as well as in views of life, education, ideas and morals. When, after the reforms of Peter the Great, French ways were aped by the dvorianstvo, and French language accepted by them as a means of social intercourse, the abyss between the two worlds became even more unbridgeable.

Similarly the bureaucracy and the revolutionary intelligentsia were two violently opposed camps with little possibility of cooperation between them. And while secondary schools and the universities were producing increasing numbers of lawyers, teachers, architects, journalists, artists, and literati, the tension between the bureaucracy and these intelligentsia developed into an intense and open enmity. Extreme emotionalism nursed on the family level was only heightened in such conditions. Each of these groups therefore showed a great deal of dogmatism; they tended to be implacable, irreconcilable, and full of malevolent criticism of each other. To the revolutionary intelligentsia the bureaucrats were the "corrupted lackeys of the dynasts to be killed like beasts." To the government officials all the liberal intelligentsia were the "mortal enemies" of the Czar. They represented the "sedition" and had to be "mercilessly annihilated."[12] Thus while the intelligentsia relentlessly attacked the bureaucracy in a spirit of destructive criticism, the bureaucracy responded by persecuting the liberals and the revolutionaries with such a blind passion and hatred that the opposition had to go underground or emigrate abroad and organize its war from out-

184 side. The gulf between these two leading groups of the Czardom
585 became impassable.

The intelligentsia themselves were far from being unified or having a common purpose. They were a restless and unstable crowd. They were split into numerous parties, factions and cliques which were in a perpetual state of feuding and warfare among themselves. Since all tended toward extremes and all sought absolute power, each party, faction, and clique considered itself to be the only repository of the Truth and therefore anathematized all others. Dogmatic intolerance and neverending feuding constantly fostered new schisms and heresies, new renegations and treacheries, bitterness, hostilities and extreme factional strife.

Both the peasants and the intelligentsia resented the military. The officers kept apart from the rest of society as a separate caste, and were therefore alienated from the common people. Within the military ranks there was a great deal of distrust and suspicion of common soldiers toward officers. The revolutionary intelligentsia considered the armed forces to be the main bulwark of the autocracy, showed a passionate hatred toward them and were waiting for the first chance to destroy this pillar of the old regime. All the strata of the population equally loathed the dreadful political police. The revolutionary intelligentsia were also distrustful of the clergy and Church hierarchy. Most of them were openly atheistic.

182 In want of an integrating middle class and a unifying ideology, all these warring strata, groups and factions were held together by the authority of the Czar, which was sanctioned by the Church and rested on the bureaucracy, the police and the armed forces. The influence of the Church, however, was greatly shattered, the bureaucracy was inefficient, self-concerned, full of internal tension, and not fullheartedly behind the existing regime, and the police were resented by all. The fate of the Czardom therefore depended exclusively upon the discipline and the loyalty of the military.

In such conditions, if the support of the armed forces would fail, both the Czar and the Czardom were doomed. This was well realized not only by the opposition, but by the Czar himself. And after the army which Czar Nicholas personally commanded in 1917 had suffered defeats at the hands of the enemies, and the chiefs of the armed forces suggested to the Czar that he should resign, he realized that his prestige had fallen and his authority gone. As out of spite he abdicated not only for himself but for his heirs as well. And as it has already happened in Russia's past, when the central authority suffered defeat and loss of prestige, all seething internal forces of revolt, relieved of the controls that kept them under check, burst out in violent eruptions. In such circumstances everybody deserted the Czar, even the Orthodox Church: 182 [727]

> Even the Orthodox Clergy, that class that had been an integrated part of the Czarist system deserted the Czar in the hour of his doom. Showing as much lack of a sense of proportion as the other classes of Russian society the official hierarchy went as far as to pass a decision according to which all lines containing the word "king" in the Psalms of David were to be deleted.[13]

III

All these circumstances, combined with the extreme factionalism within the intelligentsia, greatly facilitated the seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks. All the four national *Dumas* which were convoked since 1905 were composed predominantly of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. The same situation existed in the leading circles of all political parties.[14] But in each party, self-centeredness and lust for power led the intelligentsia into constant bickering among themselves and neverending fighting for leadership, a situation that manifested itself in numerous party splits. 665 517 [646]

It was only in the Bolshevik Party that the Party's Central Committee was well disciplined and unified under one leader who had absolutist and dictatorial powers. This situtation spared the Party too many splits. This Bolshevik system favored the reduction of Party leadership to a rather small number of intellectuals who relied on the semi-intelligentsia and industrial workers in local Party work. It was this dictatorial, centralistic and "aristocratic" organization of the Bolsheviks, as well as the extreme ruthlessness and aggressiveness of its leaders and fanat-

565 517 icism of its rank and file, that gave this Party an advantage over its main rival for power, the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, in the chaotic days of 1917.

727 669 565 Just as it had happened in the past, a weakening of the prestige of the ruling classes as a result of defeats on the battlefield led to peasant uprisings. Almost immediately after the Czar's abdication, that is, in March, 1917, peasant rebellions arose in 34 districts and by June spread to 325 districts. The distrubances were again especially intensive in the upper Don and in the middle Volga, the regions where the tradition of revolt was strong and the situation for revolt matured owing to unsatisfactory conditions within the land communes.

665 669 The chaos that ensued in the village was emphasized by factional strife and indecision in the center. As a result of the fall of the old Czarist regime, the two most extreme revolutionary parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks, entered into a contest for power. While the Socialist Revolutionaries controlled the Provisional Government (since May, 1917), the Bolsheviks did everything to undermine their regime and to seize the power for themselves. In the question of rural policies, the government of Socialist Revolutionaries attempted to stop the outbreaks of lawlessness and disorder in the villages by promising an equitable solution of all rural problems on the basis of laws that were to be passed by a Constitutional Assembly.

[425] [565] But the Bolsheviks counteracted such policies by inciting the peasants to seize the lands at once. The Bolsheviks also deliberately sharpened the existing social cleavages in the villages by inciting the lower peasant strata against the upper. The Bolshevised soldiers, on leave or deserting the front, pushed more moderate elements into the background and led the peasant mobs not only against the landlords, but also against the more prosperous peasant classes. Hence, attacks on *Khutoryane* (hereditary peasant homestead owners) and *otrubniki* (peasant individual property owners) were as frequent as those against the manorial estates.

Many soldiers deserted the front because the Bolshevik agitators told them that the land was being distributed back home and that those who were present would get the choice grounds. The government, controlled by the Socialist Revolutionaries,

appeared to be unable to solve these revolutionary outbursts, 665
perhaps because the seeds of these revolts of the peasant masses 669
had been sown by the revolutionary and terroristic propaganda of this same Party now in power. Moreover, this Party, though in power, was split into four factions which bitterly fought one another. Some of these factions allied themselves with the Bolsheviks to strengthen themselves in their internal Party fight. The ranks of the Bolsheviks therefore grew steadily from all sides. They had clearly defined aims and were well organized under the undisputed leadership of one man, whose unchallenged authority all Bolsheviks recognized. Their aim was to seize power at any cost and by any and all means.

In the face of an internally split and undecisive government which lacked authority, and in the midst of general chaotic conditions, the power of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the revolutionary bodies which were established throughout the country, steadily grew. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd was increasingly competing with [633] the government for the control of the state. Because of their extremism, the influence of the Bolsheviks in these powerful revolutionary bodies soon became dominant. Thus, supported by bolshevised soldiers and proletariat and promising to bring peace, bread and equalitarian brotherhood to all, the Bolsheviks were enabled to seize power.[15]

In the civil war that followed between the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks, the dissatisfied military ranks, the lower urban classes, the national and religious minorities, and a large part of the peasantry took the side of the Bolsheviks, who promised an anarchic and egalitarian Utopia for each and everyone, just as many religious sects, leaders of peasant uprisings, Anarchists and Terrorists have done before them. All those who yearned for equality and acceptance at all levels of Russian society either actively helped the Bolsheviks against the White armies, or, fearing the return of the old regime, were unwilling to fight with the Whites against Reds. The attitudes of these people, combined with the ruthlessness and resoluteness of Bolshevik political and military leadership, were decisive factors in this final victory of Bolshevism.[16]

V

Power and Personality in Soviet Russia

21

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AND REGIMENTATION

I

665 642 BUILDING their rule on Czarist traditions and supported by Lenin's teachings and practices, the Bolsheviks undertook to perpetuate themselves in power by employing the same conspiratorial means which helped them to seize the control of the state. Such policies however were contrary to the expectations of those who yearned for an equalitarian brotherhood and demanded full political participation on equal terms for all. The Bolsheviks therefore had to elaborate on the theories which justified the "dictatorship of the proletariat." One of the fundamental ideological justifications which they put forward to explain their policy of self-perpetuation in power consisted of the claim that after the seizure of power by the proletariat, the class struggle does not cease or weaken, but on the contrary it "continues in new forms, and with even greater frenzy and ferocity, for the reason that the resistance of the exploiters to the fact of socialism is more savage than before."[1] Continued dictatorship

is therefore said to be necessary as a means to completely eliminate 665 642
"exploitation of man by man" and to bring about stateless and equalitarian society in the future.

In this manner any signs of opposition to the Party policies [687]
have been construed as "class struggle" and "counter-revolution" which made it possible for the self-seeking and mistrustful ruling faction of the Bolsheviks to eliminate all opposition to its rule, including the opposition within the Bolshevik Party itself. These means and justifications of self-perpetuation in power have been supported also by the contention that the counter-revolutionary schemes of the overthrown and dying classes are encouraged and fostered by foreign capitalist powers.

These imperialist states are said to tend to encircle the "only Socialist country" seeking to destroy it.[2] Contrary to the early Socialist promises that the state will tend to "wither away" after the proletariat had seized power, the Bolsheviks asserted that, after the proletarian revolution the state must become even more powerful because it must be used as a "special machine of suppresion."[3] Thus, instead of satisfying the traditional demands [641]
for acceptance in an all-human and stateless brotherhood, the Bolsheviks established relationships of absolute rule and unconditional obedience by monopolizing all social power in their hands. Each and every subject was made dependent for his life and livelihood upon the ruling faction. In this manner, planned economic regimentation, strict political conformity, control of thought and feeling, as well as police rule became intrinsic to the Soviet system of power.

In their compulsive drive to concentrate all power and all [421]
social control in their hands, the Bolsheviks dispossessed not only financial capitalists and large land owners, but even small farmers, fearing that these might eventually oppose and challenge their rule. "The medium peasantry is a self-sufficient class; the only one which, after the obliteration and expulsion of squires and capitalists, remains capable of opposing the proletariat," said Lenin.[4]

The need to regiment the peasantry, to break their group sol- 178
idarity and make them completely dependent upon the govern- 429
ment was supported also by other considerations. Owing to lack 701

178 439 701 of foreign loans and investments the process of industrialization and of economic autarchy, which was needed to develop military potential necessary to withstand internal and external threats, was proceeding at too slow a pace. This situation made it imperative for the impatient and insecure ruling class to have at hand goods available for quick export in order to buy foreign machinery and to industrialize and militarize the country at a higher speed.

241 The peasants in the meantime were busy in making improvements on their possessions and in raising the amount of food for home consumption. Increased peasant consumption of food however meant decrease of the crops available both for export and for the needs of fast growing urban strata which were being created as a result of a speedy industrialization. Also lack of regulation of agricultural production meant that planting and sowing were designed to a large extent to satisfy the home needs of the peasant, and only to a lesser extent those of the national or foreign market.

472 241 565 This meant that as long as a large section of the peasantry remained as independent producers there was always a danger that the ruling class might not have at its disposal sufficient quantities of marketable products. And the more the ruling faction felt insecure in its power, the more this potential threat of an economically independent peasantry seemed real and close. This feeling of insecurity and mistrust of the Bolsheviks was manifested in their hatred of the peasantry. "The peasant who has two cows is already an enemy," they would say. Hence the Party hierarchy made the decision not only to abolish the economic independence of the peasants, but also to "destroy peasantry as a class" by means of collectivization.

565 661 578 In their determination to "destroy peasantry as a class," the Bolsheviks first incited the poor and the medium peasants against the "kulaks" and then the landless against the small peasant owners. The Bolshevik agitators took advantage also of the traditional tensions within peasant families and aroused son against father and brother against brother. Thus inciting and exploiting resentments and hostilities between various peasant strata and taking advantage of family antagonisms, the Bolsheviks were able

to force the peasants to join the collectives and the state farms. 565
Those who opposed such policies were resettled or banished to 661
convict labor camps. Many were massacred. According to Stalin 578
ten million peasants became victims of this "class war."[5]

In order to insure their complete control over the farming 474
population, the Bolshevik leaders sent the most trusted Party 665
people from the city to the village to manage the newly formed 565
kolhozes. These *novye bary* (new lords), as the peasants called them, installed themselves in the mansions of former estate owners and kept themselves at a considerable distance from the rural population, not unlike the former serf-owners. And not unlike the former gentry the new masters were also bent upon extracting maximum labor from the peasantry with minimum reward.

Under such conditions, the peasants, in the first outbursts of 565
their reaction against this state of abusive submission resorted 669
to outward aggression in the form of traditional uprisings. They 472
burnt their crops and slaughtered their cattle rather than collectivize them. It is estimated that almost two-thirds of the entire livestock and a large part of the crops were destroyed.[6] Such a
situation affected even the Ukraine, the "granary of Russia" and [731]
greatly contributed to the famine of 1932–33 in which hundreds
of thousands of people died of starvation and epidemics. It was by such active rebellion that the peasantry forced the Party into a temporary retreat. The Party had to appease the peasants by giving each peasant household the right to retain in private use a small plot of land, and also in private possession a limited number of livestock. Also, private trade in agricultural products was restored in a limited degree.[7]

These were however only temporary concessions, since the 241
Bolsheviks were determined to completely "industrialize" the 178
peasantry as a means of political and economic control. Following such aims the highest possible degree of specialization in farm operation has been fostered and the members of the same family have been assigned to different, spacially separated activities. In this manner the agricultural brigade instead of the peasant family became the basic unit of agricultural production. For the same reason the highest possible degree of mechanization of

241 178 agriculture, centered in Motor Tractor Stations, has been fostered.[8]

474 465 463 At the same time differences in individual income levels have been encouraged by means of a differential wage system based on the degree of specialization, the amount of work, the quality of labor and the quality and quantity of production. There is also a tendency to train each kolhoz member for one specialty only. In this manner differentiation is increased, family self-sufficiency and family bonds are being destroyed, a greater degree of dependency upon the Party is achieved, group solidarity is weakened and the development of organized peasant opposition is prevented.

241 463 178 The "industrialization" of the peasantry seeks to eliminate the old type of peasant farmer who was self-sufficient, had manifold interests and possessed a variety of skills needed to manage his economy, of which he was the owner and the manager. By fostering specialization and wage differentiation the Party hopes to develop a type of agricultural worker and specialist who is skilled in one activity only, and cannot be self-sufficient. Since in this manner every agricultural worker becomes entirely dependent upon others, and upon the Party, it is expected that as a result of such conditioning the drive to own farm property will disappear, that all land property will then become governmentalized and that agricultural labor will become in all respects and for all purposes the same as industrial labor, that is, completely divided within, dependent economically, and better amenable to Party control.

474 178 It is along such lines of thought that the Party has recently endeavored to amalgamate kolhozes into large collective units. In small collectives the Party's control was weak or non-existent and the peasants were enabled to maintain a degree of group solidarity and to put up a certain resistance to government agrarian policies. According to the Party's admission "small collective farms blocked the progress of socialist farming."[9] Therefore, in order to "strengthen their directing personnel" the Party decided to amalgamate small farms into large ones. The management of these amalgamated collectives is to be put entirely in the hands of non-peasants.[10]

This trend to expropriate the peasants and to overspecialize 178
them as a means of political and economic control found its ex- 829
pression in the recent development of Bolshevik ideology. In the 369
utterances of Party leaders and in the Soviet press it is being stressed that the conditions in the Soviet Union are already so advanced that the Soviet state is ready to move from socialism into the first levels of a limited Communism. This first phase of Communism will consist of the elimination of differences between industrial and agricultural work, between industrial workers and the peasantry ("Liquidating the contrast between the city and the village"). Thus it is pointed out, the old opposition between the country and the city will vanish and also cultural and psychological differences between these two strata will disappear. Every person will become engaged in a special "technical-engineering" task and all will be equal and like brothers.

As a result of such development, it is said that even the dif- 178
ferences between the manual laborer and the intellectual worker 829
will eventually be abolished and thus the classless and anarchic 463
society envisaged in socialist writings and rooted in the traditions of the Slav culture will be finally achieved.[11] Productive forces will develop an abundance of all consumer goods whose distribution will be on the basis of exchange and according to one's needs. There will be no monetary relations and no differences in social status.

It is clearly and repeatedly emphasized, however, that nobody 829
should mistake this change from socialism to communism as a 471
"withering away" of the state. The state, say the Bolsheviks, 642
must remain "strong" for the needs of defense,[12] until the Soviet system spreads over the entire earth.

II

Total power concentrated in the hands of Bolshevik conspira- 461
tors as a means of perpetuation of their rule led to compulsory 661
regimentation of all labor, to speed-up system, and to intensified differentiation in skill, income, and status within the working classes. The aim of these measures is to increase production and to control the working classes by breaking their group solidarity and by tying the laborer to his machine and the office worker to

461 661 his desk in the same way as the peasant has been **bound** to the land.[13]

464 882 The Party hierarchy has also passed a decree which enables the Party to keep the youth under its complete control. The decree orders mobilization of hundreds of thousand of Soviet youths to be trained annually as labor reserve. All those who go through such a training are "considered mobilized and under obligation to work four successive years in state enterprises in accordance with the directive of the general officer of Labor Reserves . . ."[14] Along the same lines of labor mobilization and economic regimentation a decree was passed according to which every skilled laborer, technician, engineer, and factory employee could be ordered moved from one factory to another in any location in the Soviet Union according to the needs of industrialization.[15]

475 467 In accordance with the need for total control of the working classes and of economic production the management of the factories was completely removed from the control or influence of the workers and centralized in the hands of the factory directors (*edinonachalie*). These became responsible for failure in output, for waste and for low quality of products. In such an industrial system the trade unions have become instruments of regimentation and speed-up. They ceased to be an institution for the protection of the rights and interests of the working class and instead evolved into an organization of overseers and labor drivers. The trade unions' Charter of 1949 expressly states this function:

> 461 Mobilization of all factory workers and employees for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the production plan, for the strengthening of labor discipline, and for the development of socialist competition.
>
> Elaboration of practical measures for the stepping up of labor productivity, improvement of the quality of production, reduction of production costs, and raising of profitableness of the enterprise.[16]

In the same manner, one of the May Day slogans of 1952 reads: "Soviet trade unions! Develop socialist competition more widely for pre-schedule fulfillment of the state plan by every enterprise."

It was because of this need to regiment labor and make it completely dependent upon and submissive to the ruling Party that the old idea of freedom in the choice of work and equality of opportunity was replaced by emphasis on the "discipline of labor," that is, the contention that the objective of high output demands specialization and that in the interest of increasing the skill one cannot recognize the freedom to change one's speciality and one's job.[17] It is also stressed now that an important element in the process of production is the "habit of hard work,"[18] and this habit could best develop as "the first life necessity" if the freedom of choice of specialty and of place of work is restricted and controlled.[19]

In accordance to this imperative need of the Bolsheviks to keep the working classes in complete subjection, Soviet propaganda idealizes hard work. Humble (*skromny*), infinitely devoted (*bezgranichno predany*), and hard working people, those who "burn with desire to work," and those who "sacrifice their lives to working for the cause of Lenin-Stalin," are especially eulogized. In the obituary of some outstanding person the climax of eulogy is the statement that death reached him while he was struggling at his post of duty.[20] In the Stalinist Con- [642] stitution of 1936 this system of labor subordination to the ruling Party is eulogized as a "matter of honor" and is justified in terms of the right of the Party to starve those who do not work according to the Party interests:

> In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."[21]

III

Building on practices of Czarist bureaucratic hierarchy and supported by traditions of patriarchal protection-dependency relationships, the Bolshevik rulers have succeeded in regimenting the industrial labor and in forcing it into unconditional submission to and dependency upon the ruling Party. But they have failed to increase the productivity of labor. Frequent reenactments of measures to increase "labor discipline" indicate, however, that to increasing measures of regimentation the industrial

461 labor tends to respond by a certain degree of apathy and by disinterest in the Soviet system, also by a robot-like attitude toward work. In such conditions neither the "habit of work" nor labor efficiency can be expected to thrive. Habits are developed and maintained only in circumstances which bring rewards. And as long as the political aims of Bolshevik industrial expansion and militarization have to be achieved by means of abusive regimentation, the working masses might respond by fatigue, disinterest, and withdrawal,[22] just as they did in the days of serfdom.

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626 Such circumstances in their own turn dictate increasing Party vigilance and government interference at all levels of production. It is increasingly felt that the Party and the government must rely on over-seers and labor drivers who see to it that the Party wishes are executed according to the plan. In a thoroughly politicized society in which labor adopts an apathetic or robot-like attitude toward work and in which the ruling hierarchy tends to be composed of power-thirsty, mistrustful and ruthless professional conspirators, the need of constant Party and government exhorting and watching is always present. There is, therefore, a strong inclination to increase the watchdog, the supervisory and the controlling agencies at the expense of the productive ones. As Pravda itself admits, "On each two workers there is a superior, a supervisor, or a staff member" (*Na kazhdykh dvukh rabochikh odin vyshestoyashchy, rukovodyashchy ili obsluzhivayushchy*).[23]

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626 The emphasis on controlling, supervising, checking and counter-checking agencies not only increases the cost of products but creates unsatisfactory labor-management relations. The tensions result primarily out of domineering pressures that are exerted on different levels both against labor and against management. The supervisory system and pressure methods of the slave-driver type tend to provoke feelings of humiliation and to create an atmosphere of anxiety, resentment and urges of destructive aggression. In such conditions of oppressive domineering and degrading submission it is very difficult to develop qualities of social and personal responsibility, initiative and self-reliance. In an atmosphere of vigilantism, denunciation, fear and loss of self-respect, work becomes irritating and frustrating; it does not offer

much possibility for self-expression, creativeness and personal satisfaction.[24] 466 626

On the other hand an atmosphere of domineering and vigilantism offers a great opportunity for advance to the fanatic Party member as well as to the ambitious and unscrupulous careerist within the labor ranks, and the ranks of technicians and engineers. Even among those managers and foremen who might otherwise have different inclinations, the need to maintain their positions often forces them towards a policy of vigilantism, cynicism and oppressive labor driving. [557]

22

INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL CONFORMITY

I

THE SYSTEM of dominance, based on economic dependence, social isolation and lack of trust, which has enabled the Bolsheviks to monopolize all social power, has helped them also to force the intellectual strata into unconditional submission to the will of the ruling minority. Just as the land has been collectivized and industrial production governmentalized to make the peasants and the industrial labor dependent upon the Party, so all sources of income in the intellectual fields have been monopolized by the Party-state to make the intellectuals completely dependent for their lives and livelihoods upon the ruling faction of the Bolsheviks. The office tenure of this new service nobility has been conditioned upon their blind submission to the rulers in the Kremlin, just like in the days of the old dvorianstvo. 517 642

The educated strata are of a special strategic importance from the point of view of self-perpetuation of the Bolsheviks in power, because it is these strata that provide ideological and political leadership and Party cadres. The party has endeavored therefore to make the intelligentsia even more socially split and dependent

517 upon the regime than the peasantry and industrial labor. The
642 objective of this policy has been to prevent among the intelligentsia
formation of an *esprit de corps* and opposition to Bolshevik
rule, and to command the services and unquestionable
[554] obedience of every educated man. These are the political foundations
of the growing and deliberately fostered stress on rank
and distinction, on social differentiation, sense of superiority
and inferiority, absolute superordination and blind subordination.

565 In the upper strata, much more so than in the lower classes,
554 the process of hierarchal and functional differentiation is fostered
and maintained not only by means of specialization of
work and differences in rank, but also by means of sharply differentiated
income, and by means of differential distribution of
spoils, and of privileges. This sharp stratification of Soviet society,
[557] rooted in the traditions of the Czardom, in its own turn promotes
power-seeking and domineering, dependency and subservience,
as well as lack of social intimacy and lack of trust.

665 The highest privileges in the Soviet society are accruing to the
554 top ruling faction of professional conspirators. But this group is
itself internally sharply differentiated. It is headed by the Party Leader (*Vozhd*), and is divided into a number of policy making bodies, among which the Political Bureau (Politburo), now to be known as the Presidium,[1] is of foremost importance. Though the members of the Presidium and of other top policy making bodies, such as the Secretariat, are formally appointed by the Central Committee of the Party, they are *de facto* selected by the supreme leader and therefore depend upon him for their position. Such a situation fosters bickering among top ranking officials in their mutual struggle to win the favors of the head man, which in turn enables the supreme Party leader to play one faction of his camarilla against the other one or—not unlike in the days of the Czars—to select a more intimate inner circle of a few most trusted persons on whom to rely for advice and help. These then assist the leader in selecting and in eliminating the members of the top ranking hierarchy, according to expediency and circumstances.

This highly concentrated power structure is supported by a

corresponding Party structure on the lower levels of the Party 665
hierarchy where Party Secretariats hold the reins of power. In 554
this system of political and social control it is the Party Secretariats on local, regional and republic levels that are of pivotal importance.[2] Through his control of the Central Party Secretariat, the supreme Party leader is enabled to select the most useful and the most trusted people for such offices.[3]

The top Party leadership is therefore in a position to direct 665
the recruitment of Party membership. It is empowered to accept and to expel members. It directs the secretariats on the lower levels of Party hierarchy as to whom the Party shall "elect" as its officers and as its deputies to the higher Party bodies, or whom to delegate to the local or national Soviets, and other representative Party or non-Party institutions. It consults with the secretariats about the appointment of trusted Party members to responsible regional and republic government and managerial positions, and it checks on fulfillment of Party directives. This [626]
checking is done through the Committee of Party Control whose representatives function independently of local Party bodies.[4]

Stalin was well aware of the significance of the selection of leading Party personnel from the point of view of perpetuation of power when he said "Cadres decide everything." It was by his control of the top Party Secretariat that he himself was enabled to eliminate all his opponents in the hierarchy and to rise to undisputed and absolute leadership.

Since it is local, regional and republic Party secretaries who 665
form the axis of this monolithic Party-state machine, the posi- 555
tion of such potentates yields great power, and high material 157
rewards. Such offices are therefore sought after by people of great ambition and lust for power, also by people of fighting, conspiratorial and domineering inclinations. Thus it is the zealous, the shrewd, the calculating and the career-minded people who are also efficient and hard-driving that tend to be picked out for these positions because it is such people on whom the Party can rely for a blind and unquestioning execution of all orders. The Party which has remained essentially a conspiratorial organization demands militancy and aggressiveness, a severe and exacting attitude toward subordinates, irreconcilability and lack of com-

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passion towards deviants and slackers, lack of intimacy among associates, complete dedication, and humbleness concerning one's own achievements.

Since the Party membership must assist the Party secretaries in the execution of Party policies, it is from among the same types of people that a significant part of the Party membership tends to be recruited. Such people form the hard core of the Party cells and the *aktivs* of Party and government institutions. They are likely to be distant and stern, critical and demanding; they watch over and feel responsible for the behaviour of others, but show no personal consideration or concern.[5]

Another part of Party membership is recruited from among the people who are not zealous, nor over-ambitious nor blindly submissive, but are especially useful to the Party because of their occupational or professional skills. Such people are likely to be competent, as well as humane, considerate, close to their subordinates and understanding in their relations with non-Party men. These people tend to alleviate the harshness of Soviet oppressive bureaucracy and perform therefore a function which is analogous to the role of the mother in the patriarchal Russian family.

It is however the hard core of zealots and careerists who are on the ascendancy and who direct Party work and control government administration and economic management with the help of the aktivs, that is, groups of selected and trusted persons formed within every organization to assist its leadership according to the Party directives. Aktiv is a cardinal agency of Party control. It is an institution of vigilance, supervision and intelligence, as well as an instrument of guidance and planned political manipulation. In the Party itself the role of the aktivs is of fundamental importance:

> Meetings of Party *aktiv* members play an outstanding role in the life of the Party organizations. It is at these meetings that the decisions of the Party and government as well as major problems in the life and work of the Party are discussed. The meetings of Party activists are a means of expression of Party public opinion; they are a forum for Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism.[6]

By choosing the "right" people to fill the key Party positions, 665
by using Party aktivs as an instrument of vigilance and political 626
manipulation, and by systematic periodical purges of Party members and of Party officials who do not come up to the standards set up by the Party hierarchy, the whole Party is regimented and kept in submission according to the will of one man and his innermost circle. By an efficient control of such a regimented Party the life of the whole society is manipulated since the Party members are the "leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state."[7] It is also upon the Party's recommendation that all the important appointments in the government, managerial and military hierarchy and in learned professions are made. Hence by controlling the Party, the Party leadership is enabled to regiment the whole society and to make it dependent upon its will.

Such a Party, however, in order to perpetuate its leadership and to maintain its undisputed dominance, must preserve ideological and organizational unity, rigid discipline and *esprit de corps.*[8] These qualities can be best achieved if the Party is limited to a small membership consisting partly of professional conspirators, agitators and political organizers, and partly of the members of government, military and managerial hierarchies. In such a Party the zealots and the careerists, specialists in conspiracy, vigilance and violence, tend to take the lead. As a result, the Party which had been originally conceived as the "vanguard of the working people," which effectively "guides" a devoted proletariat,[9] remained instead an essentially conspiratorial institution and was bound to lose its initial intimate contact with the broad strata of the population.

II

A small faction of professional conspirators, which rules in 665
opposition to the traditionally rooted demands for egalitarian 647
acceptance and full political and social participation, must rely on active help of experts in all fields of political organization and social control to maintain its monopoly of all power. The top hierarchies of these various strata of specialists are all trusted

665 Party members. Together with the policy-making Party bodies
647 they form the ruling class of the Soviet society. This top Party-state governing class consists perhaps of about two hundred thousand people or one tenth of one per cent of the total population. They are often referred to as the *Partia i Pravitelstvo*—the Party and the government.

The middle and lower layers of government specialists are often referred to as the *Sluzhashchie*. This stratum includes the rank and file of the learned professions, the rank and file of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, the middle and lower professional military, the middle and lower government managerial
[162] ranks, the engineers and the technicians. According to the 1939 census the number of those in the sluzhashchie class, that is "all those who work in offices" was close to thirty million or seventeen per cent of the total Soviet population, as contrasted to the industrial labor (*rabochie*) which formed thirty-two per cent and the peasantry (*krestiane*) which formed forty-six per cent of the total.

[554] The more one goes down this social scale, the smaller becomes the proportion of Party members to non members and of the privileged to the non-privileged. One's position in this caste-like pyramid determines his status expressed not only in the form of income, but even more so in the extent to which he gets the benefits of various social services, the extent of appurtenances,[10] the amount of freedom of personal movement, and the degree of superordination and subordination.

665 The privileged position of the educated and semi-educated
565 classes is well manifested in the internal structure of the Bolshevik Party. As late as 1930 about 65 percent of Party members were workers or recruited from the working class, about 20 percent were peasants or of peasant background, and less than 15 percent belonged to the white collar class. But by 1941–42 the composition of the Party was reversed and apparently at present more than 70 percent of the new candidates and members are recruited from among the educated and official classes.[11] The Party rules, which in the first years of Bolshevik regime had favored the industrial proletariat, and to a certain extent the soldiers and the collective peasants, had to be revised in order to

ease the entrance of the upper classes into the Party ranks. This 665 565
was done in 1939.[12] According to Pravda's figures, in 1947 out of five to six million Party members and candidates, about one-third had university or middle school education (1,700,000).[13] The extent to which these upper classes imposed their dominance over the Party is indicated by the figures according to which at the Eighteenth Party Conference in 1941, the percentage of delegates with a complete college or university education was 41.8 as against only 6.5 percent of the voting delegates with higher education at the Party Congress in 1924.[14] [874]

Such a Party structure is very much out of proportion to the general ratio of educated to non-educated classes in the Soviet Union, since at least four-fifths of the Soviet subjects have less than high school education. The Bolshevik Party structure is also greatly out of proportion to the vocational composition of the Soviet Union where still about three-fourths of the population belong to the strata of peasants and of industrial labor. The conspiratorial nature of the Party, the complexity of the Soviet system of rule and the need for increasing specialization of Party members in activities on which the Bolshevik power rests, favor limitation of Party membership to the educated and ruling classes. [872]

The meaning of education and specialization in Soviet power 871 565
structure becomes clearer if the system of controlled schooling in the Soviet Union is kept in mind. Both university and middle school education are mainly within the reach of higher classes.[15] It is extremely difficult for the average industrial wage-earner or peasant to send any of his children to more than elementary school because the tuition fees and the living costs in educational centers are above his income. The low wages of the industrial labor and the peasantry make it necessary for all family members, including mother and young children, to contribute to the family income by full time or part time work. Also the government conscripts youths for labor reserve battalions mainly from these strata. The children and youths from these strata depend therefore entirely upon the government stipends if they have any ambition and necessary pretraining for higher education. However in selecting candidates for schooling at govern-

871 ment expense the Party recruits these in the first place from
565 among specific categories of children, such as war orphans, illegitimate and delinquent children, and children of Party functionaries. Such children are considered to be most promising from the point of view of Party objectives.

It is mainly from the university student body that the new ruling classes and all needed experts of the Soviet Union are being recruited.[16] It is therefore of paramount importance that this reservoir of the ruling strata is kept well under control and that it is thoroughly ideologically indoctrinated and trained in unswerving loyalty and conformity to the Party. "Ideological training of Soviet students is a vital and integral part of all the work of district, city, province, and territory party committees."[17] It is therefore imperative that this body is highly selective and not overcrowded. Recruitment of university students from among higher classes and from selected categories of children serves well the Party objectives to perpetuate its power and to command unconditional submission of all to its will. Such policies also tend to solidify Soviet social structure along caste lines.[18]

III

661 The Bolsheviks have also employed other means to establish their absolute dominance. Following Anarchist precepts and practices, and driven by power-seeking and destructive aggression, they have justified a number of oppressive measures as being necessary "to hasten the liquidation of the capitalistic elements and to organize defense against capitalist encirclement which is as yet far from being, and will not soon be destroyed."[19] Their objectives were to be achieved not only by means of economic dependency, systematic indoctrination, planned social isolation and lack of trust, but also by means of relentless vigilance and systematic terror.

671 One of the most important instruments of such policies have
692 been the courts of law. Soviet socialist law is defined as the "totality of the rules of conduct, established in the form of legislation—to the end of annihilating, completely and finally, capitalism and its survival in the economy, manner of life,

and consciousness of people. . . ."[20] The Soviet court is to 671
accomplish this task "by destroying without pity all the foes of 692
the people in whatsoever form they manifest their criminal encroachments upon socialism."[21]

One of the chief watchdogs in such use of the law and of the 693
court is the Prosecutor General of the USSR. In this function as the **main** overseer in the application of Soviet law the office of the Prosecutor General is empowered "upon its own initiative" to interfere on all the levels of juridical procedure, including even the decisions of the Supreme Court. The Prosecutor's office is therefore defined as "Inseparably integrated with the court—an organ of state authority obligated to oversee that socialist legality is observed."[22] The Prosecutor's office initiates criminal proceedings and has also the right to initiate a civil court proceeding. It also supervises the fulfillment of court sentences.

In this manner the office of the Prosecutor General has become the main instrument in preventing any local opposition to or local deviation from the application of law. To best perform this role of strict legal uniformity the office of the Prosecutor General had to be highly centralized, made independent of local organs of authority, while in close contact and under the strict supervision of the highest organs of the Party's hierarchy.[23] In this way the Public Prosecutor has become a means of the "uniform conception of justice" (*edinoobraznoe ponimanie zakonnosti*), "an instrument of political power" (*orudie ukreplenia gosudarstva*), and an agent of "moral-political unity" (*moralno-politicheskoe edinstvo*).[24] By enforcing strict application of the letter of the law, the top Party leaders have been enabled to keep the republic, the regional and the local government agencies, the municipal bureaucracies, and the industrial and farm managements from any deviations in the application of law.[25]

Another significant instrument of political conformity in 625
Soviet society is the institution of the political police. In accordance with its tradition this institution specializes in intelligence, vigilance and violence. It complements all other instruments of conformity and functions as an omnipresent and omniscient power which sleeplessly watches over the private and the public life of every Soviet citizen at home and abroad. The

625 political police is under direct supervision of the supreme Party leader himself and is always headed only by one of his most trusted advisers. In a system of prison-like regimentation of all the subjects, a distrustful and fierce ruling faction of professional conspirators can never relax in their watchfulness and must act swiftly and without regard for legal formalities, or for personal or human considerations in stamping out and annihilating all signs of opposition to its rule.

Early in the history of the Bolshevik regime the secret Political Police came to be so indispensable that this institution was identified with the Party. "Every good Communist should be a good Chekist," said Lenin. By the end of 1918 the Cheka (*Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya*) had been reorganized from an organ of investigation into an organ that also resorted directly to "extra judicial measures of coercion, assuring swift and of necessity, cruel repression of the enemies of the Soviet state." In 1922 Cheka, whose terror became too odious, was abolished and supplanted by the G.P.U. which was characterized by Stalin as "the indefatigable guardian of the Revolution, the unsheathed sword of the proletariat."[26] To inform not only on non-Communists but on the members of his own Party and even on the members of his or her own family, became one of the first duties of every Party member.[27] Refusal to inform came to be considered as conspiracy against the Party and the state. A dense net of secret agents and informers became instrumental in preventing social intimacy and strengthening lack of trust.

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672 Following age-long practices of Czarist rule and traditions of mutual responsibility of family members the Soviet political police uses the family members of political suspects as hostages.[28] Any person who had any dealings or connection with a political suspect, even in a most casual or incidental way, becomes *ipso facto* himself a suspect.[29] In Soviet police philosophy and practice every subject is a suspect as an offender or potential criminal unless he proves his innocence. A distrustful and violent ruling clique which is determined to perpetuate itself in power by all and any means must stamp out any opposition regardless of how many non-guilty ones might suffer. An important objective of the political police is therefore to instill fear and terror in the

hearts of the Soviet subjects and to exert unremitting pressure 625
on them, so that they never relax in their striving to conform to 672
the Party's will. The secret police, in Lenin's words, is "our weapon of assault upon innumerable conspiracies . . . innumerable attempts against Soviet authority."[30]

23

CONTROL OF THOUGHT AND FEELING

MONOPOLIZATION of all social power by the Bol- 626
shevik rulers and their failure to satisfy the traditional demands 208
for equality and acceptance has been breeding both apathy and latent rebellion in Soviet society. Realizing that such a development might eventually undermine their power, early in their rule the Bolsheviks proceeded to indoctrinate the thoughts and to control the feelings of their subjects. It became imperative to evoke identification of the masses with Bolshevik leadership and gain their faith, enthusiasm and willing self-sacrifice in support of the Soviet system.[1]

In order to justify this need for ideological and emotional con- [771]
formity, it became necessary to monopolize the Truth. The Bol- 829
sheviks therefore stated that all problems, those of the past and of the present, as well as those of the future, have found their answer in Marxist-Leninist theory. They asserted, however, that since this theory "is not a dogma, but a guide to action,"[2] the Bolshevik leadership is "able to enrich this theory with the new propositions and conclusions, . . . to *develop it and advance* it" and "to replace such of its propositions and conclusions as have become antiquated by new ones corresponding to the new historical situation."[3] And just as earlier the Russian Orthodox Church had claimed to represent the "true Christianity" centered in Moscow, the Third Rome, so now the Bolshevik rulers have usurped for themselves the right to represent the "true Marxism," centered in the Kremlin:

829 It may be said without fear of exaggeration that since the death of Engels, the master theoretician Lenin, and after Lenin, Stalin and other disciples of Lenin, have been the only Marxists who have advanced the Marxist theory and who have enriched it with new experience in the new conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat.[4]

This trend of thought, dictated by the determination to perpetuate themselves in power, led the Bolsheviks to reinterpret the philosophy of dialectical materialism and determinism. Con-
828 trary to early Socialistic doctrines the ruling Bolshevik faction
153 put forward the claim that by a correct manipulation of man's environment, his behavior and nature can be easily changed to suit predetermined objectives. The "unity of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice," the Bolsheviks say, enables them to know how and in what direction the events "ought to develop."

The Bolshevik design is, therefore, to develop a "new type of man" more amenable to submission and control. "We make tractors, but also want to make new men," they say, "since man can consciously change nature in the direction needed by him."[5]
827 Therefore the chromosome theory of heredity according to which heredity depends upon the genes which cannot be controlled, had to be denounced as heresy from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism.[6] Instead, the Michurin-Lysenko theory according to which environment determines heredity ("hereditary transmission of individual characteristics acquired by the organism under the conditions of its life") was proclaimed as "the only scientific principles."[7] Thus since the physical environment becomes amenable to control, the hereditary characteristics of man could be planned in advance, according to these ideas.

Supported by such theories and encouraged by Party policies, some Soviet scientists advanced the claim to have been able to "conquer nature." They stated that they have shown the way how it is possible to produce "new species" under a planned change of environmental conditions.[8] Other Soviet scientists have initiated studies which are expected to lead to the "transformation of dead matter into living cells."[9] In like manner, the official endorsement of Pavlov's school in physiology has been prompted by the hope that studies of the functioning of the animal brain might lead to the knowledge of how to control the human brain.[10] 827

Thus Marxian theory of dialectical materialism and determinism has been revised to allow the Bolshevik ruling hierarchy to control "matter" so as to affect events in a direction which seems to be most desirable from the point of view of the perpetuation of their regime. In the same manner the Marxian theory of "ideological superstructure" has been revised to suit Bolshevik needs. Morals and ethics, esthetics, character, thought and feelings are now to be planned in advance by an appropriate control of social surroundings and environmental influences in accordance with the decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow. The Bolsheviks now say that "the best qualities in man are those that are planned beforehand and are inculcated into him."[11] 153 626 [577]

Contrary to earlier Marxian doctrines the Bolsheviks now state that even when social roots of certain habits or ideas are eliminated "men's minds lay behind social actuality."[12] They claim now that "Subjective factors play a decisive role in turning possibility into reality." It is therefore necessary to influence human minds and eradicate "tenacious survivals of the past,"[13] by a planned and deliberate action even in a Socialistic society which is already transforming itself into a Communistic society.

The basic principle in this planned shaping of human thought and feeling is that human personality should be molded in a way which best suits the political needs of the Bolshevik hierarchy. Hence morals and ethics, literature and art, economic activities as well as private lives must be politicized. Just as earlier the Anarchists had subordinated ethics and morals to the need of the revolution, so now, according to Bolshevik philosophy, "that is moral which causes the Communist system to triumph."[14] Morals and ethics depend upon the question of "our political needs"; they stem "from our requirements in the building of socialism."[15] In the same manner the fundamental task of art and literature is said to consist in propagating "supreme devotion to the Soviet regime":

626 517 They believe that politics is the business of the government, the business of the Central Committee, and as for the writers that their business is not to interest themselves in politics. They believe that if a man wrote well, artistically, and beautifully, one should let it go, in spite of the rotten passages which disorientate our youth and poison it. We demand that our comrades, both the supervisors of literature and the writers themselves must be guided by something without which the Soviet regime cannot exist, and that is politics. Lenin wrote: "Literature must become Party-minded . . . Against bourgeois literary careerism and individualism . . . socialist proletariat must put forward the principle of party literature . . ." Comrade Stalin described our literati as the engineers of human souls. It is necessary therefore that our literature, our literary magazines, . . . should help the Party and the people to educate the youth in the spirit of supreme devotion to the Soviet regime . . .[16]

536 626 Special attention is paid in this respect to dramatic art because of its popularity and effect. It is stated therefore that "a playwright must be a politician" and that the producer and actor must be "politicians" of the same stature. Appointment of a group of actors for a Soviet play "is a political question for the producer . . . and how the hero must be played in a Soviet play is a political question for the actor."[17] In the same manner in painting, sculpture and music the Party demands "Soviet realism" which means that the artists and the musicians must have recourse to "topical themes and images of contemporary Soviet reality" and must discard "formalistic trickery and subjectivist insularity."[18]

177 186 Accordingly any alien, especially Western, influence on Soviet thinking must be completely eliminated. Western philosophy of liberalism and free individual expression could undermine Bolshevik endeavors to create a completely regimented and submissive "new man." Hence a crusade against "cosmopolitanism, objectivism and other manifestations of bourgeois ideology"[19] has been initiated together with the severance of all closer contacts of Soviet intellectuals with the Western world.[20]

656 Such policies of complete subordination of one's thoughts, feelings and behavior to the needs of the Party demand not only strict censorship of all published matter[21] but dictate even the use of statistics to suit the objectives of the ruling class. A ruling

group which claims perfection and monopoly on Truth cannot 656
afford to lay itself open to any fundamental criticism of its accomplishments. Figures are therefore manipulated so as to achieve the desired effect.[22] "In the land of the Soviets statistics have become a weapon for Socialism and Communism," the Bolsheviks say.

II

Shaping of the "new man" must begin early in his childhood. 153
To answer to this need, the schools have become in the Soviet 861
system one of the fundamental instruments of character molding in the hands of the ruling faction. Special measures must be applied by educators to fashion character since "the life itself would not do it," the Bolsheviks say. The schools in the Soviet society have therefore a twofold objective. The first is to develop in each and every child psychological traits which are considered most desirable from the point of view of the perpetuation of the Soviet system and Bolshevik rule. The other is to develop needed skills and to train specialists which are of fundamental importance in a system of total control, such as experts in conspiracy, political organization and agitation, in overseeing, in vigilance and violence.

In a thoroughly regimented society training in unconditional 157
obedience and in identification with and dependence upon the 867
leader is of paramount importance. Such personality traits, already rooted in the Russian social and political structure, are being reinforced by the system of training in the Soviet schools whose pedagogical principles in their essentials do not differ from the precepts of the Domostroy. "From early years we must educate children so that a state of discipline will remain as their permanent possession," says a textbook on Soviet pedagogy.[23] "This discipline must be *firm*, that is, unquestioned obedience and submission to the leader, the teacher, or the organizer . . . " Submission to the will of the leader "is a necessary and essential mark of discipline."[24]

According to these pedagogical ideas the teacher does not coax 876
pupils, he *demands* obedience.[25] The teacher is expected to be 157
"authoritative and strict." Whenever necessary he must give

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157 commands and impose punishments. "If an order is given it must be carried out absolutely."[26] In order to achieve such absolute, unconditional and unquestioning obedience, the training of the young must be not only strict and firm but also consistent, so that their "habit of obedience" once formed is not easily broken.[27] Training in blind obedience is justified by the need to avoid conflicts and discord which a Soviet society cannot tolerate.[28] In such a society all available human energy must be employed exclusively in building socialism.

In order to develop the habit of unconditional obedience it is necessary to prevent any reflection upon given orders. Therefore the school training must stamp out "indecision" in the Soviet children. "We must create in Soviet children a state of mind which causes them to consider indecision in necessary actions as unworthy of their honor."[29] Obedience and submission demand traits of self-abnegation and self-denial; " . . . to bear pain patiently, to maintain self-control on hearing unpleasant news, and to endure unavoidable privations without complaint . . . all of this means to children a manifestation of courage."[30]

It is recognized that children have to be trained also in leadership, and that initiative is necessary in that respect. The Party, however, cannot allow any such initiative which might go counter to the Party's will. It is emphasized therefore that the initiative, too, must be "disciplined," because it is needed only for purposes of organization, vigilance and struggle along the lines put forward by those who possess the Truth. Hence according to Soviet principles of education it is "important that initiative not be exhibited impulsively, but that it be directed into organized channels . . . out of children of initiative good organizers must come."[31]

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156 This complete submerging of the individual into his group, rooted in the social and political traditions of Russian society, is being reinforced by Soviet school training which strives to "educate people for whom the pronoun *I* could not . . . become more important than *we*, for whom thought for themselves always yields to thought for their comrades, for the group and for the country."[32] In this manner "clash between social demands and personal inclinations" is surmounted and the group

is "perfected until there are no shortcomings." Then on mem- 876
bers of such a group one can make great demands.[33] They will be 156
disciplined, enduring, courageous and faithful. Work will become "second nature" to them; they will not abhor hard effort, nor be afraid of "healthy sweat."[34] They will be industrious and efficient and will develop the "best and most worthy feelings of [157]
man," that is, devotion to labor, heroism in the struggle against the forces of reaction, untiring, ruthless and unwavering vigilance against the survivals of capitalism, and an irreconcilable attitude toward the slightest manifestations of deviationism.[35]

III

In the days of Czardom the system of economic and political 626
regimentation found its support in religious sanction and in 152
nationalism. In a like manner the Bolsheviks had early realized that great privations which their regime demands could be best elicited from their subjects with the help of an identification with the great, the absolute, the sublime. It is by such means that traditional cravings for attachment and acceptance could be satisfied. In such a manner also a sense of guilt and urge for self-sacrifice could be reinforced and employed for political purposes.

It is along such efforts that the Bolsheviks have revived and 771
strengthened the traditional Russian images of God, Czar, 829
Father and Mother and have projected these images to the Leader and to the Party. The likeness to God and religion is manifested in the Bolshevik claim of infallibility of their leaders, universality, eternity, and sanctity of their doctrines. Lenin's teachings, for instance, are extolled by the Bolsheviks as being "superior" to any other ideology, as embracing the whole of humanity, and as living forever:

> Lenin's thoughts represent a superior achievement of the Russian and of the world culture; an eternally living and eternally developing science of society—a fighting banner of the working class—living soul of the Bolshevik Party which led our Fatherland to the avant-garde of the whole human kind.
>
> The books of the vozhd and teacher are immortal. They live and

771 829 will live eternally. Yes, Lenin lives, his spirit is immortal—his idea is eternal—the leaves of his wonder books are imperishable.[36]

769 643 Lenin is represented not only as the architect of a promised world, but also as a prophet, all of whose prophecies have come to pass (*svershayutsya vse prorochestva Lenina*). There is an officially sponsored cult of Lenin which is propagated by means of many legends that surround his life, his activities, his martyrdom, and his death. He lies mummified in a mausoleum where thousands of pilgrims daily come to worship him. And throughout the country there are numerous Lenin's museums which, like the churches, remind the faithful of the omnipresence of Lenin's spirit. It is the aim of the ruling hierarchy to make their subjects incorporate in their conscience the image of a holy, infallible, and immortal Lenin in whose name the Bolsheviks will be able to make great demands:

> Here everything is eternal,
> Here everything is holiness
> Here sleeps a great Man—
> He and the people are inseparable
> He is—the Conscience of my Motherland.[37]

771 643 Accordingly, as in its worship of Lenin, the Party of the Bolsheviks is tireless in propagating the cult and the iconolatry of Stalin, who is pictured as Lenin's best pupil, as his closest friend and collaborator, and as his legitimate successor. In poems dedicated to him, Stalin is acclaimed as the "master of the entire world"; he is pictured as foreseeing the coming events and disasters, as possessing miraculous powers and life-giving qualities, and as being able to conquer death itself.[38]

With the death of Stalin, the Party is faced with the problem of molding the image of a new Leader with God-like qualities and patriarchal prerogatives. The Soviet press is now picturing Malenkov, one of the present top Party men, as being the pupil of Lenin and comrade-in-arms of Stalin. It is by means of such filiation that a new ruler acquires the attributes of the old deities.

000 Building on the traditional role of the Father in the Russian

Building on the traditional role of the Father in the Russian
family the Party portrays the Party Leader as a strict and distant 593
but also watchful and solicitous man who takes good care of his 771
family. Following the traditional image of God and of the 208 665
Father, the Party Leader is pictured as being benevolent toward those who submit to him unconditionally, but as being wrathful and merciless toward his foes and all those who disobey. And just like the members of the Great-Russian family, the Soviet people are expected to show "filial gratitude" to their Elder for his care and vigilance. Hence the supreme Party Leader is addressed as "our own father" (*rodnoy otets*), teacher (*uchitel*), leader (*vozhd*), friend (*drug*), and feeder (*kormilets*). Articles and letters of gratitude published daily in the Soviet press invariably mention his fatherly solicitude (*otecheskaya zabota*), his wise (*mudry*) plan and his genius (*geny*). Without fail they thank him ardently (*goryachee spasibo*) for what he has done for the well-being (*blago*), happiness (*schastie*), and world mightiness of the Soviet state (*velichaishaya derzhava mira*). On the occasion of the Leader's birthday numerous songs and musical compositions include titles which convey the idea of dependence upon and filial gratitude to an All-Powerful and All-Wise Vozhd.

It is expected that such identifications will reinforce in the 154
Soviet people the feeling of guilt and make them redouble their 783
efforts in building and supporting the Soviet system. Thus in the letters which various institutions, organizations and associations write to Vozhd, pledges are given to fulfill and overfulfill their quotas and to improve quality of products in gratitude for his unceasing "paternal care" and solicitude. And if they have failed, stayed behind, or have not come up to the expectations of their "father and teacher," they admit their guilt and promise to spare no efforts to improve, and thus arrest his wrath and rejection.[38] Not only lowly and humble folk from the bottom of the Soviet social pyramid, but men and women on the lofty peaks of Soviet arts and sciences, write such letters to Stalin in the same tone of religious reverence and humility, that strongly remind one both of the servility of Czarist official classes and of the prayers to an All-Mighty and wrathful God in the Russian Orthodox Church.

The ruling hierarchy realizes, however, that deification of the 000

665 208 The ruling hierarchy realizes, however, that deification of the Party leader would not produce desired effects unless supported by rewards, that is, actual gains or hopes of gains ascribed to his wisdom. It is for this reason that Stalin's name is invariably linked with and symbolically attached to all the outstanding accomplishments of the Soviet system. Stalin is also pictured as incorporating in himself longings and aspirations, dreams and yearnings both of the Soviet people and of all the oppressed and humiliated in the world, of all those who are rejected and deprived of good things in life. Such an image of Stalin strengthens culturally and structurally rooted identification with suffering. He is therefore represented as a symbol of the interests and hopes of all hard-working and suffering mankind. Hence the epoch in which we live, the epoch that is renowned for the strivings of the working masses (of those who suffer), for acceptance in an equalitarian society is to be known as "Stalin's Epoch" (*Stalinskaya Epokha*).

869 643 But even this linking of Stalin's name with all significant achievements of Soviet society in the field of economy, government, science, and art is not considered sufficient to prevent doubts and skepticism. Deep faith in the Vozhd and identification with him which will be so strong that it will endure most adverse circumstances and make people ready for great and supreme sacrifices must be instilled early in childhood. Thus already in nurseries the children were given toys on which it was inscribed "Thanks to Comrade Stalin for happy and joyful childhood" (*Spasibo tovarishchu Stalinu za schastlivoe i radostnoe detstvo*). Small children are taught to recite stories which emphasize the dependence of the whole country upon Vozhd who is compared with the rising sun. The Soviet children are told that no child and no youth is so fortunate in any other place in the world. They are assured that Vozhd is doing everything in his power to make their lives prosperous and happy. The children are expected therefore to show a feeling of gratitude toward Vozhd, the Party, and the government and must grow up as worthy fighters to take the place of the present leaders:

> We, the children of the Soviet Union, the happiest country in the world, feel the constant solicitude for us by the Party, the government, and our beloved leader, comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin is the best friend of us children, of all the children 869
of the world. It is he who builds for us the best schools, palaces of cul- 643
ture, stadiums and camps, where we can become strong and healthy, 665
so that we can study more and better in the winter time, when we go to school. We must grow up as fighters worthy to take the place of those now present here (*Applause*)—as fighters devoted to the cause of the Party, devoted to the cause of the Communist International (*Applause*). Long live our beloved Stalin! (*Applause*).[40]

Accordingly the study and imitation of the life of the two deified Soviet leaders, Lenin and Stalin, is considered to be one of the primary duties and a sacred obligation of every Pioneer and Komsomol. The aim of the Party is to form the conscience of the young according to an idealized image of Lenin and Stalin. Young people are told to think constantly of their leaders, to be inspired by them, to follow them, and to love them. It is often pointed out that the reason that Stalin became so great and achieved the leading position in the Party was because he was such a faithful follower and loyal disciple of Lenin. "We must do everything so that our life is such as the unforgettable Iliich wanted it to be."[41] "In the soul of each one of us there is one and only one image which governs all of us. That is the image of the great Stalin."[42] And if a Pioneer or Komsomol is relaxing in his duties and vigilance, he is instantly reminded: "Comrade Iliich would not have approved of you." Stalin himself in his speeches often stressed the need to imitate Lenin:

> Remember, love, study, Iliich, our teacher, our leader. Fight and defeat enemies, internal and external—like Iliich. Build a new existence, a new mode of life, a new culture—like Iliich. Never refuse to do even the smallest jobs, because out of little things the great things are constructed—this is one of the important legacies of Iliich.[43]

IV

The apotheosis of Stalin did not seem to have sufficient 208
appeal among sophisticated and disaffected intelligentsia, nor 186
among dissatisfied and apathetic laboring masses who tended to blame Stalin for their ills. Nor was the identification of the Party with Mother sufficient to inspire faith in Bolshevik system. It was

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therefore imperative from the point of view of the survival of the Soviet power and self-perpetuation of the ruling faction to find new mass identifications and symbols. These were readily found in ideas of grandeur and perfection, and in ethnocentrism, rooted in Czarist traditions, in Slavophilism and in the Third Rome ideology. [152] These feelings and attitudes were reinforced in the structure of Soviet society in which, just as in the Czardom, dependency and subservience are likely to foster in the higher strata compensatory feelings of superiority and desire to dominate.

In Bolshevik ideology, however, self-apotheosis expressed in ideas of grandeur and in myths of social and national superiority, and in plans of conquest reached much higher proportions than in the Czardom. Thus the language of Bolshevism became saturated with words and phrases which convey the image of grandeur, perfection, holiness and eternity. Words and phrases, such as grandiose (*velichayshy*), life-giving (*zhivotvoryashchy*), invincible (*nepobedimy*), the most perfect (*naybolie sovershenу*), limitless (*bezgranichny*), legendary (*bogatyrsky*), epoch-making, holy (*sviatoy*), miraculous (*chudotvorny*), immortal (*bessmertny*) and eternal (*vechny*) are regularly used to depict the achievements of the Soviet state. The Soviet state is referred to as the "magnificent Soviet State," as "the most perfect political form of power" which has already achieved "world-wide historical victories," and still contains "inexhaustible possibilities." There is today no such force "which could surpass its might."[44] Such a mighty and powerful Socialist state "shows a profound influence on the whole international life, on the hearts and minds of all liberty loving people," thus initiating a "new era in the history of human kind."[45]

The Soviet people themselves are said to be unique and to excel in their personal qualities. The Soviet man, as pictured by the Communist press has in every respect attributes superior to the man of any other society. Having "unheard-of opportunities for education," he is said to be at the head of all "progressive humanity." It is pointed out that he is the one who possesses "the only correct orientation" and absolute knowledge of the past, present and future given him by the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

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Unbounded faith in the victory of Communism gives the Soviet man and woman the strength to withstand otherwise unsurmountable difficulties. It is for this reason that his "unmatched heroism" has deserved the respect of all humankind. He has the interests of the state at heart as if they were his personal affairs, he shows an "infinite attachment" to the Communist Party, has a "most holy" respect for Lenin's legacy, and an "inexhaustible love" for his country. He is endowed with "limitless creative energies" and is ready for any sacrifice, including his own life, for the Soviet cause. He is a perfect man in a perfect society:[46]

> Where do you find such people and such a country as ours? Where do you find people with such superb qualities as manifested by the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War and as displayed by them in their toil which is at the head of the peaceful development and reconstruction of economic production and culture? Every day our people get higher and higher . . . We are not the same as we were yesterday. We changed and grew together with those majestic transformations which changed our country in its very roots.[47]

The grim Soviet reality, however, contradicts this mythology. There is therefore an imperative need to offset the demoralizing effects of such a contrast and to bolster the self-confidence of the people and the prestige of the ruling faction by concentrating all the efforts to achieve some spectacular accomplishments at home and abroad. The Soviet leaders are therefore tireless in magnifying any of their achievements in the field of technology, science, war or diplomacy. By emphasizing the monumentality of these deeds the Bolsheviks expect to leave on their subjects an ineradicable impression regarding the ability of the rulers and the greatness of the system. This line of thought and feeling explains the emphasis on many imposing prestige undertakings in addition to mythical projects that are said to have moved mountains, made oceans out of deserts, produced new species and conquered death. Also pyramidal monuments to Soviet victories, frequent military parades, demonstrations in which hundreds of thousands of people take part, and other mass pageantry are designed to make the people experience a feeling of invincibility, grandeur, and unsurpassable might of the Soviets.

V

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[563] Perhaps the most significant aspect of this self-deification is found in the systematic endeavors of the Bolshevik leaders to emphasize the superior qualities of the Great-Russian people as compared to other peoples of the Soviet Union. The Great-Russians form less than half of the population of the Soviet Union, but they are the dominant nation in the state. The top Party bodies and the government and the managerial hierarchies, are overwhelmingly composed of the Great-Russians or of the non-Russians who have been thoroughly Russified. The Great-Russians constitute a majority in the branches of the Soviet armed forces deemed essential to the internal security of the Soviet Union. The Great-Russians predominate in the security police and its militia as well as in the air force and in the tank divisions and other mechanized troops. And the infantry units when composed of other ethnic groups always include a sufficient number of Great-Russians as a cementing force.[48]

There is strong emphasis on Russification in all schools of the country, especially the Party schools. In all constituent Republics, autonomous republics, and autonomous territories and regions, Russified natives or the Party members of Great-Russian origin figure as Party leaders, as top bureaucrats and top managers, or as advisers and experts.

In order to justify this policy of Russification and to accustom the non-Russians to the dominant position which the Great-Russians occupy in the Soviet Union, a myth of Great-Russian superiority has been developed by the Bolsheviks. At the Kremlin victory banquet on May 25, 1945, Stalin gave a toast "first of all" to the Great-Russian people. He referred to them as "the most outstanding of all nationalities forming part of the Soviet Union." According to Stalin, the Russian people "merit general recognition in the Great Patriotic War as the leading power among all the peoples of our country . . . they have a clear mind, steadfast characters, and endurance."[49]

A textbook on pedagogy asserts that "the history of the Russian people proves to all mankind their political wisdom, their military values, and their genius."[50] Other Soviet writings claim that "All the peoples of the Soviet Union recognize and appreciate the tremendous historical mission which the Great-Russian people is performing, as the outstanding people of the Soviet fraternity of nations."[51] In the same manner Grekov, a Soviet academician and one of the most outstanding Soviet historians, claims that the Russians, owing to their fighting ability and their readiness to sacrifice themselves for a good cause, saved the Western European civilization from barbarism and destruction even in the middle ages.[52] 186

Innate superiority of the Great-Russians is said to have manifested itself in an unsurpassable inventive genius. Hence the Russian military strategists, scholars and technicians are credited with a number of outstanding inventions which have been heretofore generally regarded as being developed in the Western countries. It is claimed, for instance, that the "Soviet Military science" developed by the Great-Russians is superior to any bourgeois concept of war. Also, most of the basic technological discoveries and inventions, from the spinning wheel to the nuclear nature of the atom, are said to have been the result of the "creative work of Russian genius,"[53] but "wrongfully ascribed to Germans, Englishmen, Americans, and Italians."[54] [176]

Dominance of the Russians over the other peoples of the Soviet Union contradicts both the Socialistic doctrines and the Bolshevik myth of equality of all national and ethnic groups. As a result of **Bolshevik** policies of rigid centralization of power which promotes Russian hegemony, national and ethnic autonomies provided for by the Constitution became illusory. Reaction to such a situation has provoked dissatisfaction among subjected nationalities, resulting sometimes in open rebellions. To stamp out such revolts the Bolsheviks had to resort occasionally to resettlement and extermination of the whole recalcitrant populations, just as the Turco-Mongol rulers did before them. As a result a number of ethnic and national groups disappeared as separate entities, such as the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tartars, the Kalmyks and others. 563 186

The Bolsheviks realize, however, that these are means only to be used in extreme cases and in emergencies. Their aim is therefore to promote Russification among all their non-Russian sub-

563 186 jects as a means of permanent control. It is felt that only by Russifying the non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union and con- [182] vincing them of the benefits of close ties with Russian people and Russian institutions[55] a common culture will be developed; on such a basis a feeling of unity, of common interests and of common objectives will grow.

191 186 It is in light of such circumstances that the earlier Marxian theory of linguistics had to be revised to suit the new situation. Present language is not considered any more to be just a "superstructure" destined to give way to a completely new language of Socialism. On the contrary, Russian language and even Russian script is looked upon now as the basic language and basic script of Soviet socialism. Contrary to earlier Marxian theory, Russian language is now looked upon as an agent of unification and control under Soviet rule.[56]

208 829 186 Myths of national and racial superiority, however, do not appeal equally to all strata of the population. The toiling multitudes, if dissatisfied with their status, might remain deaf to such calling unless convinced that in different conditions their situation would become worse and even more precarious. It was to strengthen the latter feeling that the Bolshevik Party undertook to propagate a myth of the inferiority, rottenness, and damnation of the non-Soviet world. Building on anti-Latin and anti-Western traditions of the Orthodox Church and of Slavophilism the Bolshevik propaganda has attempted to develop attitudes of horror, disgust, and utter contempt of the capitalist world and of Western culture. Accordingly the Western society has been pictured as exploitative, war-mongering, decadent, decaying, full of internal conflicts and contradictions, and therefore self-destructive. The miserable, exploited, toiling multitudes in Western countries and their dependencies have been pictured as living in inhuman, deplorable and destitute conditions, exposed to constant unemployment and hunger, and heartlessly exploited by pitiless capitalists.

Because of this inherent and unsurmountable conflict of interests between labor's demand for higher standards and the capitalist's demand for higher profits, there is an intrinsic self-destroying tendency in the very nature of capitalism, the Bolshe-

viks say.[57] The bourgeois countries are therefore inescapably 208
crippled and inevitably doomed beyond any hope of recovery 829
whatsoever.[58] The only way out of such an unbearable situation 186
for the capitalists is to "turn the whole planet into a police [721]
station, under American supervision."[59] Hence the capitalists prepare for war and imperialistic expansion as the only way to maintain their power. They tend to encircle the Soviet Union and attack it. Therefore, sooner or later "a series of the most frightful collisions between the Soviet republic and bourgeois states is inevitable."[60]

Propaganda concerning the inevitable doom of capitalism is aimed at discouraging hopes for change in the Soviet system. Such propaganda supports the myth of the infallibility and invincibility of the Soviet system; the inevitability of the coming economic crises in the capitalist world, especially in the United States, will lead to the final breakdown of the capitalist system, the victory of the Soviets, and the establishment of a World Soviet Republic.[61] At the same time the claim that the capitalistic powers will resort to aggression as a last hope to save their dwindling system functions as a justification for aggressive diplomacy and strategic expansion; it strengthens the demands for greater sacrifices and deprivations in favor of police measures and war preparedness. The emphasis on the inevitability of war justifies also the increasing centralization of power and "iron discipline" within the Party ranks.

VI

Following Turco-Mongol and Czarist traditions, Bolshevik 701
leaders believe that training in unconditional submission to [626]
superiors, identification with the powerful and faith in victory can be best achieved if the whole society is militarized. Militarization is looked upon as the best morale builder. When militarily organized, people are more amenable to control. Also a powerful army under the Party's control strengthens the confidence of uneasy and mistrustful rulers in their ability to check internal opposition and withstand external pressures or attacks.
A powerful army is also a necessary instrument for aggressive 701
diplomacy and territorial expansion; it becomes an instrument 721

701 of international Communism. "In our times," said Stalin before
721 the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, "it is not the custom
to give any consideration to the weak. . . . consideration is only
given to the strong." The Party therefore undertook to drill
millions of subjects in the use of arms and to develop an imposing
army of professional soldiers.

The need of militarization of the entire population has been
reflected in the Bolshevik ideology of total war. As early as the
nineteen twenties the Bolshevik military strategist and Commissar
of Defense, Mikhail Frunze, developed the theory of mobilization
of the entire population and of regimentation of all
aspects of life as a means of war preparation.[62] As a result of such
a trend of thought pre-military training has been introduced
into public schools and many teaching subjects have been
oriented toward military thinking. Also the Party has sponsored
[575] and supported private organizations to promote physical fitness
and military training (*Ossoaviokhim*) on a mass scale.

703 The need of the ruling faction to use military training as a
school of obedience, loyalty, leadership, and war preparedness
dictated also the policies concerning the system of military training.
Consequently earlier ideas of fraternization and equality of
ranks developed as a response to the longing for an anarchic
brotherhood were attacked as "false democracy"; instead strict
military discipline has been introduced and embodied in minute
[687] military regulations.[63] As a result very heavy and hard punishments
have been provided for slightest breaches in discipline.

The military regulations now demand unquestionable obedience of the subordinate to his superior, and immediate and literal execution of his command regardless of what that command may be: "The order of the commander is law for the subordinate. The order must be fulfilled without question, literally and immediately."[64] To insure such unconditional obedience the military regulations authorize Soviet officers to use harsh means to cope with lapses of discipline. These include not only ordinary punishments, but physical beatings and even killing "in an emergency, when there is no time to spare." Significantly enough, the term "officer" was discarded and has been substituted by that of "commander."

703 The wording of the Soviet armed forces oath bears witness to the vigor of this discipline and the strength of social pressure brought to its support. In addition to the punishment that may be expected by the Soviet soldier who did not fulfill his duty as expected, or who did not promptly sacrifice his life for the country is, according to this oath, "hatred and contempt of the working people" (*nenavist i prezrenie trudyashchikhsya*).[65]

[554] At the same time the moral authority of the commander has been enhanced by a great amount of educational work and political agitation. The commander's unconditional authority is also consolidated with the help of an elaborate system of ranks, medals, and uniforms, and by the introduction of caste-like relations between the officers and the rank-and-file, a situation which is supported by the general trend in the Soviet society toward differentiation, superordination and subordination, and sharp social stratification.

874 703 Accordingly, Soviet practices in military education and training favor different types of schools according to the rank and the class. In the school for commanders the admittance practices favor children of professional army officers. In this manner Soviet military schools tend to solidify the present military caste system and to develop professional classes of hereditary warriors. Following Czarist traditions there is much pomp, ritual and ceremonial in the armed forces. There is also a certain emphasis on mysticism manifested in kneeling, bowing of heads in silence and stress on holiness. All these are means of appealing to emotions, of emphasizing the sacredness of military duty, and of developing loyalty and dedication to the colors.

701 665 As a means of political control the armed forces of the Soviet Union are completely centralized and thoroughly infiltrated by Party men. The strength of Party control of the Soviet armed forces is best seen in the degree of Party infiltration of its commanding personnel. By 1934 the percentage of Party and Party-affiliated persons in the commanding positions of the Soviet Army was about 72. The percentages were even greater in the branches which are considered especially crucial from the point of view of security, such as the tank divisions and the air force. In these two branches the percentage of Party and Party-affiliated

701 665 members was close to 85 percent. And as to the top level of the army command by 1941 this top military hierarchy was one hundred percent Communist.[66]

To maintain ideological purity among the armed forces and to strengthen the Party's control is the specific function of the political officer and of the Partorg (Party organizer). The political officers have now regular army training and in the actual fighting, the political officer becomes "the commander's substitute or takes his place when the commander is disabled."[67] It is this ability of the Party to replace any army commander by an army trained but Party devoted man, that is expected to insure absolute control of the armed forces by the Party even in times of greatest stress and defeat. [703] The duty of the political officers is not only to interpret and to propagandize the latest utterances of the Party leaders or the decisions of the Politburo, but to watch for any weakening of enthusiasm, for any pessimism or gloomy views that may be noticed and to combat vigorously any signs of demoralization. The most important task of the political officers, however, is to cultivate martial spirit and to build up morale, thus creating "a psychological condition which sets up resistance to fear of discomfort, pain, or death."[68]

701 157 208 The goal of the Party is to infiltrate with martial spirit not the armed forces alone, but the whole Soviet population as a means of bolstering the morale of the Soviet masses behind the Bolshevik regime. This is being achieved by means of militarization of all public activities. The Bolshevik leaders consider that militarization is the only morale builder in a situation in which the laboring masses tend to become lethargic, apathetic and disinterested in their work. Speaking of the experiences in World War II, Stalin said that in that struggle people got transformed and acquired new qualities which strengthened the power of the [461] Bolsheviks: "But the people themselves in the rear have been transformed, they have been more efficient, less slipshod, more disciplined; they have learned to work in wartime fashion, and to realize their duty to our motherland."[69] Stalin looks at sports and athletics from the same point of view:

> We stood for five hours on the tomb while the show went on. The Generalissimo showed no sign of fatigue. On the contrary, he ap-

peared to enjoy every minute of the show . . . A final remark of the 701
Generalissimo's while we were watching the sports spectacle was that 157
mass athletics and exercises were fine because of their effect upon the 208
populace. He said, "This develops the war spirit."[70]

In accordance with the Bolshevik need for morale building 701
most Soviet institutions have been militarized, including the 461
Party. Thus when a Soviet subject leaves his school and his Pioneer or Komsomol organization and enters a factory, a kolhoz, an office, a research laboratory, or becomes a Party worker, he has been already trained for work in a society which is in most of its aspects organized along military lines. Anywhere where he is assigned a job he might find military discipline and military relationships. In a number of civilian jobs he will wear a uniform with badges of his rank. In his factory or kolhoz he may become a member of a "shock brigade" or a "hero of labor" and therefore an important link in an all-embracing Five-Year-Plan whose main emphasis is on military preparedness. As a
Party member he will take his position in the Party pyramid as [665]
a common soldier, as a petty officer, or as a higher officer:

> Three or four thousand men of the high command—the generals of our Party. Then 30 to 40 thousand intermediate commanders; these constitute the officers' corps of our Party. And further, 100 to 180 thousand of the leading elements of our party—these are, so to speak —the subaltern officers of the Party.[71]

In a militarized society military language is used in all activi- 195
ties. Military language has always been a tradition in the Bol- 701
shevik Party and has been always widely employed by Lenin, Stalin, and other Party leaders. Therefore when addressing a meeting, or when writing in a newspaper or in a literary or scholarly periodical a Soviet subject is expected to employ military phrases, and use analogies taken from military campaigns and military experiences. He will speak of "reconnoissance," "skirmishes," "encounters," "operations," "outposts," "fortresses," "citadels," "maneuvres," "camps," "cadres," etc. and he
will be expected to do his duty on his own "battle post." If he 665
rises to the top of the Party hierarchy and if he especially dis- 701
tinguishes himself in his civil activities he might be endowed

665 701 with the real rank and uniform of general or perhaps even with that of marshal.

24

FAMILY BACKGROUND OF PERSONALITY IN SOVIET RUSSIA

I

PROMPTED by drives of destructive aggression and 594 829 supported by the ideological traditions of Nihilism and Anarchism, the Bolsheviks were determined to destroy the family in order to have unchallenged control over the training of children and the molding of their personalities. Their view was that there was not much that they could do with the parents, but that "the children **belonged to the Party.**" Such a trend of thought was supported also by an intense reaction of many people against the old patriarchal and despotic family pattern which existed in the Czardom. There was a strong desire on the part of many family members to liberate themselves from the old practices of parental and marital authority and discipline. It was in such an atmosphere that the Bolshevik Party at first introduced a series of decrees and measures which greatly facilitated the dissolution of family ties.[1]

The Bolsheviks, however, soon realized that the family could not be allowed to disintegrate without dire consequences for their regime which was bent upon rapid industrialization and militarization and was in great need of manpower. Also as a [736] result of wars, famines and a growing number of broken families, there were hundreds of thousands of homeless and neglected children and aged people. Care for these proved too great a burden for an economy which had to use all its available resources primarily for state security and war preparedness. Thus instead of destroying the family the Bolsheviks decided to maintain it but to manipulate it so as to use it as an instrument of the new order. The family, therefore, as all other institutions of the Soviet society, was to be reconstructed and regimented in such a way as to best serve the purposes and the objectives of the new ruling class. 594 829

As a result of such a change in attitude and reversal of policy the Bolsheviks have introduced laws and decrees whose aim has been to impose mutual responsibilities and obligations on family members. The new laws have also favored "indissolubility" of marriage ties and encouraged large families. At the same time, however, the family has been placed under the guidance, control and overseeing of the Party and of the government authorities. In consequence of a series of laws and decrees, the Soviet family has been given the task of training children in discipline, in collective responsibility, in obedience to authorities and in faith in Bolshevism. Just as the Soviet school, the Soviet family has been given the task of helping to train willing toilers, zealous labor drivers and agitators, and fearless fighters for the cause of world Communism.[2]

Following the traditions of the Russian patriarchal family and in order to make the parents an instrument of the training of children in obedience to authorities, parents have been made legally responsible for the behavior of their children. Prosecution by civil and criminal law, administrative fines and prison terms[3] have been established against the parents whose children came into conflict with administrative regulations or existing laws. Just as in the Domostroi the parents are encouraged to be strict and non-indulgent, and to rely on frequent punishment as a means of correction; they are also encouraged to be authoritative and to keep a necessary distance from children so that their authority is not undermined by unnecessary intimacy. The parents have been given joint rights of discipline but subjected to government and Party control.[4] 594 672

This interference of the Party-state into the family relationships has been backed also by another law according to which parental rights have been subordinated to the interest of children. The "interests of children" are determined according to the Party interests and views; the court has been empowered to deprive the parents of their parental rights whenever the Party

594 672 chooses to consider that the interests of the children have not been safeguarded.[5] In such cases parental rights might be lost for up to five years.[6] According to the Soviet educational philosophy it is expected that the parents will *rear* the children, but that the public organizations under the Party's supervision will instruct and supervise parents in the ways of *Communist upbringing* of children.[7]

594 578 The Party considers it to be its duty to arouse antagonism of children against parents when such action is necessary in the interest of the survival of the Soviet regime. As mentioned earlier, planned rift between fathers and sons was, for instance, employed to speed up the process of collectivization. Commissar of Agriculture Jakovlev, speaking before a Party congress on the struggle against the kulaks, stated that "In a number of cases, the children of the kulaks are made to revolt against their parents, and thus the kulak families are divided and the kulaks still more isolated." The Party has also been known to take advantage of family conflicts to encourage the children to spy on their parents and to denounce them to the political police:

> [626] Russian parents had to be very careful of what they said in the presence of their own children, and even of how they disciplined their children. One boy, Pavlik Morosov, was built up as a hero among youth because he had denounced his father who was organizing resistance against the kolhoz. Great propaganda was made about this boy. A book was written about him. Actually he became a hero to most children.[8]

[661] In times of political "purges" there were frequent notices in the Soviet papers in which the children of the parents who were politically persecuted publicly renounced their parents.[9] That [672] was the only way they could escape the vengeance of a regime which had revived the tradition of family hostages and used it as an instrument of political conformity.

656 837 594 The Bolsheviks consider that since "one's way of life is a social matter . . . a matter of national policy,"[10] the Party has the right to interfere even in pre-marital and extra-marital sex relations, as well as in the relations between the spouses. "Young Communist organizations cannot remain neutral when the con-

duct of its members in love and family life run counter to the 656
ethics of Soviet Man."[11] The fundamental motivation behind 837
this interference in love and sex life is political control. "Moral 594
corruption brings political corruption,"[12] the Bolsheviks say. It is in accordance with such a line of thought that it is considered to be the duty of one to inform on his or her own spouse. Such behavior is especially expected of a Party member. Therefore "A prudent Russian today hesitates to confide in even his wife too fully."[13]

At the same time while the Soviet family laws and Soviet 594
philosophy and practices tend to favor Party and government supervision of family relations and in some cases sharpen family conflicts, they also endeavor to enforce family discipline over children, and to strengthen the sense of mutual responsibility among family members. The Bolsheviks, however, do not encourage development of the sense of kinship loyalty which 602
might go counter to the interests of the state. The Soviet family 736
laws have broadened the concept of family to all ascending and descending lines and to brothers and sisters. In case any one of these relatives is needy or incapacitated, the others have the obligation of support.[14] Emphasis on family responsibility is [594]
manifested also in the provision of the law of 1926 which, contrary to the Russian traditions, abolished the principle of separate property of the spouses.[15]

In accordance with new policy, factual or non-registered mar- [582]
riage which earlier enjoyed state protection was denied that privilege and a decree in 1944 ruled that "only registered marriage confers the rights and obligations of spouses."[16] A decree of 586
the same year ruled that divorce is allowed only in case the wish of one or even both parties who seek divorce coincides with the "government's recognition of necessity to dissolve marriage."[17] Moreover in order to make divorce proceeding prohibitive and marriage practically indissoluble, a long judicial procedure was established. In the course of this long procedure the parties must clarify the motives for divorce and bring witnesses. Also high divorce fees were introduced. And to facilitate state interference, no grounds for divorce were stated or specified in the decree.

However, the procedural instructions concerning this decree

586 do specify the cases in which the state wishes to facilitate divorce and dissolve marriage. Such cases are for instance, "a court sentence depriving either spouse of his or her liberty for no less than three years," and "the absence with no news of either spouse."[18] In such cases the party seeking divorce is exempted from the payment of fees and also from the requirement that a public notice be put in the local newspaper. These provisions
[672] are in accordance with the principle of family hostages and the well known practice of the Soviet political police to persecute the families of political offenders. Divorce from such a person may in some cases rehabilitate one in the eyes of the Party. The police as a rule exert pressure on the spouses of political culprits or suspects to seek divorce, and the law provisions are such that the court may facilitate divorce in such cases.

168 The Bolshevik regime depends to a great extent upon the available large contingents of manpower for its armed forces and for its industrial enterprises whose labor efficiency is very low. In accordance with such needs a series of measures was introduced designed to encourage large families, such as strict laws against birth control, maternity leaves, safeguards for employed pregnant women, monthly cash payments for children, reduced fees in nurseries, advantages in income tax payments, medals, awards, citations, and titles for mothers bearing and raising a certain number of children.[19] At the same time special taxes were imposed upon bachelors, childless couples and couples with only one or two children. Also suits to establish paternity were abolished and an unmarried mother was given the option to accept a modest allowance or to place the child in a public institution where the state takes care of it.

594 The recognition on the part of the Bolshevik rulers of the significance of the family as an institution of early training of Soviet subjects in discipline, subordination to the group, and obedience to authorities is manifested in the inclusion of family legislation within the jurisdiction of the central government of the Soviet Union. The constitution of the Soviet Union itself was amended for this purpose in 1947.[20] Thus the trend of Soviet legislation in the matters of family relations in the course of over thirty years of Bolshevik rule tended to increase and

strengthen the control of the Party over that fundamental social 594
institution. This intent to completely subject the family to the Party's aims is expressed in Bolshevik ideological parlance as "the cultural-educational influence of the socialist state upon family relationships in the direction of strengthening socialist principles."[21]

II

Following Russian traditional attachment to the Mother 593
Country, Soviet pedagogical principles demand that love for the 186
Rodina should be emphasized in the training of children. Building on traditional mother-child attachment in the Russian family, the Party instructs teachers to point out to their pupils how Lenin was attached to his mother.[22] It also emphasizes the tender relations between Stalin and his mother. Teachers are told that this natural attachment of a child to his mother should be used as a means to instill in the child love for his Mother Country.[23]

At the same time in the school textbooks, in the daily press, 665
in the speeches of Party leaders and all other means of mass 593
communication, it is the Bolshevik Party that is represented to be the Mother of the Komsomols, Pioneers, and Octobrists, and the "mother of the Soviet people." The love for the Rodina is, therefore, interpreted as being conditioned by and subordinated to the primary duty of love for the Party or the Leader with whom the Party is identified. Hence, even when mother-attachment remains strong in a Soviet child, the attempt is made to transfer that attachment to the Party and to raise loyalty to the Leader and to the Party above loyalty to the country. Thus Party loyalty precedes both family and national loyalty in the Soviet educational philosophy. "Party is above everything else," the Bolsheviks say. And it is this loyalty to the Leader, Party or Cause which precedes all other loyalties that forms the core of Bolshevik internationalism and the basis of its world appeal, not unlike the appeal of a universal church.

Most children of elementary school age and a greater part of 883
those on secondary school level belong to Party auxiliary organi- 665
zations, the Octobrists, the Pioneers and the Komsomols. In the great variety of activities in which these organizations are ex-

883 665 [594] pected to help the Party "at all times," there is always a possibility of conflict between the demands of the Party and those of the family. Also, owing to a great shortage of manpower and a very low standard of living, most women, with the exception of those from the upper ruling strata, are forced to work long hours outside the home. Many of them have to engage in heavy physical labor. Such mothers are not only physically exhausted at the end of the day, but are often disillusioned, bitter, as well as critical of the system, a fact which is confirmed by a rather high percentage of women in convict labor camps. Such mothers cannot pay sufficient attention to their children.

593 152 At the same time great demands and responsibilities placed on parents in regard to the discipline of their children and the interference of the Party and the government in family affairs often causes harshness in treatment of children. Hence overstrictness as well as negligence of children is the result.[24] Such a situation favors both feelings of rejection and revolt, as well as extreme self-concern and destructive aggressiveness on a larger scale and in a more intense way than in the days of Czardom. And since the Soviet system of vigilance encourages family members to inform on one another; mutual suspicions, fears, and hostilities rooted in patriarchal traditions are greatly magnified. Training in self-confidence and trust, and in group attachment cannot thrive in such circumstances. But it is exactly self-concern, mistrust, and destructive aggression that are so instrumental in the perpetuation of the Bolshevik rule.

738 Unstable political and economic conditions, together with consequences of wars, depletion of rural areas of adult men, famines, convict labor camps to which millions of parents have been confined, have resulted in an unprecedented number of broken families and a growing number of neglected, illegitimate and delinquent children. A number of such children, especially orphans of war heroes, at the age of nine are sent to military schools. Many neglected and delinquent children at the age of 3 to 13 are sent to special homes for children which are in charge of the secret political police.[25] The increasing stress on internal vigilance, together with the pressing need of the political police to feed their vast economic enterprises with cheap

[Ivan the Terrible]

convict labor, indicate that the number of such children will not 738
decrease in the foreseeable future.[26]

Such children are considered to have an ideal background [165]
for their training as future specialists in conspiracy, vigilance,
and violence. Therefore the children who have been raised in a [155]
tense family atmosphere or who have been rejected and neglected by their families form a fertile ground from which the Bolshevik rulers recruit a significant part of their future followers and leaders. But what is the future of a society whose ruling classes are being formed out of persons who have been raised in the midst of harshness, brutality and lack of human warmth or whose desire for emotional attachment has been thwarted?

By the middle of the sixteenth century Ivan the Terrible, 159
who himself was left motherless early in his childhood and was 155
exposed to great instability in his emotional attachments, became a victim of ideas of persecution and of boundless and in-
satiable thirst for power and self aggrandizement. Driven by [625]
such compulsions he undertook to organize a body of fanatical devotees who were bound by oath to forswear association not only with "friends and brethren" but even with their own parents, and to serve the Czar blindly and unconditionally. These *Oprichniki* became renowned in history as a brotherhood of brigands who lived separated and isolated from the rest of society—"men vile and filled with every sort of cruelty."[27] Throughout the day they indulged in savage torturing and killing of suspects after they had attended the morning liturgy. In their wild outrages they terrorized peaceful citizens immediately after their brow-beating prostrations before the Altar.

In the same manner in the Ottoman Empire, the elite militia 000
of the Sultans, known as the Janizaries, were recruited from among the children who were often early in their childhood or boyhood taken away from their parents to be raised and trained in loyalty to the Sultan only. Still earlier in the society of Eurasian steppe warriors want of bonds of human attachment brought about instability and explosiveness of Asiatic empires. Both the Asiatic conquerors and the Janizaries became renowned in history for their recklessness and barbarism. They also rebelled and excelled in insubordination to established

000 authorities as soon as these showed signs of weakness and defeat.

Could it be that lack of acceptance, thwarted and unstable attachments in the Soviet system of rule will bring about the same results? And will the fanaticism, cynicism, and extreme self-concern cause the Soviet "Oprichniki" to play as fateful a role in their own day as their predecessors did in theirs? Will such "Janizaries" become the spearheads of a new plan for world conquest, in the name of a new Allah? Or will they bring about internal chaos and anarchy as soon as their personal power is imperilled? Increasing complaints against misappropriation of public funds and properties, venality of government officials and Party members indicate such possibilities. Disrespect for personal rights on the part of the government bureaucracy and the military, emphasis on hatred in the educational system and the press, and inhuman practices of the political police point in the same direction.

593 [672] On the other hand, the same pressures that work in the direction of family tension and of breaking up of family ties might, in certain circumstances, strengthen family attachments and family solidarity. In the police practices of the Soviet Union all those who had any ties (*svyaz*) with a political culprit are suspected of the same crime. It is this philosophy of implied culpability that leads to the principle of joint family responsibility and family hostages in case of political offenses by one family member. It appears that a number of "confessions" in the political trials were the result of a promise on the part of the secret police that the family members of the victim will be spared. Such conditions of consistent external threat if combined with indifference toward Soviet efforts might foster the tendency to withdraw within one's own family circle, to keep the outside contacts to a minimum, and ~~to~~ strengthen the intimacies of the home.

In those cases when changes in family relations take such a trend, the status of the father apparently assumes a different position and function from that which was typical of the Great-Russian patriarchal family system in the past. Instead of the strictness and detachment which characterized the father's role

in that family, the new circumstances call for more leniency and 593
more intimacy on his part toward his wife and his children. The mother at the same time, because now closer to her husband, is in no need to become over-attached to her children. Such well-balanced family relations come to closely resemble those in the Old-Slavonic family.

It is the children with such close family ties in an emotionally [155]
balanced family atmosphere that develop traits of moderation, [157]
self-control, responsibility, group orientation and humane feelings. It is in such families that patriotism, idealization of the past and longing for a more humane and more equalitarian political system are nursed.[28] In such families skepticism concerning Bolshevik mythology and opposition to Soviet system may be safely expressed. In such families also religion is cultivated or secretly practiced.[29] In such families apparently numer- [522]
ous anecdotes which ridicule Soviet regime circulate and are spread throughout the Soviet Union.[30] It is to break such family intimacy and solidarity which breed opposition to their regime that the Bolsheviks have shown increasing concern for the control of family relations.

But if the opposition to the Bolshevik regime centers in such 641
families of patriots and humanists, the fate of the Soviet system 184
might rest upon them, in the final analysis. These people might be reluctant to support a Soviet war of aggression led by careerists and fanatics, but ready to defend their Mother Country in the event of hostile aggression from the outside. However, in a war against the Soviet Union which the patriots and the humanists would interpret as a war of liberation from the oppressive, inhuman and destructive policies of Soviet rulers, they might be inclined to take the side of the invading liberators. Inasmuch as such people already find themselves at the fringes of Soviet power structure as specialists and experts in economic management and government administration, in times of crisis the shift of power to these people could easily take place.

Such a trend of development will be even more emphasized 563
among the oppressed, but nationally-conscious minorities, than 727
among the dominant Great-Russians. Millions of Soviet subjects 641
who willingly gave themselves up to the German invaders and

563 727 641 welcomed them as liberators in World War II, indicate such possibilities.

III

155 369 362 593 511 In studying personality growth in the Soviet society, one should take into account also the differences between the urban and the rural environments and the influences of those environments on interpersonal relations within the family circle. Owing to the very rapid pace of urbanization and low rate of production of consumption goods, most of the families located in the urban areas are exposed to the housing shortage and lack of home privacy. Many of these families live in community apartments in which there is only one room per family and in which a number of unrelated families share a common kitchen and [578] toilet facilities. Family conflicts and tensions tend to be intensified in such circumstances. Lack of privacy, noisiness, and lack of sleep in crowded quarters, together with the lack of sufficient food, long hours of work and unsatisfactory conditions of work increase dissatisfactions and magnify existing family conflicts. An outlet for dissatisfactions is found then in trivial scandals and bickering, in petty squabbles, but also in violent emotional outbursts.[31]

474 241 511 Conditions in rural areas are somewhat different. Though virtually all peasant families live in one or at most two-room cottages, which they often share with a few heads of livestock, yet the rural family does have its own privacy. Most peasant families possess a small lot of land around the cottage, on which they raise some poultry or a pig; some might even own a cow. Though this is all very modest, yet with some labor, after the work for the kolhoz has been done, the peasant family has been able to raise some food on its own property and perhaps to sell it on the open market and then buy some clothing and other bare necessities.[32]

Compared to the situation of the city worker, the peasant, though receiving lower wages for his work, and often going in rags, perhaps does feel relatively more independent. If he is an adult with a family he is much less likely to be pushed around, though he is constantly exhorted by kolhoz officials to work more

and harder and to produce more for Socialist Motherland. Not 474 241
infrequently the brigade leaders have to use physical force to 511
make him get up early enough to work on collective property. [461]

Yet in spite of such unfavorable circumstances, compared to 241
city workers, the peasant might still be in a somewhat better 369
position in regard to security and stability, attachment to his 641
family, to his cottage, to his small plot of land, and to his village.
For this reason he has been able to put up resistance against
the Party and the government.[23] It is against these scanty remnants
of emotional and economic security, of personal independence,
of group solidarity and resistance that the Bolshevik rulers
are campaigning; it is to eradicate this psychology of group intimacy
and opposition that the Party had recently attempted [166]
to resettle the farmers and move them into concentrated
and urbanized surroundings; the Bolsheviks are exerting all
efforts to eradicate these "residues of kulak psychology" root and
branch and to make the peasants as completely helpless, insecure
and subdued to the Party will as they have done with the industrial
and intellectual workers.

There is a considerable disproportion in sex ratio in Soviet 162
rural areas. Owing to great casualties in wars it is estimated that 464
at present there are about fifteen million more women than men
in the Soviet Union. And due to the increasing need of manpower
to maintain huge military forces and to feed the inefficient
city industries, the Soviet leaders are constantly draining both
male youths and adult men from the villages in the form of
military and labor drafts. They are therefore increasingly relying [462]
for agricultural work on peasant women. Hence peasant villages
and peasant families tend to be composed predominantly of
women.

Here too a family structure with semi-matriarchal traits, similar 594
to the Old-Slavonic family, is being formed. Though in such 369
circumstances the number of illegitimate children is increasing, [848]
it is quite possible that the women, especially those who are
traditionally strongly attached to their family, are exerting a
moderating and softening influence on the personality of the
peasant child. An indication of such possible differences in the
psychological atmosphere of the city and the country is given in

594 369 those accounts of Soviet life in which the gloomy appearance of the city populace is contrasted to the more optimistic outlook of the country folk.[34]

25

DESTRUCTIVE AGGRESSION

I

642 PROMPTED by extreme power-seeking and by deeply rooted mistrust of their own subjects, the Bolsheviks have built a monolithic Party-state system which differs in the degree of its rigidity and power concentration from all other systems of despotism, theocracy, military dictatorship, totalitarian and police state. In those autocratic political systems not all aspects of life are regimented. A certain limited degree of freedom is left at least in some spheres of personal and of group behavior. But the main difference between these systems and the Bolshevik regime is that while the former prohibits only those activities which have a direct negative bearing upon perpetuation of the system, the latter allows only such behavior as has a direct positive bearing upon the perpetuation of the ruling faction in power.

641 557 In the Soviet society the ruling class is not content with mere passive acceptance of the Bolshevik rule. It demands of each subject a "positive attitude" toward the regime. In such a society there is necessarily a premium in terms of privileges and power for the activities in the fields of political organization and agitation, of vigilance and violence, as well as in the fields of labor-driving, economic management, and military preparedness, since it is in the main upon such activities that perpetuation of Bolshevism depends. In such a "prison and barracks society", it is the calculating and ambitious careerists and zealous devotees and watchdogs, specialists in conspiracy and violence who climb toward the top levels of the Soviet political and social pyramid where blind obedience, crouching servility, jockeying for positions and power, and advancing on the cadavers of one's associates become a matter of survival.

Many observers of Soviet society have noticed that in this con- 661
stant struggle for power, and sometimes in order to save their 557
very lives, Soviet officials and intellectuals must be ready not 572
only to inform on each other, but also to "throw mud" at the closest associates and friends as soon as these happen to fall in disgrace.[1] Denunciation of a friend is often "the best way out of a hole," they say. Many "pretend to deny and to disown those who fall in disgrace" or, frightened, "join in verbal lynching to protect themselves." There is a "malignant joy regarding a comrade's mistakes . . . exaggeration of mistakes."[2] They "rush to kick a man who is already down, to push him over the precipice." In such conditions "Friendship is strained with blood and betrayal; it is an object of fear and suspicion."[3] Even members of one's own family might be repudiated under such pressure.[4] At
the same time the need for cringing before one's superiors is [154]
often compensated by arrogance, capriciousness, arbitrariness, insulting and humiliating treatment of his subordinates or of all unprotected.[5]

The sense of guilt, insecurity, and feelings of humiliation [156]
which develop in such circumstances are magnified by means of social isolation. This isolation is manifold in the Soviet society, especially in the upper ruling strata. Intimate personal contact and unfettered social and intellectual intercourse is officially frowned upon and is therefore very limited among the Party, Army, government and managerial hierarchies. Intimate fraternization with associates is looked upon with great suspicion in a society whose ruling minority maintains itself in power by means of planned social divisions and mistrusts. Said Stalin: ". . . such family conditions create a favorable environment for the nurture of reptiles, not Bolsheviks."[6]

Real risks are involved in any free discourse in a society which is infested with watchdogs and informers and in which many are
inclined to seek self-advance in the ruin of others. In the upper [565]
strata besides fear, suspicion and need for extreme caution, there is lack of intimate contact also because of sharp differentiation in rank. For the same reasons intercourse between the educated and non-educated strata has to be kept to a minimum.

There is also a deliberate policy on the part of the ruling class 000

There is also a deliberate policy on the part of the ruling class

177 626 609 to prevent personal contact and exchange of ideas between the Soviet subjects and the foreigners. In this way the Bolshevik Party is performing the same role in the social and psychological development of Russia as the Orthodox Church has done in the past. Xenophobia and a deliberate avoidance of strangers easily develops in such circumstances, traits which have been noticed by all the observers of Soviet society. Xenophobia is so outstanding in the Soviet world that it has been noticed even by the most casual and most friendly visitors. Soviet authorities have done their best to encourage this feeling. "We were completely cut off [625] from the great bulk of the Russian people by constant police surveillance, by propaganda and by the threat of punishment."[7] "The air itself was clothed with hate and suspicion . . . penetrated even to the child world. . . . Our next door neighbours, too, were grilled, and though we had known them for years, they took to avoiding us utterly."[8] As a rule, only police informers are assigned to foreigners as servants because everyone else is afraid to work for them.

517 647 In such conditions original ideas and independent intellectual pursuits are fraught with great risks and it is often the less original, the mediocre, the cynical, the shrewd and the unscrupulous that take the lead. Some independent and creative people in such circumstances tend to become apathetic, to withdraw, to sever social contacts and put an end to their creative activities.[9] Others tend to seek safety in bureaucratic routine and in avoidance of initiative and responsibility. For each decision they tend to cover themselves by presenting the matter to various committees, or by seeking the Party's advice, thus letting others shoulder the responsibility.

517 665 The social consequences of such a development are then manifested in a pronounced anti-intellectualism, bureaucratism and vigilantism. The ascendancy of anti-intellectualistic and watchdog trends in Soviet society is well expressed, for instance, in the change in the composition of the membership of the Politbure. In this topmost ruling body the more intellectual types of revolutionaries have been gradually purged and replaced by the activists, the semi-educated professional conspirators, Party organizers, agitators and former security officials.

517 815 The trend toward pauperization of the intellect which develops in such a society will be emphasized the more when that society is bent upon increasing war preparedness. In such a case, particularly when faced with low labor productivity, the ruling faction will need to mobilize all available intellectual resources for its political and for its military objectives; basic research and many fields of knowledge not directly related to such objectives will have to be neglected and might even be completely paralyzed.

But dogmatism and lack of free criticism, anti-intellectualism and vigilantism lead to stagnation not only in the fields of theory, basic research, and art, but also in the fields of applied science, including political and military affairs. Even if industry, state administration and military science could conceivably make substantial advance on the basis of regimented, conscripted, and convict labor, they must be constantly fed with new ideas and inventions both in the field of technology, and in the field of organization to keep pace with the industrial and military development in the free enterprise countries which are looked upon as potential enemies.

816 The Bolshevik rulers are well aware of this problem. In Soviet publications it is often pointed out that various scientific institutes established to develop applied science in the field of industry and agriculture do not fulfill their plans, fail to assure proper cooperation, work on "secondary problems" and neglect questions of "vital importance." High cash prizes known as Stalin Premiums have been offered each year to stimulate the work on such problems of "vital importance." Nevertheless the Bolsheviks had to a great extent to rely on acquiring essential blueprints from abroad either by purchase or by intelligence.

517 204 626 In Czarist Russia a certain degree of criticism in civil and military matters was allowed while a considerable degree of criticism existed in philosophical, literary, and historical fields. The all-powerful Czarist bureaucracy was often very anxious to accept the ideas put forward by the opposition. Many reforms in the Czarist administration in the direction of liberalism and democratization originated in the leading minds of the opposition. The opposition was often able to express their views in

517 newspapers, books, and pamphlets, some of which were printed
204 abroad and circulated freely though often clandestinely among
626 the leading circles of the Empire.

517 The ruling circles of the Bolshevik Party themselves were
626 always aware that without criticism intellectual stagnation, lack of creative initiative, and bureaucratism would set in. But they could not afford to allow complete freedom of thought and of expression which might eventually undermine their own power. As a result the Bolsheviks introduced a system of "criticism and self-criticism," known as *samokritika.*

[461] According to this practice it is the duty of every Soviet subject to criticize his own work and the work of others in his shop or office as a means of stimulating alertness, initiative, and hard
[557] work, and as a way to correct errors. But among the officials who closely watch each other's activities, each hoping to rise on the
[647] cadaver of the other, samokritika is often used as a means of intrigue and ruin in jockeying and struggling for ranks, positions, and power. Samokritika therefore has developed into a weapon employed to detect the ideological deviations and diversions and to criticize any lack of sufficiently positive attitude toward the "Party line." In this manner "self-criticism" in the Soviet Union has become another instrument of regimentation and means to increase conformity.

626 Samokritika is also employed by the ruling circles to manipu-
661 late hostilities generated by the Soviet system and to direct them away from themselves and against the managers and bureaucrats located mostly on the lower levels of the Soviet social pyramid. These people conveniently function as scapegoats. It is such people who, together with a sprinkling from the higher echelons, are periodically offered as sacrifice and "purged" or "liquidated." Samokritika is therefore employed also as a check against abuses of power, though mostly on the local level.

626 In an atmosphere of complete dependence upon and subordi-
154 nation to an overwhelming and infallible power which instils
782 fear and awe, the slightest deviation from the line of thought and emotions as laid down by that distant and inscrutable force might easily provoke anxieties, and a strong sense of guilt. In circumstances in which one feels isolated and without support,

one's helplessness, feeling of rejection, and dependence upon the 626
controlling power is especially keenly felt. In such conditions 154
even a slight deviation might provoke a feeling of guilt, need 782
for self-punishment and suffering; it might call for public self-humiliation, confession of errors and pledges to repent and to correct the wrong done, especially when such practices are supported by the inherited traditions. There is therefore a certain degree of truth in the assertion of the Bolsheviks, that "Criticism and self-criticism is a great driving force in the development of Soviet society."[10]

II

In a "prison and barracks" society privileges of power and 642
ideas of grandeur do not sufficiently compensate for lack of 152
acceptance, isolation, humiliations, feelings of insecurity, and sense of inferiority and rejection. In an atmosphere of suspicion, intrigue, degradation, and lack of intimate personal and intellectual contact and of social support, anxieties, fears, extreme self-concern, and deep antagonisms easily flourish. Such a situation tends to magnify feelings of destructive aggression developed on the family level and is therefore likely to become overcharged with extreme hostilities and hatreds; it is likely to become full of potential explosiveness which may be directed against the ruling class itself unless convenient channels for discharge of aggressiveness are found.

In a society in which overt expressions of emotional behavior 642
are under the control of a ruling clique, accumulating aggressions 661
are readily directed against internal and external "enemies" 208
of the regime, be they real or invented for the occasion. In this manner the feeling of hostility against the regime might be redirected against its opponents. It is therefore in the interest of survival of the ruling faction in such a society to cultivate hatred and destruction of the "enemy" by all means of public pressure, propaganda, agitation, education, as well as lawmaking.

These are the reasons why attitudes of extreme animosity 208
against the "enemies of the Soviet Motherland" are propagated 648
in the Soviet daily press and in the school textbooks. Stirring 186
hatreds is one of the main tasks of Party agitators.[11] Accordingly 152

208 in the political philosophy expressed in Soviet writings and in
648 the speeches of outstanding Party members, extreme hatred of
186 the internal and external adversaries is considered as a precondi-
152 tion of Bolshevik victory and of survival of Soviet society. Thus, for instance, in a May Day Order of the Day, Stalin, as People's Commissar of Defense declared: "You cannot defeat any enemy without having learned to hate him with all the power of your soul." In Soviet writings Lenin is hailed as a man who had "a holy hatred of the oppressors of the people . . . "[12]

Just like the Anarchists before them, the Bolsheviks claim that a deliberate cult of hatred is a precondition for the development of a "revolutionary passion." They justify hatred as a means to achieve their revolutionary goals. Following the same traditions the Bolsheviks insist that fanatical devotion should be instilled
[861] in people as a means to arouse passionate hatred. Therefore deliberate cultivation of hate together with the training in extreme identification with the Leader, the Party, the Motherland, and the Communist cause must start with kindergarten and with school training of Soviet children. Passionate hatred and passionate love are expected to mutually strengthen each other.
[876] According to pedagogical teachings, the Soviet children should be "saturated with irreconcilable hatred toward the enemies of socialist society," as well as with "passionate love of the Motherland." But here too just as in the Anarchist precepts, hatred appears to take the first place and love the second:

> Hatred gives birth to class revolutionary vigilance and creates a feeling of irreconcilability toward the class enemy; the weakening of such vigilance undermines the cause of the socialist revolution. It is necessary to learn, not only to hate the enemy, but also to struggle with him, in time to unmask him and finally, if he does not surrender, to destroy him . . . to vanquish the enemy is impossible without the most burning hatred of him . . . Passionate love of the motherlands breeds inevitably strong hatred of the enemy.[13]

538 Many outstanding Soviet novelists in their writings emphasize
152 this cult of destructive aggression. Maxim Gorki, for instance, wrote an essay entitled "If the enemy does not surrender, he must be destroyed." Konstantin Simonov, another outstanding Soviet

author, wrote a well known poem under the title *"Ubey ego"*— 538
kill him.[14] In a similar manner Alexey Tolstoy, a well-known 152
Soviet novelist, has published an essay entitled *Ubey Zverya*—Kill the Beast. "Kill him," writes Alexey Tolstoy, "that is your sacred command."[15] Mikhail Sholokhov, another prominent Soviet writer, wrote a pamphlet entitled *Nauka Nenavisti*—The Science of Hatred—in which he stressed, in a like way as the early Russian Anarchists and contemporary Soviet pedagogists, the necessity of ardent love for the Cause as a source of passionate hatred of all the opponents. To him, too, love seems to be necessary primarily as a means of hate.[16] "Hatred for enemies of the [829]
land of socialism is an inseparable feature of socialist ideology and the ideology of Leninism," the Bolsheviks repeatedly say.

Under the label "enemies" are classed not only the foreign 661
"capitalists, imperialists, and reactionaries," and internal non- 152
Party oppositionists, but also Party members who deviate from 565
Party ideology, and "all sceptics, opportunists, capitulators, scabs, and traitors." Hatred and struggle against these "enemies" within the Party must be as merciless and ruthless as against external adversaries. This is considered to be imperative in a mortal struggle against the capitalist world:

> The history of the Party . . . teaches us that unless the Party of the working class wages an uncompromising struggle against the opportunists within its own ranks, unless it smashes the capitulators in its own midst . . . it cannot perform its role of organizer and leader of the proletarian revolution . . . If, while it is carrying on a life and death fight against the bourgeoisie, there are capitulators and traitors on its own staff, within its own fortress, the working class will be caught between two fires, from the front and the rear. Clearly such a struggle can only end in defeat.[17]

This conscious fomenting of intense hostility and animosity 661
against internal, as well as external "enemies" as a means of 152
survival in a "mortal struggle" is manifested in the language of 192
Bolshevism. The words "liquidation" and "purge" which are often synonomous with killing and extermination of opponents became outstanding in Soviet vocabulary. There is an increasing use of words which convey ideas of hatred and violence and stimulate such feelings and practices. In Bolshevik stereotyped termi-

661 nology opponents are referred to as the "enemies of the people."
152 They are said to be "groups of spies," "traitors to the country,"
192 "dregs of humanity," "fiendish criminals," "pigmies," "useless
rubbish," "hordes of barbarians," "hangmen," "cannibals," "enemies of humankind."[18] These "instruments of oppression of the proletariat," full of "falsehoods and perverse lies," "narrow-minded petty-bourgeois with sickly mentality," have to be mercilessly "smashed," "annihilated," "crushed," "destroyed" with an "ever greater frenzy and ferocity."[19] They have to be "cleansed" from the Soviet society in order to ensure the consolidation of the rule of the Bolsheviks.

It was in order to justify ruthlessness in dealing with the opposition that labelling, denouncing and name-calling has become prominent in Bolshevik practices. Any softness toward the "enemies" is denounced as bourgeois "sentimentalism."[20] Instead, *besposhchadnost* (mercilessness), *surovost* (ruthlessness), *besstrashie* (fearlessness), and *zheleznaya volia* (iron will) are said to be the "Lenin ways" by which the political workers are to deal with all the "opponents, slackers, and deviants."

665 If in this "life and death fight," ruthlessness, pitilessness, and
661 mercilessness have to be applied then also cunning, guile, craft,
ruse and deceit are equally welcome as useful means. Lenin is often quoted as saying that the Communists, when necessary, must "resort to strategy and adroitness, illegal proceedings, reticence and subterfuge,"[21] that they must use any trick and veiling of truth; that they must dodge and maneuver. They must be ready in the interest of final success to suffer humiliation and self-abasement. In the interest of the cause and of final victory, they must know how to retreat and how to "crawl in the mud on their bellies."[22] According to the Bolshevik teaching, there is not an "absolute ethic." Every act is measured by how it corresponds to the interests of the group.[23]

III

152 Emphasis on extreme hatred, on ruse, and on mercilessness
661 against those who do not conform is not new in the history of
175 Russian society. Destructive aggression formed an aspect of the
Czarist rule; it was manifested in the persecution of religious

dissenters, in the civil wars as well as in the struggle between the 152
Czarist police and the revolutionary intelligentsia; it was even 661
formulated as an ideology and became a credo of Anarchism. 175

In the Bolshevik ideology this anti-humanism is justified by 152
representing the "enemies" as not being human beings. Just as 661
in the folk attitudes toward enemy aliens, the oppositionists and 829
the adversaries, actual and potential, real and imaginary, are identified in Bolshevik writings with "gnats," "insects," "reptiles," "dogs," "wild beasts," and "beasts of prey." It is by such ways of reasoning that the Soviet pedagogists have come to the assertion that indoctrination of the people with "burning hatred" of the enemy does not contradict the ideas of humanism, because, they claim, the ideas of humanism and humane feelings do not apply to beasts. In this manner even acts of cruelty toward the "enemies" are condoned and encouraged:

> Hatred of the enemies of the socialist Motherland by no means contradicts the principles of humanism, since it is devoted to the protection of the rights and liberty of the worker from the designs of beasts of prey.[24]

The need for such an appeal to extreme animosities against 152
the adversaries is in itself an indication of instability of the 661
Bolshevik system. The ruling faction had to resort to such a means in order to promote complete identification with and fanatical devotion to the Cause and to the Leader. Here, however, we see a noticeable difference between the Czardom and the Soviet Russia. Though the Czarist system often exhibited
aspects of extreme ruthlessness, the whole ideological and intel- [178]
lectual development of the Czarist Russia, especially in the last century of its existence, was in the direction of increasing West-
ernization and humanization. This trend coincided with certain [641]
gains in the field of personal, economic, and cultural freedoms in the Czardom.

As a result terrorism and acts of violence, though widely prac- 517
ticed, were not openly advocated as official Czarist policy. Many 661
moderate and conservative factions of the intelligentsia strongly denounced all acts of terror performed either by the government
or under the auspices of the revolutionary intelligentsia. One 000

792 One of the outstanding tenets in the philosophy of Russian monas-
829 577 ticism whose history is even longer than that of the Czardom was
[795] charitable love. Many sects of the *Raskolniki* propagated and
practiced principles of humaneness. The Slavophils were espe-
829 577 cially prominent in advocating the return to an idealized state-
less society of benevolent paternalism where brotherhood, Chris-
[177] tian love, and compassion would reign. The "Westerners"
endeavored to introduce into Russia Western concepts of justice
and tolerance, and a humanistic, libertarian and juridical state.
Russian belles-lettres, Russian school textbooks, as well as laws
and regulations in the nineteenth century and up to the begin-
ning of World War I, bear witness to this trend toward Westerni-
zation and humanism.

178 In Soviet Russia, on the other hand, after a brief initial period
661 of reaction against the old regime which led toward an emphasis
on all-human values and equalitarian brotherhood, soon the trend of events pushed the Bolshevik ideology in the opposite direction. The determination of a ruling clique of professional conspirators to maintain themselves in power by any and all means dictated the emphasis on the internal and external "threats" which would justify the intensification of internal "measures of security," and of external aggression. Thus vigilantism and war preparedness, and expansion of internal and external Bolshevik power, became the main base of the policies of the ruling class.[25] Such policies had to be constantly reinforced by a deliberate incitement to hatred and destruction.

661 The image of Soviet society as being in a constant state of
642 war, not only against foreign enemies but against internal oppositionists, deviationists, spies, saboteurs, and remnants of bourgeois mentality has been determined by a social structure which the Bolshevik rulers themselves have created, but which makes their own power uncertain and precarious. In such circumstances Lenin's idea of a life and death struggle with the "class enemies," the idea that "it's them or us" (*Kto kogo*) has provided the main motivating force of the Party's internal and foreign policies. Fearing to be annihilated unless they themselves destroy their enemies, conscious that they have "either to rule or to die," the Bolsheviks have ruthlessly applied the principle of "obedience

or death" (*povinovenie ili smert*) in their rule; thus terror has 661
become one of the main instruments of their power. 642

But once self-seeking careerists and fanatical devotees, special- 000
ists in violence, conspiracy and vigilance take into their hands the reins of a society which they indoctrinate with hatred and ruthlessness, the value of human life tends to be greatly lowered. In their constant struggle for survival, fear-ridden and extremely insecure, these people are forced to adopt an attitude of expendability toward all their subjects, just as earlier the Anarchists and Terrorists considered that all their members were only capital to be freely spent in the interest of the revolution.

In such conditions the disregard for individual rights and 641
needs, and lack of consideration and of human feeling become 661
generalized and are applied not only in dealings with enemies, but also in relations with associates, relatives, friends, allies and subjects in general whenever the vested interests of the ruling clique are threatened. The orders and the plans must be fulfilled; the victories must be made no matter what the cost in personal freedom and dignity, human suffering and human lives, because it is these orders, plans, and victories upon which the survival and the perpetuation of the ruling faction depends. All those who are in the way must be unconditionally sacrificed. Said Stalin:

> . . . it [is] easy to be a hero or a great leader if one had to do with the people such as the Russians . . . even persons of medium courage and even cowards became heroes in Russia. Those who do not . . . are killed.[28]

This attitude of disregard and contempt for human life when the survival of the ruling class and its vested interests are in question was expressed by Stalin also in his known interview with G. B. Wells. The magnitude of convict labor establishments, the police practices, and the extent of economic and other deprivations to which the Soviet subjects are exposed are all manifestations of this frame of mind.

The low value which is placed on human life in Bolshevik 641
ideology is especially well demonstrated in war times. The Soviet 727
armed forces command does not assess the cost of war in terms

41 of human lives. Soviet military policies are little concerned about
727 systematic rotation of units, facilities for recreation, short leaves and furloughs, regular correspondence with home folks, or with the development of techniques to avoid exposure of men to unnecessary risks.[27] As a result of such attitudes the toll of a Soviet division in war time might come up to 90 percent of its men.[28] Even more indifference is shown toward men who were made prisoners, since "they had surrendered and could not fight any more."[29]

IV

152 Destructive aggressiveness might become self-destructive un-
721 less turned outward. Hence constant internal pressure, intrinsic to Soviet power structure, for aggression against the outside world. A policy of external aggressiveness is likely to provoke external threats against which the accumulating hostilities of the subjects can be mobilized. Successful external aggression is also a convenient way to bolster the prestige of the ruling class and to solidify its rule. The policy of aggression against the outside world implies also the urgency to enhance external security should the policy of expansion provoke international complications.

648 Early in the development of Bolshevik rule the Communist
829 International and the Communist parties throughout the world have been regimented and employed as instruments of this policy of external expansion, as well as a means of defense against external pressures. It was in accordance with such a trend of events that the Program of the Communist International of 1928, as well as the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International of 1935,[30] emphasized complete identification of the world proletariat with the Soviet power:

> Our road is the road of revolution of the peoples against the oppressors and exploiters. Our will is the will of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Our goal is socialism for the whole of humanity. Our main slogan is the establishment of Soviet power.[31]

721 In accordance with such need for outward aggression as a
829 relief of internal destructive tensions an ideological distinction

has been made between "imperialist war of aggression" and 721
"national and class liberation." The first is said to be an "unjust 829
war" of imperalists, exploiters and war mongers, the latter is a movement of the peoples to liberate themselves from the capitalist yoke or from colonial oppression. It is said that in this "just struggle" of the peoples of the world against oppressors the Soviet Union will unselfishly interfere with its armies to help the people to liberate themselves and also to protect liberated peoples from counter-revolution. It is therefore the duty of the working class and of "progressive-minded people" all over the world to strengthen the might of the Soviet Fatherland as "the center of international revolution":

> Being the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of Socialist [186]
> construction, the land of great working class achievements, of the union of the workers with the peasants, and of a new culture marching under the banner of Marxism . . . the USSR inevitably becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the center of international revolution, the greatest factor in world history. In the USSR, the world proletariat for the first time acquires a country that is really its own, and for the colonial movements the USSR becomes a powerful center of attraction.[32]

In order to make Communist parties a tool of this new "Third 648
Rome" ideology all these parties had to follow in their internal 665
organization the Bolshevik pattern of rigid centralism and of unconditional obedience of all the subordinate organs to the higher bodies.[33] Each local Party had to be centralized in such a manner that its leadership was "endowed with complete power, authority, and ample rights" which would enable it to impose "an iron discipline" over its members.[34] All members were expected to accept such centralized Party leadership with absolute power and to "submit to its dictates."[35] This was possible only if "the strictest military discipline" and "unconditional subordination" were established within the ranks of each Communist Party:

> . . . The Communist Party should be organized on the basis of strict proletarian centralism. In order to lead the working class successfully during the long, stubborn civil war, the Communist Party must

648 665 establish the strictest military discipline within its own ranks. The experience of the Russian Communist Party . . . has proved that the victory of the worker is impossible without a severe discipline . . . and unconditional subordination of subordinate units to the decision of those above them, and a strong Party central organ, whose decrees are binding upon all the leaders of Party life . . .[36]

In this manner, the principles of absolute dominance, unconditional obedience and ruthless discipline rooted in the political traditions of Russian society and reinforced by the structure of Bolshevik power were extended to all the parties on which the Bolsheviks imposed their control. In the same manner, also, the [152] traditional filial attitudes of reverence, gratitude, love and humility have been established in relations of these parties to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Accordingly also, destructive aggression became one of the fundamental orientations of these parties. The Communist parties have been encouraged to use all means at their disposal, "including force of arms" in order "to overthrow the international bourgeoisie,"[37] and to "lay low the exploiters . . . completely defeat them . . . crush their resistance. . . ."[38]

[153] [192] As a result, the language of these parties, like that of Bolshevism, stresses hatred, destruction and war. For instance, in the Theses and Statutes and in the Program the emphasis is on extreme hostility expressed in many stereotyped phrases, such as "hatred and relentless aggression," "pitiless struggle," "persistent and merciless denunciation," "merciless contempt," "stubborn, armed and ruthless fight," "fierce and decisive battles," "ruthless war." These means against the "mortal enemy" are said to be necessary in order "to destroy the apparatus of the bourgeoisie," and to bring about the "violent overthrow" of bourgeois power, "at whatever cost." Each Communist party is expected to foster hatred and destructive aggression by all means of propaganda and agitation. The Communist press in all countries and popular Communist songs are especially significant in this respect.

665 157 Since the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union, just as the Bolshevik Party itself, stress hatred, pitilessness and destruction, they tend to attract into their ranks people who for one

reason or another feel rejected, non-accepted, humiliated, oppressed or ostracized in their own society and who find in these parties an opportunity to vent their accumulated grievances and pent-up hostilities. But they also tend to attract people who for idealistic and humanistic reasons seek Utopias of all-human brotherhood. They attract ambitious and talented intellectuals and semi-educated people who have been thwarted in their professional and political expectations; also intellectuals and semi-intelligentsia with mediocre abilities but strong urges for self-assertion and desire for leadership and domination. They also attract many patriots belonging to oppressed nationalities or races, who have identified themselves with their nation, race or ethnic and cultural minority and seek acceptance of their group in a Communistic millenium. In times of social upheavals these parties attract also many adventurers, criminals, vagabonds, and other deviants and offenders. 665 157

It is, however, people overcharged with destructive aggression who in these parties tend to climb toward the top levels of Party leadership, because it is such people to whom the Party offers great opportunities for their destructive urges and who therefore tend to be unconditionally loyal to Moscow as contrasted to the more moderate and more humane and patriotic elements, who for one reason or another might not want always to accept Moscow's dictate. As a result of such internal conditions the history of all Communist parties has been a history of internal intrigues, splits, purges, and frequent bloodshed which in turn made it easier to completely subdue these organizations to the will of the Kremlin: 665 152 578 661

> . . . those who disorganize the Party are to be flayed without mercy. Championing as we do working class unity, we shall with so much more energy and irreconcilability fight for unity within our Parties. There can be no room in our Parties for factions, or for attempts at factionalism. Whoever will try to break up the iron unity of our ranks by any kind of factionalism will get to feel what is meant by the Bolshevik discipline that Lenin and Stalin have always taught us (applause) . . . *The Party is above everything else!* (Loud applause) To guard the Bolshevik unity of the Party as the apple of one's eye is the first and highest law of Bolshevism![30]

648 665 721 It was such thoroughly regimented and indoctrinated Party organizations whose leaderships comprised a hard core of violent and unscrupulous fanatics without bonds of personal or local attachment but unconditionally subservient to the Kremlin, that became a powerful instrument in the international aggression of Bolshevism. Promising Utopias to all disgruntled, rejected and disaffected, such parties became the main instrument of the Soviet Union in its territorial annexations, as well as in the formation of a ring of satellite states. The objective of this expansion was always the same: to turn outward the internal tensions, to enhance the economic, the strategic, and the military potential of the Soviet Union, and to increase the power and influence of the Bolshevik hierarchy at home and abroad.

V

665 829 648 701 New modifications in Bolshevik ideology were necessary to explain such policies. The Communist parties in the capitalist countries are now said to be unable by themselves alone to overthrow local bourgeoisies or to prevent a counter-revolution after capitalism has been overthrown. These parties therefore need active help of the Soviet armed forces not only to overthrow the capitalist class, but also to eliminate the possibility of counter-revolution and to protect the national independence of the newly formed Communist controlled states—the "People's Democracies." This "liberating" and "protecting" role of the Soviet Army and complete dependence of liberated states upon the Soviet Union is a replica of the dominance-submission and protection-dependence relationships on which the Soviet Union itself has been founded. The dependent states are expected to be ready to defend and protect the Soviets "unconditionally and without hesitation." Such a system of Moscow-satellite relationships is considered so overwhelmingly important by the Kremlin rulers that they demand that their satellite leaders constantly emphasize even in fundamental state laws their dependency upon and subordination to the Soviet Union:

> The armed might of the great Soviet Union liberated our country from the yoke of German fascism, smashed the landlords and the capitalistic anti-popular state powers, and opened to our working

people the road to democratic development. Coming to power after 665
severe struggles with the lords and defenders of the old order, the 829
Hungarian working class, in union with the working peasants, re- 648
built our war-destroyed country with the unselfish support of the 701
Soviet Union. Under the guidance of the working class hardened in decade long struggles, benefiting by the experience of the 1919 social revolution, depending on the Soviet Union, our people began laying the foundations of socialism.[40]

To emphasize the superiority of the Soviet Union, its undis- 829
puted leadership and dependence of the satellites upon it in the 648
struggle for world revolution, an important distinction has been 186
made in regard to the social and political structure of the dependencies in comparison with that of the Soviet state. Though both are said to be the "dictatorships of the proletariat,"[41] the Soviet state is said to be carrying out the transition from Socialism to Communism; the "people's democracies," on the other hand, are said to be carrying out only the transition from capitalism to Socialism.[42]

Complete political and economic dependence of the satellites upon the Soviet Union is ideologically justified by the claim that the general objectives of world revolution presuppose an industrially as well as a militarily powerful Soviet Union as a base. To this primary objective of all Communists local interests of the satellites must be subordinated. Therefore, any opposition to such plans or any hints that the "fraternal assistance" offered by the Soviet Union in the interest of the revolution might not be completely unselfish is immediately castigated as "nationalism," as "opportunism," and as "treason":

> The essential task, that of laying the foundation of Socialism in Poland, can be carried only in close alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union . . . Any tendency to weaken cooperation with the Soviet Union is directed against the very foundation of the People's Democracy . . . Anyone who imagines that the people's democratic state can be formed merely as a self-sufficient body, on a national scale, isolated from the class struggle on an international scale . . . will inevitably sink into the slough of nationalism and treachery.[43]

This system of political, military and economic dominance of 648 626
the dependencies implies an elaborate system of watching, super- 665

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665 vising, checking and controlling. Accordingly just as in the Soviet Union in each satellite country primary attention is paid to the personnel policies. "Department of Cadres" and "Personnel Bureaus," headed by people who are trusted friends of the Soviet Union and advised by Soviet experts, supervise the political reliability and the labor efficiency of all. Observers of these agencies and Soviet experts are at work in every Party organization, every office and every factory shop. The hiring, releasing, and transferring of personnel rests with these bureaus.

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[661] In all these considerations political reliability and not professional competence is of foremost importance, a situation that favors the rise of professionally incompetent zealots and careerists ahead of people who are professionally able but more cautious and moderate, or more independent.[44] In consequence, just as in the Soviet Union, there is a keen struggle for positions and ranks and there is a premium on specialists in political organization and violence, a great demand for watchdogs, agitators, overseers and labor-drivers. Unconditional faith in and devotion to Russia is considered, however, to be the first and primary prerequisite for advance in satellite political, military and managerial hierarchies.[45] Hence periodical purges or "verifications" of Party members are undertaken to insure that only sufficiently Russified people remain in the Party.

648 The need of total control of dependencies dictates also a divide and rule policy among the satellites. In accordance with such policies the Kremlin instigates and encourages local nationalisms, regionalisms and separatisms and external aggressiveness of the satellites while at the same time it must prevent pan-movements and excessive territorial ambitions which might challenge the dominance of Moscow. Thus while instigating Asiatic nationalism the Soviet Union must prevent the championship of the Pan-Mongolian idea by Mongolia or Communist China. While encouraging various Balkan nationalisms it had to prevent the formation of a South Slav Federation.

Another means of promoting effective control of and dominance of the satellites is isolating these vassal countries from the West and therefore preventing any Western influence to undermine Bolshevik rule. This aim is achieved by deliberately pro-

voking tension between these dependencies and the Western 648
world, and by promoting anti-cosmopolitanism and castigating satellite intellectuals who show pro-Western attitudes.[46] The control of the Church and persecution of Church leaders, especially those with strong Western ties such as the Catholic hierarchy, serves the same purpose.

In order to strengthen this system of total regimentation and 648
control of its dependencies the Soviet Union formed in 1947 665
an over-all agency as an instrument of coordination of its major policies toward these states, the Cominform. This over-all agency of conformity and vigilance which took the place of the old Comintern is designed by the Soviet Union to bring about a concerted pressure upon any eventual signs of resistance to the policies dictated by Moscow.

The third meeting of the Cominform (November, 1949), for instance, was especially concerned with means to increase "revolutionary vigilance," to detect "deviationism, opportunism, sectarianism" within Communist parties and to wage an "irreconcilable struggle" against all manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism" and against the "provocations and intrigues of the American imperialists." The Communists who did not unconditionally submit to the wishes of the Kremlin were denounced as "imperialist agents and spies," as the "splitters" in the ranks of the working class, as "tools of imperialists," as "traitors," "reactionary nationalists," "clerical and fascist elements," "counterrevolutionaries," "slanderers," "provokers," "fabricators of foulest lies borrowed from the arsenal of Hitler."[47] In this manner the "Party line" laid down by the Kremlin is universally and unquestioningly adopted by all.

VI

The difficulties of control which arise within such a system of vassal dependencies are well exemplified in the relationships between Soviet Russia and Communist Yugoslavia. In the latter country, the Communist-led Partisans were placed in power when the Red Army took Belgrade, but the quick withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the territory of Partisan-controlled Yugoslavia did not allow the Bolshevik Party sufficient time to place

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its own appointees and trusted agents in all the key positions in the Yugoslav Communist Party and in the Yugoslav state administration.[48]

Even during this short stay of the Red Army in Yugoslav territory, the relations between Communist-Partisan rulers of Yugoslavia and their Soviet liberators became tense. The tension resulted from the "haughty attitude" of the liberators and the hostility that this attitude provoked among the liberated.[49] And later when the Soviet Union attempted to infiltrate Yugoslavia with advisers and experts, the Yugoslav officers began "to abuse" the Soviet military advisers[50] and Yugoslav authorities showed such a "lack of hospitality and lack of confidence" that their security organs "controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia."[51] The Yugoslav Communist authorities also refused economic information to the Soviet trade representatives and resented the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia collecting information about the conditions within the Yugoslav Communist Party. And when the Yugoslav Communist leaders and their agents prevented the attempt of the Soviet Union to establish a net of its intelligence agents in the country and within the Yugoslav Communist Party,[52] the final break could not be avoided any longer.[53]

Two totalitarian controls cannot exist in one and the same territory. Thus, when the Soviet Union had realized that Yugoslavia was under the firm control of the Yugoslav Communist Party and police. that they could not liquidate its leadership which became too challenging and could not therefore bring the country to a state of complete dependence, subordination and vassalage, the next alternative left was to expel Yugoslavia from the Cominform.[54] A Communist state out of the Kremlin's hold, if allowed to remain within the Soviet orbit, could undermine the very foundations of the Kremlin's dominance over other satellites.

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Similar resentment, antagonism, and lack of trust that developed between the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Russian Politburo has always existed in all other satellite states in various degrees and forms.[55] Many Communists, particularly the "idealists" and patriots resent the presence of Russian

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experts, advisers, representatives, and agents occupying positions of power and control in each satellite country, especially their haughty and insulting behavior, constant tutoring and sermonizing on the part of Moscow and need to accept the Kremlin's dictates with humility and gratitude. Also economic exploitation of the vassal countries in the interest of the Soviet Union, the imposition of Russian language and Russian culture, the danger of military occupation and the threat of resettlement of whole sections of the population to Siberian mines and lumber camps, all of these cannot but provoke anxieties, fears, and hatreds on the part of the subjected peoples:[56]

> We are finding out that not only lack of knowledge and ability is displayed in the Czech Army toward the Soviet military science and Soviet war experiences, but that we encounter even a direct distaste and resistance based on hatred toward everything Soviet.[57]

For this reason "Titoism" in one form or another has appeared in all satellite countries. A "Titoist crisis," for instance, took place twice in Outer Mongolia, in 1924 and in 1930–32.[58] In other satellite states the same crises were manifested in a number of "spy trials" and execution of outstanding satellite leaders. But purges and trials do not eliminate the sources of dissatisfaction and hostility. Since the causes remain and constantly generate new feelings of destructive aggression, Bolshevik leaders have to constantly increase measures of security, vigilance, and control in all their dependencies. The Kremlin is therefore increasingly forced to rely on power-seeking careerists, on members of minority groups, on Russian subjects, and on children from dependent states taken to Russia and trained as "New Janizaries" to rule their own countries in a "Rokossovsky way."[59] The patriots and the humanists among the Communists have to make room for violent zealots and cynical careerists, "for such men who would not scruple any means in carrying out the orders. . ."[60] The leaders who fought with their people in underground movements against Nazi invaders have to give way to "a few individuals who spent the wartime in Moscow [and] were installed in a 'Rokossovski way' in the top positions . . . lacking the contact with the population and knowledge of its wishes, they mechani-

648 cally apply methods which are in flagrant contradiction to our
665 traditions and incompatible with them."[61] Such policies in turn
186 only emphasize the feeling of insecurity, isolation and mistrust; they cause apathy and a slowing-down in economic and intellectual advance.[62]

In this manner the pattern of Bolshevik expansion which was designed to release and redirect the hostilities accumulated within Soviet society has only extended the area of strains and tensions. The addition of each new dependency therefore adds fresh pressures for more aggression directed outward. In such circumstances the Bolshevik leadership is forced not only to instigate its satellites toward external aggression but also to deliberately provoke and perpetuate international tension. By such means the Bolsheviks expect to maintain a constant external pressure that would work toward unity of the Soviet orbit and rallying of all dependencies behind Moscow.

In the meantime, however, such growth and expansion of Soviet power and Communist fomented unrest could not have failed to provoke increasing anxieties and fears in the countries which consider themselves threatened by Bolshevik advance. War preparedness in the West and formation of anti-Soviet military alliances has been the result. Mutual suspicions and international tension which have developed in these circumstances have increased to a point which has already taken the form of a "cold war" and of scattered localized warfare. Thus growing friction between these two increasingly hostile and aggressive worlds might eventually break into an all-out fighting on a global scale.

000 On the other hand increasing resistance to Soviet expansion on the part of Western powers might eventually completely seal the outlets for Soviet outward aggression. In such a case accumulating internal complexities and stresses generated by the structure of Soviet power might get out of the Kremlin's control and bring about disintegration of Bolshevism through internal conflicts, especially if these are widened and sharpened by means of planned external economic and psychological pressures.

Notes

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

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1. See, for instance Article 88 of the *Code of the Steppes* (Mongols, Buriats, Kalmucks) and Mongol-Oirat law in V. A. Riasanovsky, *Customary Law of the Mongol Tribes,* (Harbin, 1929), pp. 198, 296; also A. E. Hudson, *Kazak Social Structure,* (New Haven, 1938), p. 40. See also customary code of the Kirghiz, Article 87; text in V. A. Riasanovsky, *Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law,* (Tiensin, 1937), p. 243, footnote. For different attitudes among the Mongol-Oirat see V. A. Riasanovsky, *Fundamental Principles, op. cit.,* p. 243. Concerning the family system of Central Asiatic peoples see also compliation of materials from old Chinese chronicles in N. Ya. Bichurin, *Sobranie Svedeny o Narodakh Obitavshikh v Srednei Asii v Drevneishie Vremena,* (Moscow, 1950), Vol. I, pp. 39–40, 46–48, 52. See also A. Bernshtam, *Sotsialno-Ekonomichesky Stroy Orkhono-eniseyskikh Turok 6–7 Vekov,* (Moscow, 1946), pp. 93–98.

2. Compare T. Peisker, "Asiatic Background," *Cambridge Medieval History,* (Cambridge, 1924), Vol. 1, p. 342. Some data concerning the ruling circles in Mongol society indicate that contrasted to other women the mother was treated with a certain deference; see, for instance, N. Bichurin, *op. cit.,* p. 52.

3. Concerning seniority principle in the family see for instance *Great Yassa of Genghis Khan,* Article 34. See text of Great Yassa in V. A. Riasanovsky, *Customary Law of the Mongol Tribes, op. cit.* See also G. Vernadsky, *O Sostave Velikoi Yasy Chingis Khana,* (Bruxelles, 1939).

4. See H. Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature,* (Cambridge, 1932–40), Vol. 3, pp. 91–99.

5. *Ibid.,* p. 97–99.

6. A. Vambery, *Travels,* (New York, 1865), p. 336.

7. *Ibid.,* p. 319.

8. H. Chadwick, *op. cit.,* Vol. 3, pp. 97ff.

9. *Greet Yassa, op. cit.,* article 29; see also *Travels of Marco Polo,* (New York, 1950), Book I, Ch. 55.

10. C. Chadwick, *op. cit.,* Vol. 3, p. 134.

11. T. Peisker, *op. cit.,* p. 346.

12. H. Chadwick, *op. cit.,* Vol. 3, pp. 102–104, 136.

13. *Ibid.,* pp. 138–159.

14. Compare, for instance, the epic on Geser Khan; also Kirghiz epic poem Manas, (*Manas, Kirghizskii Narodnyi Epos,* (Moscow, 1941), pp. 29–33); also H. Chadwick, *op. cit.,* Vol. 3, p. 75; also A. S. Orlov, *Kazakhsky Geroichesky Epos,* (Moscow, 1945), pp. 36–38.

15. See, for instance, A. A. Novoselskii, *Borba Moskovskogo Gosudarstva s Tatarami v Pervoi Polovine 17 Veka,* (Moskow, 1948), pp. 236–237, 351; also T. Peisker. *op. cit.,* p. 347–348; also Marco Polo, Book I, 11, and II, 23.

16. *Great Yassa,* 12.

17. Marco Polo, I, 54; also T. Peisker, *op. cit.,* pp. 324, 331, 340.

18. N. Bichurin, *op. cit.,* Vol. 1, p. 40.

19. T. Peisker, *op. cit.,* p. 352.

20. Compare T. Peisker, *op. cit.,* p. 337.

21. A. Hudson, *op. cit.,* p. 90.

22. *Ibid.,* p. 65.

23. T. Peisker, *op. cit.,* pp. 333, 336, 338.

24. Compare *Great Yassa, op. cit.;* see

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 (Cont.)

000 also A. Vambery, *op. cit.*, p. 170; also Marco Polo, I, 55; II, 23.

25. A. Bernshtam, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

26. N. Bichurin, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48.

27. John de Plano Carpini, *Historia Mongolorum*, V.

28. *Maxims of the Genghizedes;* text in V. Riasanovsky, *Customary Law, op. cit.*, p. 63.

29. B. D. Grekov and A. Y. Yakubovsky, *Zolotaya Orda i ee Padenie*, (Moscow, 1950), pp. 406–428; also A. A. Novoselskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 388, 391ff. Compare H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, Part 1–3, (London, 1876); also, Rene Grousset, *L'Empire des Steppes*, (Paris, 1948); also H. Lamb, *The March of the Barbarians*, (New York, 1940). See also B. Vladimirtsov, *Le Regime Social des Mongols*, (Paris, 1948), pp. 233ff.

30. E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, (New York, 1880).

31. Marco Polo, I, 54.

32. Direct evidence of these invasions of Eurasian planes dates from the fifth century, B.C., but they apparently occurred even earlier. Since then Asiatic invasions of Eastern Europe occurred periodically until the seventeenth century, A.D. See George Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia*, (New Haven, 1943), pp. 48–333.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. See J. Peisker, "The Expansion of the Slavs," *Cambridge Medieval History, op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 422–423. Compare S. H. Cross, *Slavic Civilization through Ages*, (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 5–8. See also L. Niederle, *Manuel de l'Antiquité Slave* (Paris, 1923), Vol. 1, pp. 23–24, and *Byt i Kultura Drevnikh Slavian*, (Prague, 1924), pp. 13–20.

2. Procopius, *Gothica*, VII, 14.

3. Emperor Leo, *Tactica*, XVIII, 99–107. See also S. Cross, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

4. See *Povest Vremenih Let (po Lavrentevskom spisku)*, (Leningrad, 1926), p. 8 *(i zhivyahu kozhdo v svoim rodom i na svoih mesteh vladayushche kozhdo rodom svoim)*. Compare *The Russian Primary Chronicle* (S. H. Cross), (Cambridge, 1930), p. 139.

5. *Povest, op. cit.*, p. 12. Compare M. Kovalevsky, *Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of Russia*, (London, 1891), p. 6. Also *Primary Chronicle, op. cit.*, p. 141.

6. Cosmas Pragensis, *Chronica Bohemorum;* see M. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

7. M. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

8. See, for instance, Article 1 of the Short Version of *Pravda Rushaya* (see *Pravda Rushaya*, Vol. 2, ed. E. D. Grekov, [Moscow, 1947]). See also Article 106 of the Expanded Version of *Pravda*.

9. *Etnografichesky Sbornik*, vol. 5, (Sankt Petersburg, 1862), pp. 1–119, (Mashkin, "Byt Krestyan Kurskoy Gubernii Oboyanskogo Uezda"); also *Sbornik Narodnykh Yuridicheskikh Obychaev*, vol. 2, (S. Petersburg, 1900), pp. 261–274, (D. I., "Zametki o Krestyanskoi Semye v Novgorodskoi Gubernii.")

10. *Sbornik Narodnikh Yuridicheskikh Obychaev, op. cit.*, p. 266.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 51–96. (S. Pahman, "Ocherk Narodnykh Yuridicheskikh Obychaev Smolenskoi Gubernii.")

12. *Ibid.*, p. 272 (D. I., *op. cit.*).

13. W. Sedden-Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*, (London, 1872), pp. 299–300.

14. See D. Tomasic, *Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics*, (New York, 1948), Ch. IV.

15. M. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 21. On traces of brother-sister incest in the zadruga see D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, Ch. IV.

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16. Ivan Krypyakevich, *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy* (Winnipeg, 1948), p. 18.

17. See also J. Peisker, "The Expansion of Slavs," *op. cit.*, pp. 422ff.

18. See E. Romanov, *Belorussky Sbornik*, (Kiev, 1885), pp. 263–438; compare A. A. Khvili, *Ukrainskii Folklor*, vol. 1 and 2, (Kiev, 1937); see also E. Karsky, *Bielorusy*, vol. 3, Part 1, (Moscow, 1916); also *Gomelskia Narodnyia Pesni*, collected by Z. Radchenko, *Zapiski Imper. Ruskago Geogr. Obshchestva*, (St. Petersburg, 1888).

19. E. Romanov, *op. cit.*, p. 298. Similar philosophy of life is expressed by peasants in Turgeniev's short stories "*Khor and Kalinych*" and "*Kasian of the Fair Springs*," in *A Sportsman's Sketches*, (London, 1930), pp. 1–20 and pp. 166–195.

20. K. Iashchurzhinsky, *Maloruskia Pesni*, (Warsaw, 1880), p. 56.

21. E. Romanov, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

22. E. Romanov, *op. cit.*, p. 309. The same custom and saying is found in contemporary Zadruga society of Croatia. See D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, ch. IV.

23. Compare G. P. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind*, (Cambridge, 1946), pp. 8, 17.

24. G. Fedotov, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

26. See W. Ralston, *op. cit.*

27. G. Fedotov, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

28. Note the similarity between this religious and philosophical system and that of the Zadruga society. The Zadruga people say: "Justice is stronger than God"; see D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, Ch. IV.

29. The same device was used by the partisan guerillas in these regions during World War II; Petro Vershigora, "Lyudi s chistoy sovestyu," (*Znamya*, 1946), No. 4.

30. Compare D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, Ch. IV.

31. V. D. Grekov, *Kievskaya Rus*, (Moscow, 1949), p. 465.

32. Concerning recent Soviet research on early Slav culture, see the articles of M. Tikhomirov in *Izvestia*, (April 12, 1952), and B. Grekov in *Izvestia*, (June 4, 1952); see also the article of Z. Udaltsova in *Bolshevik*, June, 1952.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. Compare A. Bernshtam, *op. cit.*, pp. 97, 163; also G. Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia, op. cit.*, pp. 50–64; also E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, (Philadelphia, 1804), Vol. 3, Ch. XXVI, pp. 312, 340; also, B. Vladimirtsov, *The Life of Chingis-Khan*, (New York, 1930), pp. 123–139; also W. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, (Paris, 1945), pp. 129–133.

2. See Ammianius Mercellinus (Tr. J. C. Kolfe), (London, 1935), Vol. 3, pp. 385–387; also Herodotus, *Persian Wars*, V, (New York, 1942), pp. 291, 313–317; see also W. M. McGovern, *The Early Empires of Central Asia*, (Chapel Hill, 1939), pp. 52–58. Compare N. Bichurin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 218; also Lucian (tr. A. M. Harmon), (London, 1936), Vol. 5, pp. 162ff.

3. G. Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia, op. cit.*, p. 48ff.

4. This is the case both in Procopius and in Emperor Leo's works.

5. Tacitus, *Germania*, XLVI.

6. Provest, *op. cit.*, p. 12; also *The Russian Primary Chronicle, op. cit.*, p. 141.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 12; also *The Russian Primary Chronicle, op. cit.*, pp. 141–142.

8. Whip made of several straps of heavy leather, sometimes leaded.

9. *Chronicarum que dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici*, Libri IV, in: *Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum*, Hannoverae, 1888, p. 144. See about a similar revolt of wives and children under the rule of the Scythians in Herodotus: "When therefore the children sprung from these slaves and Scythian women,

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grew to manhood, and understood the circumstances of their birth, they resolved to oppose the army (of the Scythians) which was returning from Media." (*Persian Wars*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 291)

10. Compare T. Peisker, "Asiatic Background," *op. cit.*, p. 339.

11. Compare G. Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia, op. cit.*, pp. 137–140, 182–184; also G. Plekhanov, *Introduction à l'Histoire Sociale de la Russie*, (Paris, 1926), pp. 52–55; also N. K. Chadwick, *The Beginnings of Russian History*, (Cambridge, 1946), pp. 112–119; also V. Kliuchevsky, *Kurs Russkoy Istorii*, (Moscow, 1937), Vol. 1, pp. 160–166.

12. Compare V. Grekov, *Kievskaya Rus, op. cit.*, p. 362.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

14. M. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–138.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

16. *Sbornik Narodnikh Yuridicheskikh Obychaev*, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, (S. K. Pahman, "Ocherk Narodnikh Yuridicheskikh Obychaev Smolenskoy Gubernii," pp. 51–76). It is of interest to note that this practice of forced unanimity, which was probably introduced by steppe warriors, was still in use in the communal and tribal life in the Dinaric regions of the Balkans as late as the early part of the twentieth century. See D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, Ch. II, pp. 101–103.

17. D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, Ch. IV, pp. 157–162.

18. *The Russian Primary Chronicle, op. cit.*, p. 145.

19. Compare Leonard A. Magnus, *The Tale of the Armament of Ygor* (*Slove o Polku Igoreve*) (London, 1915), pp. 7, 10.

20. *The Russian Primary Chronicle, op. cit.*, pp. 177–181.

21. Compare Testament of Vladimir Monomach in *The Russian Primary Chronicle, op. cit.*, Appendix, pp. 301–309.

22. V. Grekov, *op. cit.*, pp. 495–498.

23. Compare L. A. Magnus, *Russian Heroic Ballads*, (London, 1921), pp. 7–12.

24. See the legend *Mikula Selyaninovich* in N. Chadwick, *Russian Heroic Poetry*, (Cambridge, 1932), p. 44.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.

26. N. Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

27. Compare with the practice of the steppe nomads of weaning the child from his mother's breast at age of five.

28. "Volga Vselavyevich," in N. Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

29. *Ibid.*, "Volga and Mikula," p. 45.

30. *Ibid.*, "Vasily Buslaev," p. 143.

31. N. Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 162–163.

33. G. Fedotov, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 352.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 351–352.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 351–353, 191–193.
353, 191–193.

37. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

38. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 147–153.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Charles Diehl, "The Government and Administration of the Byzantine Empire," *The Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. 6 (Cambridge, 1923), p. 726, 728; also L. Brehier, *Le Monde Byzantin*, (Paris, 1947), Vol. 2, pp. 430–528.

2. Ch. Diehl, *op. cit.*, pp. 727–728. See also L. Brehier, *op. cit.*, pp. 368–71. Also Y. Finlay, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (London, 1920), pp. 216ff.

3. See P. Milyukov, *Russian Culture*, Part I, (ed. M. Karpovich, Philadelphia, 1942), pp. 1–26; also Karamzin-

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Kelly, *The History of Russia*, Vol. 1, pp. 30–32, (London, 1854).

4. Karamzin-Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 99. See also D. S. Mirsky, *Russia*, (London, 1931); also W. H. Frere, *Russian Church History*, (London, 1918); also L. Boissard, *L'Eglise de Russie*, (Paris, 1867).

5. V. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia*, (New York, 1912), Vol. 2, p. 23. See also N. Zernov, *Moscow, the Third Rome*, (London, 1937).

6. The Russian Church following its objectives of independence from Byzantium crowned in 1547 Ivan IV as Czar. A few years later the Russian Church Synod codified the usages and the canon of Saints of the Russian Church. And in 1589 the Eastern Patriarchs who depended on Russia's help for their maintenance conferred upon the Metropolitan of Moscow the rank of Patriarch. The Russian Orthodox Church thus became also formally independent and free in its political action. On Russian Church-state relations see M. M. Karpovich, "Church and State in Russian History," *The Russian Review*, (Spring, 1944), pp. 10–14.

7. Ivan III refused to take the title of king from Emperor Maximilian, declaring that he held his crown "from God alone." Ivan IV is quoted as saying: "I am your God, as God is mine." See Karamzin-Kelly, *op. cit.*, pp. 128, 142.

8. See, for instance, Sigmund von Herberstein, *Notes upon Moscow*, (London, 1851), Vol. I, p. 32.

9. V. Kliuchevsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 70.

10. Compare V. Kliuchevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 98. See also M. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

11. Dr. Giles Fletcher, "Of the Russe Commonwealth," in *Russia at the Close of the Sixteenth Century*, (London, 1856), pp. 26–28; also pp. 56ff. See also S. Herberstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 94–95.

12. S. Herberstein, *op. cit.*, p. 107; also G. Fletcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–61, 150–152; also Sir Jerome Hersey, "Travels" in *Russia at the Close of the Sixteenth Century, op. cit.*, pp. 172–173.

13. G. Fletcher, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 117–119.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–78.

17. Compare S. Herberstein, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

18. G. Fletcher, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 81–84.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 74.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Compare G. Fedotov, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 58, 132–157.

2. Compare Baron Von Haxthausen, *The Russian Empire*, (London, 1856), Vol. 1, pp. 111–112.

3. Czar's decree.

4. See C. Pobedonostsev. *Memoires Politiques*, (Paris, 1927), and *Reflections of a Russian Statesman*, (London, 1898); also M. Tourgueneff, *La Russie et Les Russes*, Vol. 2, (Paris, 1847), p. 305ff; also M. Karpovich, *Imperial Russia*, (New York, 1932), pp. 8, 28, 51–52, 62.

5. Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Empire of the Tsars*, (New York, 1893–96), Vol. 2, p. 110.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

7. Stepniak, *Russia Under the Tzars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–147, 134ff.

8. Marquis de Custine, *The Empire of the Czar*, (London, 1843), Vol. 1, p. 124.

9. *The English Woman in Russia*, (New York, 1856), p. 174; also Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 272; also General Golovine, *Intelligentsia*, Manuscript in Hoover Library, p. 6.

10. Marquis de Custine. *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 233.

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11. *Ibid.*, p. 122; also Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 98; also Baron Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 160–176.

12. Leroy-Beaulieu. *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 98; also E. Lanin, *Russian Traits*, (Boston, 1891), p. 82; also Baron N. Wrangel, *From Serfdom to Bolshevism* (*Memoirs*), (Philadelphia, 1927), pp. ~~103–112~~.

13. *The English Woman, op. cit.*, p. 244. See also General Golovine, *op. cit.*, *Intelligentsia*, p. 31.

14. de Custine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 172. See also General Golovine. *op. cit.*, *Intelligentsia*, pp. 31ff.

15. N. Wrangel, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–17.

16. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 132–133.

17. Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 84.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. The root of this word is *bolshoi*, the same as in the Bolshevik.

2. *Sbornik Narodnykh Iuridicheskikh Obychaev*, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 269 (D. I. "Zametki o Krestyanskoy Semye v Novgorodskoy Gubernii"). See also D. M. Wallace, *Russia*, (London, 1881), pp. 88–89. Also M. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–55.

3. Compare this family system with the zadruga household community in Croatia; see D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, Ch. IV.

4. *Etnograficheskу Sbornik*, (Sankpeterburg, 1854), Vol. 2, p. 47. (A. Arkhangelsky, "Selo Davshino").

5. *Poslovitsy Ruskago Naroda*, (V. Dahl), (Moscow, 1878), Vol. 1, p. 490.

6. *Sbornik Narodnykh Juridicheskikh Obychaev*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 69; (S. V. Pahman, "Ocherk Narodnikh Yuridicheskikh Obychaev Smolenskoy Gubernii.").

7. See, for instance, W. Ralston, *Russian Folk Tales*, (London, 1873); "The Leshy," p. 206.

8. *Sbornik*, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 270 (D. I. "Zametki o Krestyanskoy Semye").

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 270–271.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 75 (S. V. Pahman, "Ocherk Narodnykh Yuridicheskikh Obychaev").

11. S. Herberstein, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 95. See also A. Jenkinson, *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia*, (London, 1886), Vol. 1, p. 38. Also Karamzin-Kelly, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 150.

12. *Sbornik*, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 272 (D. I. "Zametki o Krestyanskoy Semye").

13. See, for instance, A. Afanasiev, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

14. M. E. Duchesne, *Le Domostroi*, (Paris, 1910), Ch. XVII, p. 47. See also Elaine Elnett, *Historic Origin and Social Development of Family Life in Russia*, (New York, 1926), p. 38.

15. See N. Gogol, "Taras Bulba," *Izbrannye Sochinenia*, (Moscow, 1937), p. 269.

16. *Sbornik*, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 268: "*Esli otets vedet razgulnuiu zhizn, kotoraya vlechet za soboyu razorenie khozyaystva, togda deti starayutsya otdalitsya ili zhe pokoritsya svoey uchasti, no ryedko pomyslyat zhalovatsya na otsa.*" (If the father leads an inordinate life which brings economic ruin, the children either leave or submit to their fate but seldom think of complaining against the father.)

17. See, for instance, I. I. Serebrennikov, *My Recollections*, (Tientsin, 1938), Manuscript in the Hoover Library; also Lev N. Tolstoy, *Childhood, Boyhood,*

Youth, (Boston, 1886), pp. 34–35; also Count Ilya Tolstoy, *Reminiscences of Tolstoy,* (New York, 1914), pp. 39–40; also Sonya Kovalevsky, *Recollections of Childhood,* (New York, 1895), pp. 9–10.

18. *Poslovitsy Ruskaga Naroda, op. cit.,* Vol. 1, p. 492.

19. *Ibid.,* p. 469.

20. *Ibid.,* p. 470.

21. *Sbornik,* Vol. 2, *op. cit.,* p. 66.

22. *Ibid.,* pp. 275–300 (E. T. Solovev, "Prestuplenya i Nakazania po Ponyatyam Krestian Povolzhya").

23. *Le Domostroi, op. cit.,* Ch. XXIX, pp. 63–64.

24. *Poslovitsy, op. cit.,* Vol. 1, p. 470.

25. *Le Domostroi, op. cit.,* Ch. XVII, p. 47.

26. *Poslovitsy, op. cit.,* Vol. 1, p. 470.

27. A. Tereshchenko, *Byt Ruskaga Naroda,* (Sankt Peterburg, 1848), p. 417. See also S. Herberstein, *op. cit.,* Vol. 1, pp. 94ff.

28. *Le Domostroi, op. cit.,* Ch. XVII, p. 47.

29. See, for instance, S. Aksakoff, *A Russian Gentleman,* (London, 1917), pp. 17–18.

30. N. Wrangel, *op. cit.,* pp. 13–20.

31. W. Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People, op. cit.,* pp. 130–135.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. *Sbornik, op. cit.,* Vol. 2, pp. 137–143. (V. N. Skein, "*Ocherki narodno-obychnaga prava Vologodskoy Gubernii*"); also *Sbornik, op. cit.,* pp. 261–274.

2. See, for instance, *Great Yassa, op. cit.,* Article 6.

3. *Pravda Russkaya, op. cit.,* Article 7, (Extended Version).

4. Compare these customs with *Great Yassa, op. cit.,* Article 34.

5. Concerning blind obedience see, for instance, the tale "The Robbers" in Edith Hodgetts "*Tales and Legends from the Land of the Tsar,*" (New York, 1892), p. 123.

6. *Sbornik, op. cit.,* Vol. 2, pp. 266–267.

7. *Ibid.,* pp. 51–96.

8. See, for instance, the tale "The Prophetic Dream" in P. M. Polevoy, *Russian Fairy Tales,* (London, 1901).

9. An outstanding novelistic portrait of Russian family strife is found in Dostoyevsky's *Brothers Karamazov.*

10. See *Sbornik, op. cit.,* Vol. 2, pp. 55–56. (S. V. Pahman, "Ocherk Narodnikh Yuridicheshikh Obychaev Smolenskoy Gubernii.")

11. See, for instance, W. Ralston, *Songs, op. cit.,* p. 288.

12. *Ibid.,* p. 173. Either strange fiend-like beings or great heroes are the offsprings of such unions.

13. *Ibid.,* p. 289.

14. See, for instance, W. Ralston, *Songs, op. cit.,* p. 29.

15. See, for instance, the tale "Baba Yaga" in A. Afanasiev, *Russian Fairy Tales,* (London, 1946).

16. W. Ralston, *Songs, op. cit.,* p. 25.

17. For novelistic treatment of such feelings see Dostoyevsky's *Brothers Karamazov.*

18. See, for instance, the tale "Morozko" in P. Polevoy, *op. cit.*

19. See about son's feeling of rejection and about father's fear of son in *Brothers Karamazov.*

20. N. Wrangel, *op. cit.,* pp. 19–20. Compare S. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.,* pp. 7–8.

21. N. A. Dobrolyubov, "Realm of Darkness," *Selected Essays,* (Moscow, 1948), p. 218ff.

22. Peter Kropotkin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist,* (Boston, 1899), p. 296.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

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1. See, for instance, Count Ilya Tolstoy, *Reminiscences of Tolstoy,* (New York, 1914), pp. 11, 313–14. Also L. L. Tolstoy, *The Truth About My Father,* (London, 1924), pp. 65–66, 79–80.
2. See, for instance, the narrative "Dyuk Stepanovich" in N. Chadwick, *op. cit.,* pp. 108–109.
3. See narrative "Straver" in N. Chadwick, *op. cit.,* p. 124.
4. G. Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia, op. cit.,* pp. 267–268.
5. *Stikhi Dukhovnye,* ed. by G. Fedotov, (Paris, 1935), p. 47.
6. Compare *The Russian Primary Chronicle, op. cit.,* Appendix I and II., p. 313.
7. See, for instance, the tales "Friday" and "Wednesday" in W. Ralston, *Russian Folk Tales,* (London, 1873), pp. 200–203.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

1. E. Lanin, *op. cit.,* p. 45.
2. A. Pushkin, "Boris Godunov," in *Alexander Pushkin,* (tr. A. Yaromlinsky), (New York, 1936), p. 347.
3. See text of the Confession in Bakunin, *Sobranie Sochineny,* Vol. 4, (Moscow, 1935), pp. 99–207; also E. H. Car, *Michael Bakunin,* (London, 1937), p. 211.
4. Leo Tolstoy, *My Confession,* (London, 1904), pp. 8–9.
5. G. Fedotov, *op. cit.,* p. 213.
6. See, for instance, *Primary Chronicle, op. cit.,* Appendix IIB.
7. G. Fedotov, *op. cit.,* pp. 206–208.
8. *Education of a Princess,* a memoir by Mary, Grand Duchess of Russia, (New York, 1930), p. 57.
9. N. Wrangel, *op. cit.,* p. 46.
10. *The Diaries of Tschaikovsky,* (New York, 1915), pp. 247–48.
11. M. Bakounine, *Oevres,* Vol. 3, (Paris, 1908), p. 21.
12. *Stikhi Duhovnye, op. cit.,* p. 30.
13. G. Fletcher, *op. cit.,* pp. 116–117.
14. See on this point G. Fedotov, *op. cit.,* pp. 209–11.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

1. For a novelistic treatment of reaction to rejection and humiliation see Dostoyevsky's *Brothers Karamazov.*
2. V. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia, op. cit.,* Vol. 2, p. 95.
3. *Ibid.,* p. 75.
4. *Ibid.,* p. 63.
5. N. A. Dobrolyubov, *Dnevniki,* (Moscow, 1931), p. 70; J. A. Posin, *Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov, and Pisarev, Thesis,* (Berkeley, 1939), p. 187.
6. *Ethnograficheshy Sbornik,* (Sankt-Peterburg, 1862), Vol. 5, p. 20; (Mashkin, "Byt Krestyan Kurskoi Gubernii, Oboianskaga Uezda.")
7. *Etnograficheshy Sbornik,* Vol. 2, p. 103, (Sankt Peterburg, 1854); A. Rudnev, "Selo Golum i Novomihailovskoe Tulskoy Gubernii."
8. See, for instance, the tale "Ilya Muromets and Svyatogor" in A. Afanasiev, *op. cit.,* pp. 125–126.
9. *Poslovitsy, op. cit.,* Vol. 2, pp. 438–440.
10. *The Journal of Leo Tolstoi,* (New York, 1917), pp. 10, 71, 125, 127, 140–141, 146–147, 155–56, 196, 200, 206, 221, 253, 259, 265, 278.
11. *Ibid.,* p. 251.
12. E. Lanin, *op. cit.,* pp. 25–26, 84.

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13. Maxim Gorky, *Days with Lenin,* (New York, 1952), p. 52.

14. Compare N. Leites, "Quarreling Among Great-Russians," Manuscript, Columbia University, Research in Contemporary Cultures, (May, 1948).

15. Compare Nevin O. Winter, *The Russian Empire of Today and Yesterday,* (1913), pp. 274–5.

16. Bernard Pares, *Russia* (New York, 1949), pp. 20–21. See also E. Lanin, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–27, 66ff.

17. E. Ellnet, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

18. G. Fedotov, *op. cit.*, pp. 352–353.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

1. V. Snow, *Russian Writers,* (New York, 1946), pp. 128–129.

2. *The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen,* (New Haven, 1923), pp. 26–27, 95, 96, 99–100, 118–119.

3. P. A. Kropotkin, *An Appeal to the Young,* Chicago, p. 30.

4. Nina N. Selivanova, *Russian Women,* (New York, 1923), p. 173.

5. *The Little Grandmother of the Russian Revolution,* Reminiscences and letters of Catherine Breshkovsky, Ed. by Alice Stone Blackwell, (Boston, 1918), pp. 6–8.

6. F. Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov,* (New York, 1937), "Elders."

7. E. Carr, *Michael Bakunin,* (London, 1937), *op. cit.*, p. 7.

8. *Ibid.*

9. M. Bakounine, *Oevres, op. cit.*, p. 213.

10. *Ibid.* 23.

11. H. Hershkowitz, *Democratic Ideas in Turgeniev's Works,* (New York, 1932), p. 13.

12. G. Fedotov, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

15. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 357–358.

16. G. Fedotov, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–131.

17. See *Catechism of Revolution,* English text in R. Payne, *Zero,* (New York, 1950), pp. 8ff.

18. *The Journal of Leo Tolstoy, op. cit.*, p. 9.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 13

1. See on this point A. Saltykov, *Dve Rossii,* (München, 1919), pp. 1ff.

2. See, for instance, *The English Woman in Russia, op. cit.;* also B. Pares, *Russia,* (New York, 1949), p. 23; also N. Winter, *op. cit.*, pp. 260–262; also Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 14, 190, 215.

3. See this contrast in Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov,* particularly *"The Grand Inquisitor."*

4. According to the hero of a novel by I. A. Goncharov. See also N. A. Dobrolyubov, *Selected Philosophical Essays,* (Moscow, 1948), pp. 174–217.

5. M. Bakunin, *Ispoved, op. cit.*, p. 154; also Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

6. General Golovine, *op. cit.*, *The Revolution,* pp. 21–32.

7. *Ibid.*, *The War,* p. 11.

8. F. Chaliapin, *Man and Mask,* (New York, 1927), pp. 9–12.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

10. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 108–110.

11. General Golovine, *op. cit.*, *The Peasantry,* p. 40.

12. See, for instance, G. Plekhanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–45.

13. Compare Nevin O. Winter, *op. cit.*, pp. 260–262.

14. See on this point the works of V. Kliuchevsky and G. Vernadsky.

15. Quoted by B. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 13 (Cont.)

OOO 16. P. Kropotkin, *Anarchist Morality*, London, pp. 1–2.

17. See R. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, (New York, 1934), pp. 41–51, 206–232, 232–257; see also K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, (New York, 1940), pp. 277–278; also C. Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man*, (New York, 1949), pp. 197, 202–203; also D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–34.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 14

1. See N. Tourgeneff, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 79ff.

2. *Ibid.* See also A. Mazour, *The First Russian Revolution*, (Berkeley, 1937), pp. 164, 154–155, 262–263.

3. Compare Lenin, *Sobranie Sochineny*, XII, p. 100.

4. See on this point T. G. Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia*, Vol. 1, (London, 1919), pp. 95–104.

5. See I. V. Kireevsky, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochineny*, Vol. 1, (Moscow, 1911), pp. 174–222; see also N. L. Brodsky, *Rannie Slavianofily*, (Moscow, 1919); see also I. S. Aksakov, *Sochinenia*, (S. Peterburg, 1811), Vol. 2.

6. See I. Kireevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 174–190. Compare also T. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 109. See also *Brothers Karamazov, op. cit.*, "Conversations and Exhortations of Father Zossima." See also I. S. Aksakov, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 27ff.

7. I. Kireevsky, *op. cit.*, pp 217–218. Compare Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 295; also T. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–246; also Brodsky, *op. cit.*, p. LIII. Also Brothers Karamazov, "Conversations," *op. cit.*

8. I. Kireevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 116–120; also T. G. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 267, quoting Aksakov.

9. See Shatov's dialogue in Dostoyevsky's novel *The Possessed.*

10. F. Dostoyevsky, *Brothers Karamazov, op. cit.*, "So be it!" Compare A. S. Khomiakov, *O Tserkvi*, (Berlin, 1926).

11. Compare I. S. Aksakov, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 783ff.

12. See I. Kireevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 115–120, 217–218; also N. Brodsky, *op. cit.*, p. LIV; compare T. Masaryk, *op cit.*, p. 267. See also I. S. Aksakov, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 30ff.

13. A. C. Khomyakov, "Poslanie k Serbam," in N. Brodsky, *op. cit.*, p. 59; see also I. S. Aksakov, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 15ff.

14. N. Brodsky, *op. cit.*, p. LII; also I. S. Aksakov, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 18.

15. I. Aksakov, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 213ff; see also M. Bakunin, *op. cit.*, pp. 151–152.

16. I. Kireevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 174–222; compare also T. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

17. See, for instance, I. S. Aksakov, *op cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 66ff.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 15

1. M. Kovalevsky, *Russian Political Institutions*, (Chicago, 1902), p. 210.

2. Concerning the organization and the internal relations of the Russian Orthodox Church see Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 251ff.

3. E. Ludwig, *Stalin*, N. Y., (1942), p. 19; see also B. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

4. M. Kovalevsky, *Russian Political Institutions, op. cit.*, p. 210.

5. This feeling of rejection is, for instance, expressed by the conspirator Verkhovensky who portrays Anarchist Nechaev in Dostoyevsky's novel *The Possessed.* Verkhovensky reproaches his father: "You never gave me food or

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drink and sent me as a tiny little baby from Berlin to X Province by post."

6. See D. Pisarev, *Sochinenya,* (St. Petersburg, 1901–09) and *Izbranye Filosofskie i Obshchestveno-politicheskie Stati,* (Moscow, 1944). See also N. Chernishevsky, *What's to be Done?,* (Boston, 1886). See also J. Posin, *op. cit.* See also T. Masaryk, op. cit., p. 55.

7. *Catechism of Revolution,* by Bakunin-Nechaev; English text in R. Payne, *Zero,* (New York, 1950), pp. 7–14. German text in Mikhail Bakunin's *Sozialpolitische Briefwechsel,* ed. M. Dragomirov, (Stuttgart, 1895), pp. 374–380. Russian text in *Borba Klasov,* (Leningrad, 1924), no. 1–2, pp. 262–3.

8. *Ibid.* See also N. Bakunin, *God and the State,* (London, 1910); also P. Kropotkin, *Expropriation,* (London, 1909), and *Law and Authority,* (London, 1886).

9. P. Kropotkin, *Anarchist Morality,* London, Freedom Press, pp. 21–23. See also P. Kropotkin, *Organized Vengeance, called "Justice,"* (London, 1902).

10. P. Kropotkin, *Anarchist Morality, op. cit.,* pp. 21–24.

11. Stepniak, (S. Kravchinsky), *Underground Russia,* (New York, 1892), pp. 39–40.

12. *Catechism, op. cit.,* "The Duties of the Revolutionary Towards Society," point 13.

13. P. Kropotkin, *Anarchist Morality, op. cit.,* pp. 21–23.

14. *Catechism, op. cit.,* "The Duties of the Revolutionary towards Himself," point 1.

15. For instance, Peter Tkachev, an outstanding Anarchist, when 17 years old formed plans according to which in order to regenerate Russia, all people over twenty-five years of age were to be summarily executed. See B. Kozmin, *P. N. Thachev,* (Moscow, 1923), p. 18. See also *The Possessed,* particularly the dialogues of Krillov.

16. *Catechism, op. cit.,* "The Duties of the Revolutionary towards Himself," points 5, 6, 7; see also P. Kropotkin, *La Conquête du Pain,* (Paris, 1892).

17. M. Bakunin, *Ispoved, op. cit.,* p. 178; see also Carr; *op. cit.,* p. 379.

18. *Catechism, op. cit.,* "The Duties of the Revolutionary toward his Revolutionary Comrades," point 10.

19. Compare A. Herzen, *Bakunin,* (St. Petersburg, 1906); also B. Wolfe, *op. cit.,* p. 156.

20. *Catechism, op. cit.,* "The Duties of the Revolutionary towards Society," point 14.

21. *Ibid.,* point 16.

22. *Ibid.,* point 16.

23. See a novelistic account of such practices in Dostoyevsky's *The Possessed.*

24. *Catechism, op. cit.,* "The Duties of the Revolutionary Association Towards the People," point 22.

25. B. P. Kozmin, *Nechaev i Nechaevtsy, Sbornik Materiyalov,* (Moskva, 1931), pp. 13–57.

26. See Stepniak, *Underground Russia, op. cit.;* also *The Little Grandmother of the Russian Revolution, op. cit.*

27. See *Istoria SSSR,* Vol. 2, (Moscow, 1949).

28. Compare Vera Finger, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist,* (New York, 1927); also V. Bogrov, *Dmitry Bogrov i Ubiystvo Stolypina,* (Berlin, 1931).

29. Compare M. Kovalevsky, *Russian Political Institutions, op. cit.,* pp. 252–258.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 16

1. Compare J. Mavor, *An Economic History of Russia,* (London, 1914), pp. 49–52.

2. I. V. Chernyshev, *Agrarno-Krestyanksaya Politika Rosii,* (Petrograd, 1918), p. 2.

3. *Ibid.,* p. 3.

4. *Ibid.,* p. 4.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 16 (Cont.)

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5. See N. Wrangel, *op. cit.*, p. 16. See also J. Mavor, *op. cit.*, pp. 203–207; also Svatikov, *Obshchestvenye Dvizheniya v Rossii*, Post Na Donu, (1905); also L. Tikhomirov, *Russia Political and Social*, (London, 1892); also D. Wallace, *Russia*, (New York, 1861), p. 478.

6. Even after the emancipation act, not only men, but women up to fifty years of age were publicly flogged. Since beating with the birch rod (*rozga*) sometimes made peasants unfit for military service, by the middle of nineteenth century the lash was introduced to replace the rod.

7. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 18. See also J. Mavor, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

8. See *Sketches of Russian Life*, (London, 1860), pp. 9–13, ed. H. Morley. Also Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 20.

9. M. G. Hindus, *The Russian Peasant and the Revolution*, (New York, 1920), pp. 67–71.

10. M. Kovalevsky, *Ancient Customs and Modern Laws*, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–96; also M. Hindus, *op. cit.*, p. 67; also L. Tikhomirov, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 257–259.

11. *Poslovitsy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 515–517.

12. See D. Wallace, *op. cit.*, pp. 461–484.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 17

1. *Poslovitsy*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 213.

2. See, for instance, the legend "St. Elias and St. Nicholas" in W. Ralston, *Russian Folk Tales*, (London, 1873).

3. S. Kravchinsky (Stepniak), *The Russian Peasantry*, (New York, 1888), p. 223.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 222–223. When Afanasiev's volume of folk-tales appeared in 1859, its sale was prohibited by the censor.

5. *Poslovitsy*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 286.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 189–190.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 290.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

9. E. Lanin, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–37.

10. *Poslovitsy*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 338.

11. See, for instance, A. Z. Ovchinikov, *Iz Moikh Vospominany*, pp. 1–60, manuscript in Hoover Library.

12. *Poslovitsy*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 229.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

14. See, for instance, the tale "The Rogish Peasant" in E. Hodgetts, *op. cit.* See also P. Polevoi, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–7, 64–73.

15. E. Lanin, *op cit.*, pp. 9–10, 228.

16. W. Ralston, *Songs*, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

17. Note the similarity in these attitudes and those of the Dinaric warriors in D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–41, 49–53.

18. General Golovine, *op. cit.*, *The Peasantry*, p. 6.

19. *Sbornik Narodnykh Yuridicheskikh Obychaev*, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 281; E. T. Solovyev, "Prestuplenia i Nakazania po Ponyatiyam Krestiyan Povolzhiya."

20. N. Gogol, *Taras Bulba*, (Moskva, 1943), p. 27.

21. Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 116.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 18

1. See Stepniak, *The Russian Peasantry*, *op. cit.*, pp. 229–230.

2. *Pesni Ruskikh Sektantov Mistikov*, *Zapiski Imperatorskoga Ruskaga Geograficheskaga Obshchestva po Otdeleniyu Etnografii*, (Petrograd, 1912), Vol. 25, No. 215; Ed. by F. S. Rozhdestvensky, M. I. Uspensky.

3. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 467–469.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 469.

5. *Pesni Ruskikh Sektantov, op. cit.*, no. 575.

6. F. C. Conybeare, *Russian Dissenters*, (Cambridge, 1921), p. 94.

7. F. Conybeare, *op. cit.*, p. 270. See also Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 289, 299.

8. Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 500.

9. F. Conybeare, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

10. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 447–448. See also Stepniak, *op. cit.*, pp. 336–337; Also F. Conybeare, *op cit.*, pp. 327–328.

11. Paul Miliukov, *Outlines of Russian Culture*, Part I, (Philadelphia, 1946), p. 73.

12. Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 254–255.

13. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 394.

14. P. Miliukov, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–67. Also F. Conybeare, *op. cit.*, pp. 196–197.

15. F. Conybeare, *op. cit.*, pp. 366–367; see also Leroy-Beaulieu, *op cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 425–429; see also Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 251.

16. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 318–319.

17. Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 248; also Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 320.

18. P. Miliukov, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 57.

19. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 404.

20. F. Conybeare, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 358. See also Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 402.

22. *Pesni, op. cit.*, No. 585.

23. See for instance, *Pesni, op. cit.*, No. 411, No. 649, and others; also Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 420.

24. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 421.

25. Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 253–254. See also Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, pp. 408–409; also F. Conybeare, *op. cit.*, pp. 350–351.

26. Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 448.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 431.

28. Von Haxthausen, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 290.

29. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 291–293.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 19

1. V. Kliuchevsky, *Kurs Ruskoy Istorii, op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 116.

2. D. S. Mirsky, *Russia*, (London, 1931), p. 133.

3. V. Kliuchevsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 49.

4. M. Kovalevsky, *Ancient Customs and Modern Laws of Russia, op. cit.*, pp. 223–224.

5. Compare *Istoria SSSR*, ed. by N. V. Nechkina, Vol. 2, (Moscow, 1946), p. 397.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 226–227.

7. *Protokoly Vtorogo Syezda P.S.R.*, p. 87. See O. H. Radkey, *The Party of the Socialist Revolutionaires and the Russian Revolution of 1917*, Ph.D. Thesis, (Harvard University, 1939), p. 112.

8. O. Radkey, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

9. T. Y. Robinson, *Rural Russia*, (New York, 1932), p. 159.

10. *Istoria SSSR*, Vol. 3, (Moscow, 1946), p. 39, ed. by A. M. Pankratova.

11. L. A. Owen, *The Russian Peasant Movement*, 1906–1907, (London, 1937), pp. 14–20.

12. T. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

14. From the speech of the peasant deputy Kirsonov from Saratov. See M. G. Hindus, *The Russian Peasant and the Revolution*, (New York, 1920), pp. 226–227.

15. See N. J. Rokitiansky, *Stolypin Agrarian Reform*, Thesis, (Stanford University, 1950), p. 151.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 20

000 1. Concerning economic history of Russia see J. Mavor, *An Economic History of Russia,* (London, 1914).

2. See *Istoria USSR, op. cit*, Vol. 2, p. 785, ed. by M. V. Nechkina.

3. *Vtoroy Ocherednoy Syezd Rossiskoy Sotsial-Demokraticheskoy Rabochey Partii,* Polnii text protokolov, Geneva, pp. 167–170 (the minutes of the Second Congress of Russian Social Democratic Party). See also J. Kucharzewsky, *The Origins of Modern Russia,* (New York, 1948), p. 470.

4. See the *Theses and Statutes of the Communist International* "Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution" points 13, 14.

5. Lenin "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward." *Selected Works,* Vol. 2, International publishers, New York, pp. 447–448.

6. *History of the Communist Party,* (Moscow, 1945), pp. 31–34.

7. Compare Lenin, "What is to be Done?" *Selected Works, op. cit.,* Vol. 2, pp. 126–148.

8. B. Wolfe, *op. cit.,* p. 258.

9. Lenin, "Where to Begin?" *Selected Works,* Vol. 2, p. 17. See also B. Wolfe, *op. cit.*

10. Lenin, *Selected Works,* Vol. 3, pp. 486–498. See also B. Wolfe, *op. cit.,* pp. 355–356.

11. For novelistic treatment of tension between these strata, see Russian belles-lettres of the second part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

12. Compare General Golovine, *op. cit., "Intelligentsia,"* pp. 6–7.

13. *Education of a Princess*—A Memoir by Marie, Grand Duchess of Russia, *op. cit.,* p. 309.

14. Compare E. J. Dillon, "The Duma in Figures," *Contemporary Review,* Vol. 90, pp. 290–292, (August, 1906); also Paul Miliukov, "The Class of the Second Duma," *Contemporary Review,* Vol. 92, pp. 457–67, (October, 1907); also E. A. Goldenweiser, "The Russian Duma," *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 29, pp. 408–422, (September, 1914). At the Bolshevik Party Congress in 1906, only 35 delegates were of the working class, while one hundred were composed of intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia.

15. Compare A. Kerensky, *The Catastrophe,* (New York, 1927), and *The Prelude to Bolshevism,* (New York, 1919). See J. Bunyan and H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution* 1917–1918, documents and materials, (Stanford, 1934); also General B. Gourks, *Russia 1914–17,* memoirs, (New York, 1918); also M. Botchareva, *Yashka,* memoirs, (New York, 1919); also L. Bryant, *Six Red Months,* (New York, 1918); also N. Krupskaya, *Memories of Lenin,* Vol. 2, (New York, 1930); also David Shub, *Lenin,* (New York, 1950).

16. Compare General Loukomsky, *Memoirs of the Russian Revolution,* (London, 1922); also L. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution,* Vol. 1–3, (London, 1932–33).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 21

1. See on this point, A. Vishinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State,* (New York, 1948), pp. 39ff.

2. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks),* (Moscow, 1945), p. 274; see also *Bolshevik,* (October, 1950), pp. 19–31; S. Kovalev, "Overcoming the Survivals of Capitalism."

3. Lenin, *Sochinenia,* Vol. 21, pp. 431–432. See also Stalin in *Bolshevik,* (August 1, 1950).

4. Lenin's speech before the All-Russian Conference of Transport Workers in March, 1921. See also L. Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

5. See Stalin's statement to Churchill in Churchill's memoirs, *The New York Times*, October 30, 1950, p. 29.

6. M. K. Bennett, "Food and Agriculture in the Soviet Union," *The Journal of Political Economy*, June, 1949, p. 191.

7. N. de Basili, *Russia Under Soviet Rule*, (London, 1950), pp. 286–300.

8. See A. Vucinich, "The Kolhoz," *The Am. Slavic and East European Review*, February, 1949, p. 13.

9. See speech of N. S. Khrushchev at the plenary session of the Moscow Province Party Committe, Dec. 20 and 22, 1950.

10. See *Pravda*, October 9, 27, 1950; also *Izvestia*, October 14, 1950.

11. See, for instance, *Pravda Vostoka*, May 18, 1949; also L. I. Berri, "K voprosu o razdelenii truda v sotzialisticheskom obshchestve," *Izvestia akademii nauk SSSR*, Nov. 3, 1947, pp. 155–172.

12. See *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, Oct., 1950, pp. 99–108.

13. Compare "The Russians can Manage," *Fortune*, January, 1945, pp. 161, 193. See also Harry Schwartz, "Soviet Labor Policy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May 1949, p. 78.

14. *Trudovye Rezervy*, Ukaz of 2 Oct. 1940, Point 7.

15. *O Poryadke Obyazatelnogo Perevoda Inzhenerov, Tekhnikov, Masterov, Sluzhashchikh, Kvalificirovanykh Rabochikh*, Ukaz of October 19, 1940.

16. *Ustav Profesionalnykh Soyuzov SSSR*, 1949. See also *Trud*, January 25, 1951.

17. L. Berri, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–172.

18. See *Voprosy Ekonomiki, op. cit.*; see also *Voprosy Filosofii*, December, 1949, pp. 243–264.

19. *Ibid.*

20. See, for instance, *Izvestia*, "Vasily Vasilyevich Vakrushev," January 14, 1947, p. 3; also *Pravda*, *"Na polyakh peredovogo Kolkhoza,"* July 19, 1947, p. 2.

21. *Constitution of the U.S.S.R.* of 1936, Article 12.

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2. See the draft of the New Statute CPSU, Articles 40–59. See also the Composition of the new Central Committee CPSU, October, 1952.

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13. *Pravda,* January 22, 1947 ("Nas osenyaet velikoi znamya Lenina-Stalina" by G. F. Alexander, p. 3).

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11. *Voprosy Filosofii*, (Dec., 1949), pp. 247–264.

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14. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Sept. 20, 1950.

15. *Voprosy Filosofii*, (Dec., 1949), pp. 247–264.

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17. K. Simonov in *Pravda*, Nov. 22, 1947.

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19 *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, (July, 1950), pp. 1–13.

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23. This textbook, written by B. P. Yesipov and N. K. Goncharov, (Moscow, 1946), was translated in part by G. S. Counts and N. Lodge under the title *I want to be Stalin*, (New York, 1947).

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 94–95.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 49, 112.

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30. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

32. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Dec. 19, 1950.

33. *Voprosy Filosofii*, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–264.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, Sept. 1949, pp. 6–12.

36. *Pravda*, January 21, 1947.

37. Evgeny Vazanchek in *Pravda*, January 21, 1947, in a poem to Lenin.

38. *Pravda*, August 28, 1936; May 23, 1935; see also *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, September 23, 1951, p. 3.

39. For such letters see *Pravda* and *Izvestia*.

40. *Seventh Congress of the Comintern*, Stenographic report, (Moscow, 1939), pp. 10–11.

41. *Izvestia*, January 21, 1947. The Bolsheviks affectionately refer to Lenin as Iliich. This is his second name (patronymic).

42. *Izvestia*, January 7, 1947.

43. *Pravda*, January 21, 1947.

44. *Izvestia*, January 21, 1947.

45. *Pravda*, January 21, February 12, March 19, 1947.

46. See, for instance, *Izvestia*, January 21, 1947; *Pravda*, January 25, 1947; *Pravda*, January 22, 1947; *Izvestia*, May 23, 1947; *Voprosy Filosofii*, Dec., 1949, pp. 247–264.

47. A. Zhdanov, in *Izvestia*, May 25, 1947.

48. Garrett Underhill, "Report on the Red Army," *The New York Times Magazine*, October 16, 1949.

49. J. Stalin, *The Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, (1944), p. 28. See also *Izvestia*, Dec. 13, 1949.

50. Yesipov and Goncharov, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

51. "Against the Bourgeois Ideology of Cosmopolitanism," *Current Digest*

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of Soviet Press, Washington, D.C., February 1949, p. 12.

52. B. D. Grekov, *The Culture of Kiev Rus*, (Moscow, 1947), pp. 143–44.

53. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Dec. 20, 1950.

54. *Voks Bulletin*, (1949), No. 57, p. 36.

55. See, for instance, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, Dec. 1950, pp. 77–79; *Kultura i Zhizn*, Jan. 11, 1951, p. 4; *Pravda*, Dec. 26, 1950.

56. See J. Stalin, "Otnositelno Marksizma v yazykoznanii," *Pravda*, June 20, 1950.

57. *Program of the Communist International*, Parts I and II.

58. *Ibid.*

59. Alexander Fadeyev speaking before the World Congress of Intellectuals, Warsaw, Poland, Aug. 25, 1948; see also *Pravda*, March 24, 1949.

60. Lenin, *Sochinenia*, 3rd ed., Vol. 24, p. 122; also Vol. 27, p. 117.

61. *Program of the Communist International*, Part III–V.

62. M. V. Frunze, *Sobranie Sochineny*, (Moscow, 1927); see particularly Vol. 3, pp. 242–244.

63. Capt. Sergei N. Kournakoff, *Russia's Fighting Forces*, (New York, 1942), p. 56.

64. Paragraph 6 of the 1946 Armed Forces Disciplinary Manual. See G. Underhill, *New York Times Magazine*, October 16, 1949.

65. *Ukaz* of January 3, 1939; *Pravda*, Jan. 4, 1949; "O tekste prisyagi raboche-krestyanskoy Krasnoy armii," p. 1.

66. J. Towster, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

67. Capt. Sergei N. Kournakoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–98.

68. N. Kournakoff, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

69. J. Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, (1946), p. 57.

70. General D. D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, (New York, 1948), pp. 461–465.

71. J. Stalin, *O Nedostatkakh Partiinoy Raboty*, (Moscow, Partizad, 1937), p. 28. See also *Sovetskoe Administrativnoe Pravo*, (Moscow, 1940), p. 22.

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1. See decrees "On Dissolution of Marriage" and "On Civil Marriage, on Children," and "On the Introduction of Registry Books for Acts of Status." See also Code of Laws of 1918.

2. The close relationship between school training and family training is seen, for instance, in the pedagogical principles according to which the teacher must manage and supervise also the "out of school" work of children. He must assist the parents in the rational use of leisure time of children at home. (Yesipov and Goncharov, *op. cit.*, pp. 100ff.) See also *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, January 12, 1952, pp. 1–3.

3. V. S. Tadevosian, *Prava, i Obiazanosti Roditeley v Sovetskom Gosudarstve*, (Moskva, 1947), pp. 21–22; also resolution of the central Committee Bolshevik Party, March 31, 1935.

4. G. M. Sverdlov, "Milestones in the Development of Soviet Family Law," *The American Review of the Soviet Union*, August, 1948, p. 12.

5. Compare G. Sverdlov, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

6. V. Tadevosian, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

7. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, January 12, 1952, pp. 2–3.

8. From the statement of an informant (Riemer interviews, No. 4). In the winter of 1948 a number of interviews were conducted with the Russian nonreturners. The purpose of these inter-

views was to check the findings based on documentary sources.

9. Markousha Fischer, *My Lives in Russia*, p. 55.

10. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Sept. 20, 1950.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. Ed. Stevens, "This is Russia—Uncensored," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 20, 1949.

14. G. M. Sverdlov, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

17. Decree of July 8, 1944. Part 26.

18. G. M. Sverdlov, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

19. *Vedomosti Verkhovnoga Soveta USSR*, No. 37, July 16, 1944. See also V. Tadevosian, *op. cit.*, p. 14; also G. Sverdlov, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–22.

20. See Part 14 of the amended Constitution of the USSR, 1947.

21. G. Sverdlov, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

22. On the attachment of Lenin to his mother see Boris Shub, *Lenin*, (New York, 1950).

23. B. Yesipov and N. Goncharov, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

24. V. Tadevosian, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

25. See Decree of August 22, 1943.

26. See, for instance, Decree of the Presidium of the USSR of Dec. 16, 1947; also *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, July 1, 1950.

27. V. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 91.

28. These points are supported by the evidence gathered through a number of interviews of Russian non-returners conducted by the author since 1947.

29. Riemer interviews, No. 24; also No. 23. Compare *Bolshevik*, January, 1951; also *Nauka i Zhizn*, October, 1950, pp. 42–46.

30. The seriousness with which the Bolsheviks regard this kind of hostility to their rule was manifested in recent years in an increasing number of inmates in concentration camps known as the *A[illegible]dotchiki*.

31. See on this point M. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

32. Compare E. Stevens, *op. cit.*, *Christian Science Monitor*, October 25, 1949, p. 1.

33. Compare *Nauka i Zhizn*, October, 1950, pp. 42–46; also *Bolshevik*, January, 1951.

34. See John Steinbeck, *Russian Diary*, (New York), pp. 44–45; also Charles Ciliberti, *Backstairs Mission in Moscow*, (New York, 1946), p. 26.

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1. M. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

2. *Vetnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, October, 1950, Editorial.

3. G. Maximoff, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

4. E. Stevens, *op. cit.*, December 29, 1949.

5. Compare *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, September 20, 1950.

6. Report to the 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU. See also *Trud*, August 5, 1952, p. 2.

7. General W. B. Smith, "My Three Years in Moscow," *The New York Times*, November 11, 1949.

8. E. Stevens, *op. cit.*, October 18, 1949.

9. E. Stevens, *op. cit.*, Dec. 24, 1949. See also P. Miliukov, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 114–116.

10. *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, October, 1950, pp. 99–108.

11. Compare *Bloknot Agitatora*, agitator's notebook published several times a month by propaganda and agitation sections (*Agitprop*) of Party committees.

12. *Pravda*, January 20, 1947.

13. B. Yesipov and N. Goncharov, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 70.

14. K. Simonov, *Stikhi, Piesy, Rasskazy*, (Moscow, 1949), p. 137.

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15. A. Tolstoy, *Sochinenia,* (Moscow, 1950), Vol. 14, p. 207.

16. Mikhail Sholokhov, *Nauka Nenavisti,* (Moscow, 1944).

17. *History of the Communist Party, op. cit.,* pp. 359–60.

18. Compare *History of the Communist Party, op. cit.,* pp. 346–348.

19. A. Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State, op. cit.,* pp. 1–41.

20. A. Vyshinsky, "Predislovie," in T. V. Averbah, *Ot Prestuplenia k Trudu,* (Ogiz, 1936). See also *The New Phase in the Soviet Union,* report to the enlarged Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, February 25, 1920, (New York, 1930), pp. 25–26.

21. Lenin, *The Infantile Sickness of Leftism,* (New York, 1920), p. 42; see also pp. 57, 59, 64, 89, 96.

22. Lenin, *Selected Works,* Vol. 7, p. 297.

23. See, for instance, *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* November 24, 1951, p. 2.

24. Yesipov and Goncharov, *op. cit.,* p. 72.

25. Compare Alexander Barmin, *One Who Survived,* (New York, 1945), pp. 319, 321.

26. R. E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* (New York, 1950), p. 793; see also the memoirs of Winston Churchill in *Life,* Oct. 30, 1950, pp. 95, 104–106.

27. See General Eisenhower, *op. cit.,* pp. 467–470; also General J. Dean, *Strange Alliance,* (New York, 1946).

28. General Carl Spaatz, "The Prospects for Victory in Korea," *Newsweek,* Sept. 4, 1950, p. 18.

29. General Eisenhower, *op. cit.,* p. 469.

30. *VII Congress of the Communist International.* Abridged Stenographic Report of Proceedings, (Moscow, 1939), p. 2, and *Programme of the Communist International,* as adopted at the Sixth World Congress, (Moscow, 1928). See also *The Communist,* October, 1935.

31. *VII Congress of the Communist International, op. cit.,* p. 5; see also pp. 50ff. See also *The Communist,* October, 1935.

32. *The Programme of the Communist International, op. cit.,* pp. 219–220.

33. *Theses and Statutes, op. cit.,* "Role of the Party in the Revolution," Points 13 and 14.

34. *Ibid.,* "Conditions of Admission," Points 12 and 16.

35. *Ibid.,* "Role of the Party in the Revolution," Point 5.

36. *Ibid.,* Points 13 and 14.

37. *Ibid.,* "Statutes," Preamble. See also "Conditions of Admission," Point 17, "Role of the Party in the Proletarian Revolution," Preamble.

38. *Ibid.,* "The Substance of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and of the Soviet Power," Point 2.

39. George Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Communist International in his closing address to the Seventh Congress, *Seventh Congress of the Communist International, The Communist* (A Magazine of the Theory and Practice of Marxism Leninism) October, 1935. Compare the draft of the new statute CPSU, Art. 3a.

40. *Constitution of People's Republic of Hungary,* Preamble. See also the Preamble to the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of May 9, 1948.

41. The "people's democracies" of the Orient which rose on the ashes of colonialism are said to be "dictatorships of the proletariat and the peasantry."

42. See, for instance, *Pravda,* August 23, 1950.

43. Jacob Berman, Member, Political Bureau, United Workers' Party of Poland, "Role of the Soviet Union in Establishing New Democracies," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy,* Organ of the Information Bureau

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of the Communist and Workers' Parties, Bucharest, March 15, 1949. See also Tito's speech to Yugoslav miners, *Borba*, Zagreb, Sept. 13, 1949. See also Milentie Popović, "O Ekonomskim odnosima imedju socialističkih zemalja" (About the economic relations between socialist countries), *Borba*, Zagreb, Sept. 17, 1949. Also *Politika*, Belgrade, April 23, 1950.

44. Compare D. and E. Rodnick, "Communist Personality Types in Czechoslovakia," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring, 1950, pp. 81–88.

45. A. Zawadski, Secretary, Central Committee, United Workers' Party of Poland, *For a Lasting Peace, op. cit.*, Nov. 4, 1949. See also Boleslaw Bierut, Chairman of the Polish Communist Party, Central Committee, and President of Poland in his speech before the Party's Central Committee in November, 1949.

46. Joseph Chisinevschi, *For a Lasting Peace, op. cit.*, Sept. 30, 1949.

47. From the text of the Communiqué made public by the Cominform, Nov. 30, 1949.

48. Such a policy, which was contrary to the established pattern of Soviet expansion, was the result of an agreement in October, 1944, between Churchill and Stalin about joint control of Yugoslavia on a fifty-fifty basis. (See about this agreement in *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, (New York, 1948), Vol. 2, pp. 451–458; also in R. R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians*, (New York, 1949), pp. 12–13. The Bolsheviks therefore withdrew their armed forces to avoid joint occupation of the country with the British troops, figuring that as long as the British troops were kept out of Yugoslavia complete Communist control over that country which was led by a Stalinist faction would be safeguarded.

49. See *Letter from Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union to Comrade Tito*, March 27, 1948. Also *Letter from CCCPSU to Central Committee of Communist Party of Yugoslavia*, May 4, 1948. English texts of these and other letters quoted in this article are published in *Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, (London, 1948).

50. *Letter from CCCPSU to Comrade Tito, op. cit.*, see also *Letter from CCCPSU to CCCPY*, May 4, 1948, *op. cit.*

51. *Letter from CCCPSU to Comrade Tito, op. cit.*

52. *Letter from Tito and Kardel to Stalin and Molotov*, April 13, 1948.

53. See Tito's article in *Life*, May 12, 1952.

54. *Ibid.*

55. Compare articles of Milovan Djilas, Member Politburo, Yugoslav Communist Party, in *Borba*, Zagreb, Sept. 8 to Sept. 12, 1949.

56. Compare the address of Edward Kardelj, Member Politburo, Yugoslav Communist Party, before the Academy of Science, Ljubliana. Text published in *Yugoslav Fortnightly*, January, 1950.

57. General Prochazka, Czechoslovakia's Army Chief of Staff, quoted by *Tvorba*, Communist weekly, Prague. See *United Press* dispatch from Prague, *New York Times*, May 12, 1950.

58. Gerard Friters, *Outer Mongolia*, (Baltimore, 1949), p. xxxvii.

59. Marshal R. Rokossovsky, a Polish-born but Russian-trained Soviet officer, was appointed the Commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces, Minister of National Defense and member of the Politburo of the Polish Communist Party.

60. Vladimir Houdek, Czechoslovak representative in the United Nations in his statement to the Press at the occasion of his resignation, *The New York Times*, May 17, 1950.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*

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